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Foreword
The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to issue, in the
public interest, a new and enlarged edition of Fuller Employ
ment with Less Inflation, which first appeared as an Institute
staff paper in January 1969. The continuing timeliness of the
original title attests to the potential value of the incorporated
essays to students of the contemporary economic scene. The
contents should prove of interest not only to professional
economists and statisticians but also to legislators, govern
ment policymakers, and the general public.
This edition adds six essays to the four that made up its
predecessor. Two of the six (Nos. 6 and 8) have been printed
earlier under the Institute's auspices. The author's prepared
statement and answers to supplementary questions on the
report of the Kerner Commission (No. 6) were published as a
staff paper of the Institute in 1969 as well as in hearings of
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. The
other essay (No. 8) served as the introductory chapter to a
volume based on the twentieth anniversary conference of the
Institute; the volume was published by Augustus M. Kelley
in 1967 by arrangement with the Institute, which also holds
the copyright.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are
the sole responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not
necessarily represent the positions of the W.E. Upjohn In
stitute for Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan
July 1981
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Preface
The ten essays comprising this enlarged edition of Fuller
Employment with Less Inflation are presented in reverse
chronological order of their preparation. Four of the ten
(Nos. 5, 7, 9, and 10) constituted the original 1969 edition.
These four and two others (Nos. 6 and 8) were written and
published while I was a staff member of the W.E. Upjohn
Institute (1965-70) located at its Washington office. The re
maining four essays (Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4) are of more recent
vintage; and, of these, the first (No. 1) was prepared
especially for this enlarged edition.
From the beginning of my professional career, I had been
interested in inflation and employment as separate areas of
research; then, during my years with the Eisenhower Council
of Economic Advisers (1953-60), I found good reason to join
the two. In 1934-36, under the tutelage of Professor Willford
I. King, I became acquainted with the histories and statistics
of major inflations, both old and new—in the American col
onies, the United States, Great Britain, and continental
Europe. In 1936-39, as a statistician with the WPA National
Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Re
cent Changes in Industrial Techniques, I was initiated into
the mysteries of productivity measurement and learned
about problems and data relating to employment and
unemployment. I continued work in these areas at the Na
tional Bureau of Economic Research and the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics in 1939-43, until my entry into military ser
vice. In the course of my further graduate studies at Colum
bia in 1939-41, I benefited from association with Professors
James W. Angell, Milton Friedman, Carter Goodrich,
Frederick C. Mills, and Leo Wolman. As a member of the
senior economic staff of the Council of Economic Advisers,
for which position I was recruited by Dr. Arthur F. Burns, I
Vll

participated in the preparation of eight Economic Reports of
the President, daily pondered the optimal implementation of
the Delphic declaration of policy (Section 2) of the Employ
ment Act of 1946, and witnessed the emerging phenomenon
of coexisting high rates of unemployment and price advance.
In the interval between the last essay (1966) and the first
(1980) in this new volume, the original title of 1969 has
freshened rather than staled. With the passage of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, which extensively revised
the Employment Act of 1946, inflation became an explicit
concern of federal economic policy, coordinate with employ
ment. Furthermore, the 1980 elections convinced politicians
that the general public, after enduring a decade and a half of
the New Ordeal, really perceived an "issue" in chronic price
rise with chronic joblessness and hungered for a credible pro
mise of corrective action.
Considered together, the ten essays that follow represent a
"time core," or chronological sampling, of my views on the
inflation-unemployment syndrome of 1965-80. They reflect
an early and continuing eagerness to arrest or cure the
disease while it was easier to do so and while many promi
nent economists remained calmly indifferent, routinely op
timistic, or disdainfully aloof. The essays repeatedly address
the problems of designing (1) appropriate statistics for the
benign administration of wage-price guidelines with com
pany self-monitoring; and (2) appropriate auxiliary
measures for mitigating the unemployment side-effects of a
necessary resort to monetary leeches and fiscal tourni
quets—the crude remedies that are universally prescribed for
draining a systemic inflationary fever.
The auxiliary measures that are sketched in several essays
would provide incentives for individuals to abandon infla
tionary behavior voluntarily. In particular, they would offer
protection via tax credits or low-interest bonds redeemable at
Vlll

public convenience of the real earnings of wage and salary
workers who accept pay rises no greater than the projected
near-term rate of gain in national productivity (or zero rises
if this rate is negative). The same principle of protection
could be adapted to personal savings and to the profits of
price-restraining firms. In short, I believe that it is possible
to design, and that it would be foolhardy to reject out of
hand, "bridging" programs for encouragement of quick and
substantial (1) restraint of unit labor cost and (2) increase in
the ratio of non-inflaters to witting or unwitting inflationmongers. It is not necessary for a society to court inadvertent
death by unemployment in the shorter run through zealous
and exclusive concentration on the standard remedies for
avoidance of death by inflation in the longer run.
The essays that make up this volume should, like those in
cluded in the first edition, appeal on different levels to a wide
spectrum of readers. Two, Nos. 3 and 6, were prepared in
response to invitations from the Joint Economic Committee
of the U.S. Congress, which I served as a member of its ad
visory panel in 1967-72; and two others, Nos. 4 and 9, were
reprinted by this Committee. The Congressional Record also
reprinted two—Nos. 4 and 5. In the new political setting,
more readers are likely to take seriously the proposal of in
centives for noninflationary pay behavior if it is tendered as
part of a "supply-side tax package" than as a variant "in
comes policy."
I am grateful to Dr. E. Earl Wright, Director of the W.E.
Upjohn Institute, for his encouragement in the preparation
of this book.
Irving H. Siegel

Bethesda, Maryland
December 1980
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1
Looking Backward
and Forward
Orientation
This essay, which briefly surveys the nation's recent
economic performance and the variety of informed opinion
concerning needed corrective policy, is intended particularly
as background reading for the nine essays that follow it. All
of the nine have been published previously. Indeed, four of
them comprised the slimmer 1969 edition of this book. The
original title of 1969 has been retained for this new enlarged
edition because it has become even more apt with the passage
of time.
In the interval between the two editions, politicians,
policymakers, and professional economists in general have
come to recognize the durability of a phenomenon that they
had been inclined to regard as transient: the coexistence of
high rates of unemployment and of wage-price increase. Of
ficeholders learned in the 1976 and 1980 election campaigns
that the waggish "misery" or "discomfort" index, which
merely summed together the unemployment and inflation
rates, could change from a toy to a dangerous weapon in the
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hands of officeseekers. 1 Zealous economic fac
tions—monetarists, rational expectationists, supply-siders,
and post-Keynesians—have emerged to challenge and mock
the "neoclassical synthesis," the paradigm that reigned
supreme in macroeconomic textbooks since the end of World
War II yet failed
to suggest how the goals of full employment and
price stability could be achieved conjointly, thus
avoiding the need to make a Phillipsian choice be
tween the two—or even to explain how recession
and inflation could occur simultaneously, as they
did throughout the 1970s. 2
The Phillips curve itself started as a simple statement of
trade-off between unemployment and inflation, but it has
had to undergo extensive reformulation for continuing ser-

1. The "discomfort" designation is often attributed to A.M. Okun. Candidate Carter used
the adjective "misery" in taunting incumbent Ford in 1976; in 1980, incumbent Carter was,
in turn, the target.
Instead of simply adding the annual percentage change in prices to the average annual
rate of unemployment, some index makers have proposed (1) the introduction of weights
and (2) the inclusion of the annual percentage in Gross National Product as a third compo
nent with a negative weight. See, for example, a letter to The Economist (London),
November 29, 1980, p. 6.
2. A.S. Eichner, "Introduction," in A.S. Eichner, ed., A Guide to Post-Keynesian
Economics, M.E. Sharpe, White Plains, 1979, p. 10.
The attack on ruling doctrine is well described in a special issue of The Public Interest,
1980, entitled "The Crisis in Economic Theory," especially these four articles: J.W. Dean,
"The Dissolution of the Keynesian Consensus," pp. 19-34; A.H. Meltzer, "Monetarism
and the Crisis in Economics," pp. 35-45; M.H. Willes, " 'Rational Expectations' as a
Counterrevolution," pp. 81-96; and Paul Davidson, "Post Keynesian Economics: Solving
the Crisis in Economic Theory," pp. 151-173. Another informative paper is by Brian Kantor, "Rational Expectations and Economic Thought," Journal of Economic Literature,
December 1979, pp. 1422-1441. It should be noted, in passing, that Keynes was too broad
and complex a thinker to be characterized as a "Keynesian" in the sense in which this ad
jective has commonly been used since his death in 1946. On this point, see, for example,
T.M. Humphrey, "Keynes on Inflation," in 1980 Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, pp. 5-16.
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viceability as a tool of analysis and econometric estimation. 3
In 1978, the Employment Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-304), which
expressed a federal resolve "to promote maximum employ
ment, production, and purchasing power," was at last revis
ed to include the additional explicit resolve of promoting
"reasonable price stability."
The remainder of this essay is organized into four sections.
The first reviews the nation's experience of unemployment
and inflation since the end of World War II in context with
the Employment Act and the law that drastically amended it
in 1978, the (Humphrey-Hawkins) Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act (P.L. 95-523). The second section ex
amines the sources of the inflation that has persisted since
the mid-1960s and that has occasioned the preparation of the
two editions of this book. The third section samples the
views of economic and other experts on the prospects and
methods of disinflation and the restoration of wholesome
growth. The concluding section comments on the need—and
a way—to mitigate the unemployment side-effects of a prob
able major campaign to achieve disinflation.
By design, this essay is confined to literature and other
public information available in 1980. Accordingly, it does
3. Illustrative of the writings on the evolving Phillips curve are: two papers by Milton
Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, March 1968, pp.
1-17, and "Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, June 1977, pp.
457-472; E.S. Phelps, "Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation, and Optimal Employ
ment Over Time," Economica, August 1967, pp. 254-281; G.L. Perry, "Slowing the WagePrice Spiral," in A.M. Okun and G.L. Perry, eds., Curing Chronic Inflation, Brookings
Institution, Washington, 1978, pp. 23-55; G.L. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice,"
in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1980, pp. 207-241; Philip Cagan, Persistent
Inflation: Historical and Policy Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979,
especially Chapter 8 on "The Reduction of Inflation and the Magnitude of
Unemployment," and Chapter 9 on "The Relation of Inflation to Slack Demand"; Gennifer Sussman, "A Summary and Critique of the McCracken Report," an appendix to
C.E. Beigie, Inflation Is a Social Malady, British-North American Committee, March
1979, pp. 60-72; T.M. Humphrey, "Changing Views of the Phillips Curve," in his Essays
on Inflation, 2d ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1980, pp. 62-73; and idem,
"Some Recent Developments in Phillips Curve Analysis," ibid., pp. 74-82.
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not presume to predict or prejudge the final economic agen
da of the new Reagan Administration. It does, however, take
some cognizance of viewpoints and proposals that have ac
quired greater political authority as a result of the November
elections.

Between—and Behind—the Acts
Although the declared purposes of the Employment Act
and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act have commonly beer
characterized as "commitments" or "mandates," they are
better described as unfulfillable "resolves" or breakable
"pledges." The first pair of words have a solemn and uncon
ditional ring already belied by initial experience in ad
ministration of the 1978 law—as well as by the long history
of argumentation over the practical meaning of the 1946 law.
Reality stands in no awe of congressional or executive
rhetoric, and nowhere has it flouted federal fiat more plainly
than in the quest for high-level employment with stable
prices.
The heart of the landmark Employment Act of 1946 was a
single 11-line sentence constituting a "Declaration of
Policy" (Section 2), and the arms were a new Council of
Economic Advisers (which would assist the president in
preparation of an annual report) and a joint congressional
committee (which would receive and review the report). The
single sentence asserted, but with eager qualification, a
"continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal govern
ment" to promote the three objectives already cited. Despite
the minimal machinery and the omission of any explicit
reference to stable prices, no president in office between
1946 and 1978 ever felt inhibited from taking steps to deter
or counteract inflation. If authority were deemed necessary,
it could always have been read into the notion of maximum
"purchasing power."
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The Humphrey-Hawkins Act announced quantitative
unemployment and disinflation objectives and dates for
substantial progress toward them. Thus, as provisional
unemployment goals for 1983, it specified reduction of the
jobless rate for the labor force as a whole to 4 percent and of
the rate for persons 20 years old and older to 3 percent; and
it also aimed for moderation of the rise in the Consumer
Price Index to 3 percent by the same year. Furthermore, it
contemplated achievement of still lower unemployment rates
corresponding to "full employment" by some unstated later
date; and it called for a "zero" price rise by 1988. But the
law has a loophole: It allowed revision of the indicated
schedules, and the president (and the Congress) exercised the
permitted option to defer at the earliest opportunity! The
1978 commitment, then, is no firmer than the 1946 resolve;
and, although jobs and prices seem to have become twin
pillars of public policy, they also remain the horns of a
dilemma of policy.
Historically, it is as easy to explain omission of price
restraint from the 1946 charter for federal involvement in the
functioning of the economy as to explain inclusion in the
1978 amendments. During World War II, formal controls
masked the inflationary potential that would burst into being
in the aftermath. Meanwhile, full or overfull employment
was discovered to be feasible—a welcome contrast to the
idleness of the 1930s, when price "reflation" was also deem
ed healthier than further price reduction. Before 1946, the
bear and the bull were the best-known members of the
popular and professional economic bestiary, and the spoor
of "stagflation" was not yet suspected. Existence of the new
brute was hinted in the 1950s and 1960s but did not become
confirmed until the 1970s.
Funny things can—and do—happen to a bill on the way
through a quorum, as anyone acquainted with our nation's
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legislative process is aware. S. 380, wishfully called the "Full
Employment Act of 1945," lost its adjective and its principal
parts in a familiar rite of passage. It was replaced by the far
less ambitious Employment Act of 1946, which represented
the maximum consensus attainable at the time. 4 This law has
often since been miscalled the "Full Employment Act of
1946"—out of defiance, nostalgia, or simple ignorance. On
the other hand, some of the strong supporters of S. 380 later
came to recognize that its failure to become law was prov
idential to the reputation of economists and that the
Employment Act of 1946 was not a hollow mockery after
all. 5
With the unexpected maintenance of high-level employ
ment after World War II, attention soon shifted to the prob
lem of price moderation in the decontrolled economy. How
many of the unhappy warriors who would not forgive or
forget the Capitol crime against S. 380 have remembered
that President Truman called the Congress into special ses
sion in November 1947 to consider a 10-point program for
dealing sternly with the post-control price explosion?
Truman's phrase, "do-nothing Congress," still lingers in the
ear; but who recalls that the plausibility of this bit of cam
paign hyperbole rested in part on the failure of a second
special session to accept the president's anti-inflation pro4. The evolution of S. 380 into the Employment Act has been recounted by S.K. Bailey,
Congress Makes a Law, Vintage Books, New York, 1964.
5. Robert Lekachman refers in The Age of Keynes, Vintage Books, 1966, p. 173, to the
"unwitting service to the reputation of economists" done by the Congress in rejection of
the "key section" of S. 380. J.K. Galbraith adds, in Money: Whence It Came, Where It
Went, New York, Bantam Books, 1976, p. 323: "It is doubtful if those who participated in
the first drafting of S. 380 . . . would, in the light of later history, have asked for much
more." Contrary to a common impression, L.H. Keyserling, who had served in the
Truman Council of Economic Advisers, did not share in the "liberal" enthusiasm for S.
380 and also considers the Employment Act preferable; see his "The Council of Economic
Advisers since 1946: Its Contributions and Failures," Atlantic Economic Journal, March
1978, pp. 17-19.
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posals in June 1948? 6 Furthermore, how many of today's
"liberal" admirers of Truman know that his Council of
Economic Advisers was already expressing concern that col
lective bargaining imparted an upward bias to prices?
In the 1950s, the increasing inflation-proneness of the
economy was concealed only temporarily by the strict wageprice controls prompted by the Korean conflict. Before the
end of the first Eisenhower term and well into the second,
upthrusting industrial prices caused considerable official
alarm. The practice of "fiscal prudence" and the preach
ment of wage-price-productivity truisms had little evident ef
fect; but, at high cost in unemployment (which could have
influenced critically the outcome of the 1960 presidential
election), tough monetary measures did help to rein in prices
by the end of the decade. Some economists were coming to
see that inflation was the head of a price coin and deflation
the tail of an employment coin, so that both of these faces
could show simultaneously.
The price bulge manifested in the middle Eisenhower years
was negligible compared to the uptrend of 1965-80, but it
provoked sharp and quick dismay—as did also the price up
surge that followed the lifting of World War II controls. The
slow public responsiveness after the 1940s and 1950s need
not show that the nerves improve with the aggravation of the
inflationary disease. Rather, it may be another sign of the
ease with which a wealthy, developed country could, at last
irreversibly, turn into another volatile and frenetic manana
republic.
In the 1960 and 1961 Economic Report of the President,
the last two of the Eisenhower Administration, the earlier
price bulge was still remembered: The suggestion was made
6. J.G. Knapp, Edwin G. Nourse—Economist for the People, Danville, IL, Interstate
Printers and Publishers, 1979, pp. 263-64 and 280-81.

8

Looking Backward & Forward (1980)

that the Employment Act be amended to include reasonable
price stability as a fourth explicit objective. Perhaps, it is not
irrelevant that two of the three members of the Council of
Economic Advisers at the time had experienced the
disastrous German hyperinflation of the early 1920s.
The 1960s began with great expectations of a New
Economics on a New Frontier, proceeded to inauguration of
a Great Society, and ended in a New Ordeal of inflation that
still rages. In the first half of the decade, unemployment was
reduced dramatically with little price advance—thanks to the
legacy of Eisenhower slack, to the adoption of wage-priceproductivity "guideposts" and their occasional reinforce
ment with presidential threats, and to the bold and
overcelebrated tax cut of 1964. In the second half of the
decade, while the New Economics was still congratulating
itself, fiscal discipline broke down; increasing involvement in
Vietnam, the expansion of "uncontrollable" expenditures
for social welfare, and rising private demand required some
reversal of the 1964 tax cut, but a new levy could not be
enacted promptly. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, the practi
tioners of economic activism found that it was easier to turn
on the fiscal taps than to turn them off.
In the 1970s, unemployment and inflation finally became
recognized by the media and political leaders as inseparable
and significant "issues." Recessions engineered during the
decade through monetary actions clearly destroyed jobs but
failed to reduce the rate at which unit production costs were
advancing. Unemployment, furthermore, was worsened by
intense foreign competition on our own terrain as well as in
markets abroad. Robust productivity gains could no longer
be expected to diminish the labor-cost impact of unabating
wage rises. A serial revolution in the price of petroleum im
ports, crop failures, and material shortages also contributed
to the upward pressure on costs.
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Two presidents felt required to try to block the tide. In
August 1971, mandatory wage-price controls were suddenly
and surprisingly instituted; in 1973, they were inopportunely
dismantled. Another try at restraint was initiated in October
1978, the same month that the Humphrey-Hawkins Act was
signed into law; but the new voluntary curbs have proved as
ineffectual as their timid and flawed design foreshadowed.
In its 22 discursive pages, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of
1978 seeks "to strengthen and supplement the purposes and
policies of the Employment Act of 1946." Its Section 102
lengthens the 11-line sentence constituting Section 2 of the
1946 law into a 17-line sentence plus 9 largely redundant ex
planatory paragraphs. The extended sentence upgrades the
original employment and production objectives from "max
imum" to "full," translates the ambiguous goal of "max
imum purchasing power" into "increased real income," and
finally adds the goal of "reasonable price stability." It
grandly asserts still other economic goals of the heart's
desire: "balanced growth, a balanced federal budget, ade
quate productivity growth, proper attention to national
priorities," and "achievement of an improved trade balance
through increased exports and improvement in ... interna
tional competitiveness."
Although the rest of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act offers
hints as to priorities and preferences as to procedures, any
conscientious administrator could distill only equivocal and
incomplete guidance therefrom. The trouble is that the many
stated objectives have long proved difficult to attain, singly
as well as in combination, in the refractory world in which
we are obliged to live. In such a world, one might be tempted
to dismiss the 1978 Act as a mere manifesto, a "Son of S.
380," a hodgepodge of compromise. Taken seriously, the
Act represents no more of a mandate and no less of a resolve

10
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than its 1946 predecessor. 7 Willy-nilly, implementation
would have to proceed selectively, judiciously, but with eyes
dutifully fixed on all gauges; and different good-faith mixes
of emphasis are conceivable and inevitable. A plausible case
could be made, for example, for heavy reliance on ex
perience gained in administration of the Employment
Act—for accent, accordingly, on attainment of the "best"
practicable combination of near-term jobless and inflation
rates without prejudice to achievement of more distant target
rates. Alternatively, an earnest administrator could start
with the view held by many legislators over the years—that
the Employment Act had "failed" because joblessness has
persisted at intolerable rates, especially for certain visible
categories in the labor force. Accordingly, emphasis would
be placed on "structural" measures, as outlined in Title II of
the 1978 law, for training and placement of disadvantaged
minorities, youths, and other potential or actual members of
the hard-core unemployed, even at the risk, perhaps, of
perceptibly enlarging a few successive federal budgetary
deficits.
The Carter Council of Economic Advisers and the surviv
ing primary cosponsor of the 1978 law have disagreed sharp
ly on the strategy of implementation, taking, roughly, the
two opposing positions just described. The divergence is
especially striking since the Council actively assisted in the
framing of the law. In the 1979 and 1980 Economic Report
of the President, the law was interpreted as a resolve to con
centrate on both unemployment and inflation while
cognizance is taken of other stated economic desiderata.
7. The chairman of the National Commission for Manpower Policy, Eli Ginzberg, refers in
a paper published in 1979 to the "great many compromises" required by the HumphreyHawkins Act "in the final effort to obtain passage" (Clark Kerr and J.M. Rosow, eds.,
Work in America: The Decade Ahead, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, p. 84). In
another reference to the same Act (p. 261), a prominent labor journalist, A.H. Raskin,
speaks of "this belated effort to make real the commitment so artfully fudged in the
Employment Act of 1946"—"the right to a job for everyone willing and able to work."
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From this view, the practical meaning of the law is that it ex
plicitly adds a price dimension to Employment Act goals, re
quires the design and discussion of future numerical paths,
and properly brings the Federal Reserve into the game. As
soon as Section 304 of the law permitted, the president defer
red achievement of the original 1983 target unemployment
rates to 1985 and of the original 1983 target rate for inflation
to 19888—by which time the Consumer Price Index had
originally been scripted to be level. Although no new later
date was given for this leveling, the event has obviously been
postponed to the 1990s.
The surviving principal cosponsor of the 1978 law did not
have to wait for the revision of dates in the 1980 Report to
claim 11 "violations." 9 He found a basis for his charges in
the contents of the 1979 Report and a Budget Message and in
the actions of the pertinent congressional committees. Ac
cording to his interpretation, the reduction of unemploy
ment has a unique near-term priority that cannot be com
promised by any immediate concern for inflationary "trade
off and that must be supported by structural measures
without regard to budgetary consequences. The scenario
calls for full production and full employment first, with
subsequent price stability and budget balance thereby
rendered more achievable. A later statement by the same
congressman ignores the 1980 timetable revisions but renews
charges of wholesale violation of the law and insists on the
need for a budget that is "highly stimulative rather than
8. Economic Report of the President, January 1980, pp. 9-10, 90-97. In The 1980 Joint
Economic Report, Senate Report No. 96-618, 1980, p. 75, the Joint Economic Committee
remarked: "While the necessity of revising these goals is certainly unfortunate, it is equally
necessary to preserve the validity of the Humphrey-Hawkins process by making the
timetable more realistic, particularly in light of long-term economic problems for which
there are no easy short-term solutions."
9. "Optimum Growth, Price Stability and Full Employment," an undated statement issued
"from the office of Congressman Gus Hawkins."
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restrictive." 10 A still later pre-election rebuke of the Carter
Administration for failure to implement the law as a
blueprint for full employment was planned but not carried
out; it was recognized to have much less chance of changing
the president's position than of changing the minds of some
voters. 11
The incoming chairman of the Joint Economic Commit
tee, a veteran congressman who fared better than his party in
November, made a post-election statement reaffirming jobs
and prices as the twin pillars, rather than opposing poles, of
policy and asserting the dominance of both in voter
judgments:
The aim of economic policy is full employment
without inflation. The Democrats have failed to
achieve this aim, and that's why we were thrown
out of office. 12

Genesis of the New Ordeal
As a prelude to examination of the variety of proposed
remedies, we note the rather consistent views of the experts
on the etiology of the economy's inflation-unemployment
disease. In November 1980, the month of critical change in
national leadership, unemployment stood at about 7.5 per
cent of the labor force, the "core" or "underlying" rate of
inflation13 was at or above 9 percent, and a still higher prime
10. Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. 126, No. 63, April 23,1980. The
same general position is taken by Congressman P.J. Mitchell in The 1980 Joint Economic
Report, pp. 106-10.
11. Washington Post, September 27, 1980.
12. Washington Post, November 14, 1980.
13. The "core" rate, referring to price increases attributable to increases in trend costs of
labor and other inputs to production, is distinguished from the contributions of external
"shocks" and excess or deficient "demand." See, for example, Otto Eckstein and Robin
Siegel, "More on Core Inflation," Data Resources U.S. Review, June 1979, pp. 1.19-1.24;
and The 1980 Joint Economic Report, pp. 34-37.
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interest rate that had not yet peaked threatened to throttle a
nascent recovery. For all of its results, the "moral equivalent
of war" to which the nation had been summoned earlier by
President Carter could just as well have been called "oral.'*
Authoritative economists of all persuasions tend to agree
that the nation's economic health began to deteriorate
seriously in the mid-1960s. The patient soon lapsed into an
"age of the second derivative;" 14 hope of stabilization of the
price level was lost, and mere stabilization of the rate of price
increase came to be regarded as a "cure." Errors of neglect,
diagnosis, and treatment were many; but there is also ample
evidence of the poverty and primitiveness of the healing arts,
with doctors not knowing what to do as well as unable to
agree. Here is a retrospective comment offered early in 1980
by a Nixon economic adviser:
Much of our failure to control inflation over the
past fifteen years can be laid to a lag in perceptions.
Inflation first became serious in 1965, but we did
not realize how dangerous it was and so failed to
adopt strong enough measures to restrain it. As
people caught on to the fact that the action was in
adequate, they came to expect prices to go even
higher. These expectations helped fulfill the
prophecy. A self-reinforcing process began that has
made inflation more fearsome and difficult to
bring down . . . , 15
14. Inflation has accustomed economists, and taught the general public, to shift attention
from changes in price (and wage) levels to changes in the rates of increase. See the remarks
by Herbert Stein, "Achieving Credibility," in William Fellner, Project Director, Contem
porary Economic Problems, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1980, p. 46; and by M.N. Baily, in a comment on the first Perry paper cited in
footnote 3 (p. 126).
15. Herbert Stein, "The Failure of Carter's Anti-Inflation Policy," Fortune, March 24,
1980, p. 50.
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A statement offered at about the same time to a congres
sional committee by the only chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers who has also headed the Federal Reserve
System assigns heavy responsibility to the federal govern
ment for the "present virulent inflation." He cites the
government's bias toward stimulus, its interference with
market forces, and its "needlessly expensive ways" of pursu
ing worthwhile improvements in the quality of living. Con
cerning the first of these, he said:
Undue stimulus through fiscal and monetary policy
tends to generate inflationary pressures by causing
the aggregate demand for goods and services to rise
above the level that can be supplied at existing
prices. This is how the current inflation was
precipitated in the fatal year 1965, when our
government sought simultaneously to fight a war in
Vietnam and to launch the Great Society at home
while reducing tax rates instead of raising them. 16
He recalled the "unprecedented effort" of the New
Economics "to accelerate the growth of an already expand
ing economy by a massive cut in business and personal in
come taxes." The gambit "was initially counted as a brilliant
success":
But as our economy was pressed to its limits by ex
pansionist policies, it became highly inflationprone; and the rest is history. 17
A prominent "liberal" economist, from the vantage point
of 1975, saw an ironic parallel in the 1968 Economic Report
16. A.F. Burns, The Perils of Inflation, Reprint No. 110, Washington, American Enter
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1980, pp. 5-6.
17. Ibid., p. 4. Additional pertinent observations by A.F. Burns are scattered through
various papers included in his Reflections of an Economic Policy Maker, Speeches and
Congressional Statements: 1969-1978, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1978.
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of the President and the State of the Union message sent by
Coolidge to the Congress in December 1928; both documents
exuded satisfaction in discovery of the keys to prosperity. He
discusses "four serious flaws" of the New Economics that
are "now wonderfully clear"—the fallibility of forecasting
as a basis for action in advance of need, the inadequacy of
machinery for dealing with excessive market power of cor
porations and unions, the undependability of fiscal policy
for inflation control via tax increase and expenditure reduc
tion, and a misplaced faith in monetary policy. 18
The 1979 Report acknowledged that "the current inflation
has been gathering momentum for over 10 years," at
tributing the acceleration to the addition of Vietnam
pressures to "an economy already approaching high employ
ment." It noted the role of stimulative fiscal and monetary
policies in setting the scene for restrictive actions that bring
recession. But the purgative power of recession, far from
restoring prices to an earlier level, may be overwhelmed by
the power of pro-inflationary behaviors encouraged by prior
inflationary experience:
Once under way, a high rate of inflation generates
responses and adaptations by individuals and in
stitutions that perpetuate the wage-price spiral,
even in periods of economic slack. Expectations
develop that wages and prices will continue to rise
at a rapid rate. . . . The formal and informal adap
tations'to a long-standing inflation exert a powerful
force tending to sustain inflation even after the
originating causes have disappeared. 19
In June 1977, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development published Towards Full Employment and
18. Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 326 ff.

19. Economic Report of the President, January 1979, p. 55.
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Price Stability, the report of a "group of independent ex
perts" headed by a former chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers. 20 The introduction to the report
observes that "disquietingly high" rates of unemployment
and inflation have followed the unprecedented growth that
the Western nations enjoyed in the quarter century after
World War II. The title of the first chapter asks "what went
wrong," and the first sentence proceeds to answer:
Going back to the 1960s, in the United States,
failure adequately to finance the war in Vietnam
and major new social programmes through higher
taxes led to increasing excess demand, despite
monetary restraint.
The chapter continues with a doleful synopsis of events and
actions in the United States and Europe up to the fragile
recovery of mid-1975. It concludes that the inflation of the
1960s originated in labor markets while the inflation of the
early 1970s originated in product markets (especially for
petroleum and various crops); that the combination of
"policy errors" (fiscal and monetary excesses) and supply
"shocks" has built up stubborn inflationary expectations
and hampered the growth of output and employment.
In an article published in 1980, a Kennedy economic ad
viser made some observations that seem appropriate not only
for concluding this section but also for introducing the next.
He suggested "two interpretations of U.S. inflationary
history since 1965" that lead in different policy directions:
One blames mistaken demand-management
policies—they aimed at overfull employment, ac
commodated too readily existing inflation and in
flationary shocks, intervened too promptly and
20. The so-called "McCracken Report," to which reference was made in a work cited in
footnote 3.
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energetically to arrest recessions and speed
recoveries. According to this thesis, correct policies
can bring price stability plus realistically full
employment.
The other interpretation depends on the view that
the price- and wage-setting institutions of the
economy have an inflationary bias. Consequently,
demand management cannot stabilize the price
trend without chronic sacrifice of output and
employment unless it is assisted, occasionally or
permanently, by direct incomes policies of some
kind. According to this second thesis, there is little
hope that monetary and fiscal disinflation alone
will cure the current stagflation. 21
While conceding "important elements of truth" in the first
interpretation of developments since 1965, he finds it "very
difficult to reject the hypothesis of structural inflationary
bias." 22

"Redeem the Dream"
The threat posed by unchecked inflation to the efficiency
of our economy and to the viability of our political system
and society has stimulated considerable thought and writing
on remedies. The prescribed regimens for draining the infla
tionary fever vary in emphasis, details, and feasibility; in
time requirements; in the kind, extent, and socioeconomic
distribution of the sacrifices still demanded and in their pros
pects of success. As might be expected, some plans solve by
assumption various subproblems that other plans consider to
be critical. It is also true that, in general, and for lack of
knowledge rather than lack of concern, the goal of full
21. James Tobin, "Stabilization Policy Ten Years After," Brookings Papers on Economic
Policy, 1:1980, p. 64.
22. Ibid., p. 65.
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employment is temporarily subordinated or ignored in belief
that disinflation is the prerequisite to the possible attain
ment. Explicitly or implicitly, furthermore, the HumphreyHawkins interpretation of the paramountcy of the employ
ment goal, even in current circumstances, is rejected or
unaddressed. On the other hand, proposals for disinflation
tend to minimize or overlook the possible need to deal with
concomitant increases in the incidence and severity of
unemployment. A sampling of the views expressed in the
very recent literature follows.
In a 1980 essay, the Nixon economic adviser cited in the
preceding section reviewed four strategies and expressed his
strong preference for the fourth, which he calls "committed
gradualism." The other three involve: improbable and risky
"shock treatment," an attempt to enforce zero inflation or
something like it by sudden and drastic reduction of the
growth rate of the money supply or of nominal (i.e., currentdollar) Gross National Product; restoration of some sort of
linkage of the money supply to gold; and adoption of a con
stitutional amendment imposing restraints on fiscal and
monetary management. The one-time Nixon adviser
observes that, in our country, "gradualism" (an intent to
disinflate over a period of uncertain duration in which
unemployment would remain a bit above the "natural rate")
has "lost credibility" only because it has not been pursued
"with the necessary persistence." The trick is to substitute
"committed gradualism"—a five-year program of determin
ed fiscal and monetary actions, undertaken with strong
presidential leadership, bipartisan congressional support,
and cooperation of the Federal Reserve, that could, if car
ried out without digression or dilution, lead to an annual rate
of price increase that is below 2 percent and to an annual rate
of increase in the nominal Gross National Product that is,
say, 4 percent. Changes would be required in budgetary pro
cedures, but the program would eschew any explicit effort to
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restrain prices or wages or to meet a predesignated
unemployment target rate. The former Nixon aide concedes
that the opportunities for abandonment of "commitment"
and for reversion to "short-run politics as usual" cannot be
ruled out. 23
In the same 1980 testimony that was cited in the preceding
section, a former Federal Reserve chairman likewise ex
presses impatience with the familiar "gradualism," which
calls for "mild measures over a period of five to ten years"
but is vulnerable to "premature suspension or abandonment
in practice." For "real headway," it is "essential to rout in
flationary psychology," toward which end he proposes four
kinds of action. The first is to revise the budget process so
that Congress takes more responsibility for the legislation of
deficits. (It should now consider cutting federal expen
ditures, especially by weakening the role of "indexing" in
Social Security and other entitlements.) The second is to at
tenuate the cost-increasing effects of regulation. (He refers
to the Davis-Bacon Act and laws concerning environment,
health, and safety.) The third is congressional endorsement,
by concurrent resolution, of Federal Reserve efforts to com
bat inflation by monetary means. The fourth is reduction of
business taxes over a five- to seven-year period (small in the
first two) to stimulate capital expansion and productivity
growth. 24
Kindred proposals were made in a paper issued by a
distinguished Committee to Fight Inflation in June 1980.
They include a curb on deficit-proneness of the Congress,
support of the Federal Reserve's counterinflationary disposi
tion, inhibition of government tendencies to raise prices by
interference with the competitive process and by subjection
of industry to excessive or overzealous regulation, tax relief
23. Stein, "Achieving Credibility," loc. cit., pp. 68-73.
24. Burns, The Perils of Inflation, pp. 9-10.
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for business, other measures to raise productivity (e.g., in
crease in outlays for research and development and establish
ment of intracompany productivity councils), and en
couragement of domestic energy production and conserva
tion by rapid decontrol of oil prices and addition of con
sumption taxes. 25
The same Committee to Fight Inflation was encouraged by
the Reagan election to issue another policy statement in
December 1980. 26 In view of "significant changes ... in the
political and social environment," it proposed a nine-point
program that contemplated:
1. Reduction of projected federal expenditures for fiscal
year 1981 (including off-budget outlays) by at least 2 per
cent.
2. Stimulation of "productivity-enhancing" capital in
vestment through reduction of business taxes for calendar
year 1981 and through additional tax and expenditure cuts
for fiscal year 1982.
3. Requirement of budget balance beginning with fiscal
year 1983 unless a deficit is authorized by a majority in each
house of Congress.
4. Establishment of a commission to explore ways to
reduce the cost increase of entitlement programs.
5. Support of monetary policies that would constrain
growth of the money supply over the next three or four years
to rates "consistent with a stable consumer price level."
6. Adoption of youth differential in the minimum wage
and rescission or amendment of the Davis-Bacon Act.
25. A Policy Statement, Committee to Fight Inflation, Washington, June 23, 1980.
(Available from American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.)
26. Second Policy Statement, Committee to Fight Inflation, Washington, December 24,
1980. (Also available from American Enterprise Institute.)
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7. Revision of environmental, health, and safety regula
tions to ensure achievement of "basic national
objectives ... at minimum feasible cost."
8. Promotion of labor-management cooperation at the
company level on behalf of productivity improvement.
9. Early decontrol of prices of oil and natural gas in the in
terest of increasing domestic energy production.
A prescription offered in 1980 by a venerable Nobel
economist residing in Britain unintentionally illuminates two
of the dangerous social challenges that would confront na
tions desirous of quickly descending from an inflationary or
bit to the preferred ground of stable prices. One major
challenge would arise from intense unemployment during an
indefinitely "short" period of, say, a half year. The second
involves exacerbation of intergenerational conflict, not only
over the distribution of burdens and benefits but also over
the tolerable length of the adjustment period. The renowned
economist favors drastic monetary and fiscal measures to
halt inflation in its tracks. He opposes gradualism as ineffec
tual, especially in the presence of strong unions. At least for
Britain, he regards an unemployment rate of 20 percent for
six months as politically more feasible than a rate of 10 per
cent extending over three years. He would not heed com
plaints about high interest rates and would welcome
bankruptcies that weed out weak managements and ineffi
cient firms. He is against government intervention to help
channel investment funds into ailing basic industries, such as
automobiles and steel. Cautious about the claim of "supplyside" economics that a large marginal tax cut would induce
substantial revenue increase, he is "afraid it may lead to
large budget deficits and more inflation." 27
27. From interviews with Friedrich von Hayek reported in Business Week, December 15,
1980, p. 110, and Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1980.
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A controversial line of attack on "rational expectations"
of continuing brisk inflation rates acquired prominence dur
ing the 1980 presidential campaign. The centerpiece of this
program would be a three-year series of substantial reduc
tions in federal tax rates. These cuts would be accompanied
by sharp curtailment of nondefense expenditures, en
couragement of business outlays to increase capital invest
ment and revive productivity, and alleviation of the burden
of regulation on industry. The scenario also envisages a con
genial monetary policy. The program is supposed to reduce
the interest rates demanded by lenders and to raise
dramatically the propensity to save. Many economists fear
that attempts to carry out the program will actually ag
gravate the inflation. In any case, a transition period of
dislocation and unemployment cannot be skipped before
"normalcy" is restored. 28
The program just described is rooted in "supply-side"
economics, which has an appealing optimistic cast. Thus,
even before the election month in 1980, the majority and
minority members of the Joint Economic Committee were
able to issue a unified annual report emphasizing "supplyside" measures rather than continuing efforts at demand
management. They envisaged a coordinated attack on infla
tion and unemployment by adoption of a pro-growth
package of "consistent and mutually reinforcing" policies.
Thus, inflation would be fought by gradual and sustained
slowdown in the expansion of the money supply and by
gradual reduction of the federal share of the Gross National
28. "Reagan's Top Problem: Braking Inflation Expectations," Business Week, December
1, 1980, pp. 104-10.
It appears from a new Louis Harris poll that "a clear 55-to-41 percent majority of
Americans opposes any cut in the federal income tax"—"despite the high priority that the
incoming administration of Ronald Reagan has given to a 10 percent federal tax cut." The
public's reluctance reflects belief that "such a cut would be inflationary." On the other
hand, the same poll shows a 63-to-29 percent majority in favor of tax incentives for
business investment. (Reported in Washington Post, December 1, 1980.)
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Product. General unemployment would be fought by
stimulation of economic growth through tax reductions that
offer incentives to invest, save, work, and produce. Struc
tural unemployment would be fought by realistic on-the-job
training in the private sector. 29
In May 1980, a tax expert who is a strong advocate of
"supply-side" economics told the Joint Economic Commit
tee that incentives could be used skillfully to combat both
unemployment and inflation—as the Committee had already
decided in its review of the President's Economic Report. He
would shift the focus of attention in policy from aggregates
to the marginal decisions of individuals, households, and
firms in response to changes in relative prices. More
specifically, he denied the validity of the Phillips curve and
the Keynesian multiplier as policy tools and counseled tight
money and significant tax cuts to induce behavioral changes
in behalf of greater price stability and fuller employment. 30
Testifying on a presidential anti-inflation message in
March 1980, the current Federal Reserve chairman not only
showed disfavor of overreliance on monetary macho but also
balked at the idea of early tax cuts, even for the stimulation
of business investment. The times required a "coordinated"
credible approach to inflation control that included fiscal
restraint (preferably, an attempt to balance the 1981 budget)
and energy policy as well as a tight rein on the money
supply. 31

29. Based on summary remarks by Representative C.J. Brown, The 1980 Joint Economic
Report, p. 5.
30. See testimony of N.B. Ture at a Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee on
Forecasting the Supply Side of the Economy, May 21, 1980, pp. 61-74.
31. P.A. Volcker, in Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee on the President's
New Anti-inflation Program, March 17, 20, and 27, 1980, pp. 102 ff; and Washington
Post, December 4, 1980.
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A Wall Street economist whose pronouncements are
highly respected in the investment community has, like the
Federal Reserve chairman, expressed skepticism concerning
the economic scenario that has strong support in the new
Reagan Administration. In his judgment, the intent to cut
taxes sharply while also raising defense spending sharply will
keep interest rates high and fail to puncture the inflationary
expectations of investors and workers. Continuing rises in
energy and food prices, he observed, hold forth the prospect
of continuing pro-inflationary wage advances. 32
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve was thought to have
embarked on a more extreme "monetarist" course as it
shifted emphasis toward restriction of the growth of the
money supply with less regard for the stability of interest
rates. The stage for this shift had been set by the failure of
government to achieve occasional budget balances or
surpluses in recent times. The shift is also consonant with
legislative requirements of 1975 (House Concurrent Resolu
tion No. 133) and 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins Act, Section
108) that quarterly and annual target rates of money growth
be publicly declared. Attainment of the near-term targets,
however, has proved difficult. Professional opinion is far
from unanimous on the most relevant money aggregate, the
sensitivity of output and prices to change in this aggregate,
the lead times, and the preferred strategy of restraint
(gradualism versus shock). Other factors also suggest that a
clearcut test of the efficacy of "monetarism" is not at
hand—the Federal Reserve's position as stated above, its
conflicting requirements to manage the money supply and to
accommodate the Treasury in deficit-financing, popular and
political concern for business solvency and jobs, and the

32. Henry Kaufman, in Washington Post, December 10, 1980.
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unhappy experience of Britain in its current wrestling with
"slumpflation." 33
The best-known advocate of monetary monism—the 1976
Nobel laureate in economics—has stated his credo on "the
cure for inflation" in a chapter of this title in a new popular
book. 34 He asserts "five simple truths" by way of conclu
sion: that "inflation is a monetary phenomenon arising from
a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in out
put"; that government essentially controls the money sup
ply; that the "only cure for inflation" is to slow the growth
of this supply; that time is required for cure even as it was re
quired for development of inflation; and that "unpleasant
side effects" of the cure, such as substantial unemployment,
are "unavoidable." A choice between unemployment and
inflation, in his view, is an "illusion": "The real option is
only whether we have higher unemployment as a result of
higher inflation or as a temporary side effect of curing infla
tion."
A leading econometrician associated with the Brookings
Institution reported in a 1980 paper that his "model" at
tributes the recent "dismal record of the * discomfort
index* " to "exogenous shocks and a large upward shift in
the inflation norm." To slow this shift, he suggests six
possibilities. The first is to maintain high unemployment,
and the second, which entails the first, is to keep fiscal and
monetary policy "tight." The third is to announce and
33. On this paragraph, see Volcker's testimony (footnote 31); J.A. Davenport, "A Testing
Time for Monetarism," Fortune, October 6,1980, pp. 42-48; two articles in Burns' Reflec
tions, "Money Targets and Credit Allocation," pp. 367-78, and "The Independence of the
Federal Reserve System," pp. 379-85; "The Redefined Monetary Aggregates," Federal
Reserve Bulletin, February 1980, pp. 97-114; Milton Friedman, "Inflation and Unemploy
ment," cited in footnote 3; T.M. Humphrey, "The Persistence of Inflation," Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, September-October 1979, pp. 3-15; and The
Economist, November 29, 1980, pp. 11-13 and 19-23.
34. Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, pp. 237-270.
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adhere to a "credible restrictive policy," and the fourth is to
"reduce prices relative to wages without squeezing normal
margins"; the intent of both would be to moderate infla
tionary expectations. The fifth is to offer tax incentives for
wage and price moderation, and the sixth is to impose direct
restraints, ranging from guidelines to strict controls. A
preference is expressed for use of a workable tax-based in
comes policy to complement slack-inducing macroeconomic
policy. 35
Many other economists see a supportive role for penalty or
reward systems, or even for stricter controls, in larger pro
grams aimed at disinflation. The purpose is to alleviate the
unemployment that would be induced by demand-restraining
measures. Despite much discussion of incomes policies in the
past decade or longer, there is little agreement on ap
propriate design and administration; some of the varieties
appear to have been influenced in their details by emanations
from the ghosts of Lewis Carroll and Rube Goldberg. 36 In
1978, the Carter Administration proposed "real-wage in
surance" as an inducement to unions to honor the pay target
set in the new stabilization program. 37 Despite the cogency of
the concept, the scheme was poorly crafted and poorly pro
moted; by protecting inflaters, it would have legitimized an
"underlying" inflation rate already intolerably high and re
quiring reversal, not reinforcement.
The writings thus far sampled seem hopeful, though
guarded; but some others, even when compatible with opin35. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice," he. cit., pp. 239-41.
36. Various tax-based incomes policies are discussed in essays by L.S. Seidman, A.P.
Lerner, and L.L. Dildine and E.M. Sunley in the Brookings volume already cited, Curing
Chronic Inflation; in Sidney Weintraub, Keynes and the Monetarists, New Brunswick,
Rutgers University Press, 1973; and in papers by A.P. Lerner and Sidney Weintraub in
J.H. Gapinski and C.E. Rockwood, eds., Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation, Cambridge,
Ballinger, 1979.
37. Economic Report of the President, January 1979, pp.9 and 82-84.
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ions already cited above, sound less reassuring. For example,
a Princeton professor told the Joint Economic Committee in
May 1980 that we need "patience," a quality "sadly lacking
in past economic policy." In any case, it appears that "we
must face up to the fact that an inflation problem that has
been building for 15 years may take just as long to be
cured." He proposed a "long-term policy" of "moderate
slack, coupled with whatever * supply side' initiatives we can
dream up to improve productivity growth"—the "only antiinflation medicine that is not pure snake oil." 38
A well-known monetary economist, contributing to a
volume published in 1979, ventured that his profession
"does not have much to say about how to extricate oneself
without great difficulty from an inflationary process," so he
would be "very happy" if his fellow-contributors "could
reach a consensus, not perhaps on how to eliminate inflation
completely, but at least on how we can lessen the rate of in
flation." Having had "the sad experience of seeing many
different efforts at combating inflation fail," he is skeptical
of "any simple scheme." He does suggest, however, that an
anti-inflation program has to be a "combined and determin
ed effort carried out along many different fronts." A curb
on government spending is necessary, "but this action must
be combined with wage policy and with other policies which
at least will provide a period of adjustment during which
people can be led to change their expectations about future
inflation." 39
Writing in 1979, a distinguished economist who has been
president of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science as well as the American Economic Association
came to "a rather pessimistic conclusion that the prospects
38. A.S. Blinder, in Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the
United States, May 28 and 29, 1980, p. 40.
39. Don Patinkin, "The Inflationary Experience: Some Lessons from Israel," in Essays in
Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 133-34.
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for control of inflation are not very good." Although he
thinks that "a full-employment, anti-inflation policy is feasi
ble," he hastens to add that it demands "more knowledge
than we now have, a somewhat different data base, and a
very different political image and will." In particular, his
policy would involve drastic federal intervention "in existing
financial contracts." Since "politically we are simply not
prepared to do this," he expects the inflation to continue.40
Finally, a post-Keynesian school of economists that seeks
to replace inadequate "orthodox" theory offers an uncom
mon diagnosis of inflation and arrives at an uncommon pro
posal for remedy. According to this school, inflation arises
not from excess demand or too rapid growth of the money
supply but from conflict over the distribution of available in
come and output. Restrictive monetary and fiscal policies
limit the available totals and thereby intensify the struggle
for shares. An incomes policy, which is nowadays proposed
as a means of mitigating the unemployment accompanying
restrictive anti-inflationary measures, is seen instead by the
new school as the proper fruit of a prior national consensus
covering all categories of claimants. This consensus,
established by a social and economic planning organ in
which all interest groups are represented, "would finally per
mit government to pursue a maximum growth or 'full
employment' policy without having to fear the inflationary
consequences." 41 It is safe to surmise that this paragraph will
not influence the approach taken by the hew Administration
and the new Congress in the quest for fuller employment
with less inflation.

40. K.E. Boulding, "Inflation as a Process in Human Learning," in Essays in PostKeynesian Economics, especially p. 30.
41. Eichner, "A Look Ahead," in ,4 Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 174-84. See
also, in the same volume, Eileen Appelbaum, "The Labor Market," pp. 117-19.
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New Era—or Error?
The dramatic shift of political power signaled by the 1980
elections provides a basis for hope of more resolute and
more effective leadership against inflation. A successful ear
ly outcome should not be taken for granted, however, in
view of the dreary economic history of the decades since the
end of World War II; the origins, later sources, and long life
of the current inflation; and the diversity of authoritative
opinion regarding appropriate strategy and tactics. Further
more, even if the struggle against inflation were eventually to
succeed, any predesigned program of disinflation would
most likely have to be revised extensively along the way. The
original timetable, too, would probably prove overoptimistic. Accordingly, whatever the exact nature of the
disinflation program that will be formulated initially by the
new Administration, the remarks that follow should retain
some relevance for evolving government policy. It should be
recalled, for the sake of perspective, that the current
fashionable revulsion against Keynesianism was preceded by
a fashionable bipartisan tolerance; that the Nixon Ad
ministration adopted wage and price controls despite profes
sions of ideological abhorrence of such intervention.
Of special interest for this book is the near certainty that a
determined attack on inflation would entail a concomitant
substantial rise in the general level of unemployment. Such a
rise is suggested by the inevitability of a central role for
monetary restraint. Furthermore, workers in particular in
dustries, regions, and localities may be expected to ex
perience prolonged idleness as a result of fiscal retrench
ments, the unwillingness or inability of state and local
governments to fill gaps in federal outlays, the limited
geographic and interfirm mobility of older disemployed per
sons, and so forth. Although stimulative tax changes and
new defense spending could favorably affect some area

30

Looking Backward & Forward (1980)

economies and assist some industries damaged in fierce inter
national competition (e.g., automobiles and steel), they
could hardly arrest the worldwide shift in manufacturing ac
tivity, reverse the decline of major central cities, or reduce
decisively the high rates of joblessness for young persons.
Assignment of top priority to the mastery of inflation need
not, of course, imply repudiation of the earlier federal
resolve to promote "maximum employment." All the objec
tives stated in Section 2 of the Employment Act, as amended
in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, remain appropriate,
whatever party is in the ascendant. While the objectives re
main fixed, the weights assigned to the various desiderata are
alterable in the light of changing economic conditions and
perceptions. As for the specific milestones of the HumphreyHawkins Act, precedent for benign neglect has existed from
the very beginning. Continued neglect would be much less
provocative than a gratuitous alternative course that has
recently been proposed: "repeal" of the Act in toto or, at
least, of the "unrealistic" prescription of a 4 percent goal for
unemployment. 42
Only an economic flatworm would be satisfied to view the
processes of inflation and disinflation simply in terms of
rates of change in prices, output, and the money supply.
Government leaders unfortunately have to recognize and
take due account of the social and political dimensions of the
two phenomena. The conduct of a serious disinflation pro
gram is bound to expose and sharpen the intergroup dif
ferences, tensions, rivalries, and conflicts that contributed to
the buildup of inflation in the first place. 43 In particular,
stern counterinflationary action could sufficiently aggravate
42. Stein, "Achieving Credibility," loc. cit., p. 73.
43. For sophisticated discussions of the noneconomic aspects of inflation, see the essays in
Fred Hirsch and J.H. Goldthorpe, eds., The Political Economy of Inflation, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1978.
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unemployment to the point of threatening national
cohesiveness and public order.
The latent danger to social and political stability counsels
the desirability of offering incentives that would shorten the
disinflation process and reduce its human pain. Specifically,
a disinflation package might well provide, through tax
credits or low-interest bonds redeemable at public conve
nience, for protection of the purchasing power of the earn
ings of wage and salary workers who agree to forgo pay in
creases in excess of the prospective national rate of produc
tivity advance. The offer of protection to such workers
would have the double merit of increasing the ratio of
noninflaters to witting or unwitting inflaters and of
discouraging the "pre-indexation" of unit labor cost that
prolongs upward pressure on prices into the future.
Four additional comments elucidate this proposal for con
structive enlistment of employees in the fight against infla
tion:
1. The proposal is not just another member of the motley
family of "incomes policies" that political leaders disen
chanted with "controls" are inclined to eschew categorical
ly. It does not require enforcement by company
managements acting as gendarmes or deputies for the state.
Indeed, it is consistent with the notion of economic freedom
that the new Administration wishes to enlarge. By appealing
to selfish interest, it seeks to motivate voluntary behavior for
the larger public good.
2. As a "supply-side" instrument, the proposal promises
far less ambiguous counterinflationary benefit than does,
say, a preset multiyear reduction in marginal tax rates for all
income earners.
3. The proposal should not be confused with the Carter
concept of "real wage insurance" that it might have in-
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spired. The latter was intended to protect workers getting
pay increases up to 7 percent—far above the expected na
tional rate of productivity advance. This idea could only
have made the inflationary result of the annual union game
of "catch-up chicken" easier to forecast; it was not aimed at
ending the game.
4. The same criterion of purchasing-power protection is
appropriate for workers in both the private and public sec
tors. (In earlier years of the current inflation, the federal
government missed an opportunity, as the nation's largest
and most concerned employer, to set an example for others
to follow by restricting its pay increases to the national rate
of productivity gain. Adjustment of federal pay instead for
so-called "comparability" with the private sector was never
technically sound and has served as a mechanism for prop
agation of "wage inflation.")
Finally, the notion just elaborated for encouragement of
voluntary wage restraint is also adaptable to other disinfla
tionary programs—for example, the stimulation of net new
personal saving. Thus, instead of hoping that a sizable
multiyear income tax cut would significantly increase net
savings, the federal government could provide a direct incen
tive in the form of a tax credit.
In the course of preparation of this introductory chapter
to a new edition of a work that began to take shape in the
very dawn of the New Ordeal, a passage in a poem by the
eminent Victorian, Matthew Arnold, often came to mind:
We do not what we ought;
What we ought not, we do;
And lean upon the thought
That Chance will bring us through.
May our nation's quest for fuller employment with less infla
tion during the next decade and a half warrant a more
positive retrospective assessment.

1979
2
On Statistics and Policy for
Wage-Price Monitoring
Another Try
As I did at two previous meetings held while guideline pro
grams were in effect (Nixon's in 1972 and Johnson's in
1968), I offer some observations that I consider pertinent to
the design of yet another—a future—program. I was con
vinced on those past occasions that strong inflationary
pressures would persist and would, regrettably, inspire new
ventures in nonpermanent wage-price control. My remarks
here are addressed either to a new installment in a serial sally
against today's robust and elusive inflationary dragon; or, if
this dragon is somehow overcome, to the hunt of a successor
dragon that will need to be checked, captured, or killed. I
present my observations under three heads: the efficacy of
guidelines, their self-enforceability, and statistical needs for
administration. The opinions I express certainly cannot be
attributed to any organization with which I have been
associated; they derive from a professional interest that
began, however, with my service on the senior staff of the
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers in 1953-60.
Reprinted with minor changes from the 1979 Proceedings of the Business and Economic
Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association.
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Efficacy of Guidelines

Despite a common lay and professional belief, guidelines
do not represent a sort of exceptional failure among govern
ment programs. Granted that the record of prices since in
auguration of the present guideline effort in October 1978 is
dismal; that distortions have been introduced; that inequities
have been exacerbated; that the groundwork for other future
(even pro-inflationary) troubles has been laid. But how suc
cessful have other ambitious government initiatives turned
out in comparison to proclaimed official objectives and
engendered public expectations? Look around almost
anywhere—nuclear power, the Alaska pipeline, the Depart
ment of Energy, defense, social security, Medicare, welfare,
CETA, reintegration of Vietnam veterans, public housing,
administration of justice, antitrust, international
trade—and, if you know enough and care enough, you will
find ample reason for frustration and dismay.
The special difficulty presented by failure in the wageprice area is that intense psychic disequilibrium ensues. Once
the inflationary menace has become even more real than
television, as personal and immediate as gasoline lines, the
failure to check or eliminate it leads to keen and widespread
apprehension. People sense that the minor unequal sacrifices
already exacted will be followed by more serious levies of
unknown cost, incidence, duration, and outcome. Surely,
not every worker looks forward, after a season of travail, to
the comprehensive and mandatory controls that AFL-CIO
again proposes in the July 1979 American Federationist as
alternatives to the present flaccid "voluntary" guidelines.
Surely, not every white-collar employee of Business Week is
cheered by the editorial call of August 13, 1979 for
"euthanasia" of the current program without any indication
as to how else the nation might fare any better. These
employees have surely read in their own journal that the con-
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ventional unwisdom, already driven beyond wit's end,
knows only to prescribe "monetary hemlock" and the crea
tion of "unemployment in the public interest." So why
should the large public that retains reliance on jobs and
credit for its well-being not suffer "malaise"?
Disappointing experience and fear for the future could
easily lead to the mistaken conclusion that guidelines have
"no effect" at all. They do, indeed, have effects, and not
only adverse side effects and aftereffects. Why should the
market-oriented gambits of government be judged inherently
inconsequential when those of a cartel, a monopoly, or a
bellwether oligopolist are automatically believed to be effec
tive? I think that the poor opinion of guideline efficacy is an
overreaction to the failure to achieve as much as promised or
expected.
What can be said of a constructive nature in behalf of
guidelines? Even when backed by mere publicity, occasional
jawboning, and the threat of sanctions, they obviously in
fluence private decisions and bargains respecting wages and
prices within a discretionary range. Their net effect is a tilt
toward moderation, especially since contracts typically have
some duration and since initial outright noncompliance is
relatively rare. I am well aware that the tilt is less than would
be desired; that announced ceilings tend to become floors
also; that norms lose dispersion; that targets tend to accom
modate, rather than seriously to counteract, inflationary
pressures. Nevertheless, I believe that, in the absence of
guidelines, speculative and disorderly surges and subsequent
retreats would ratchet up wages and prices faster than the
rates actually experienced. Even the accommodative proinflationary ceilings that are set under guidelines have to be
breached "legally" and in the sight of government ad
ministrators and price vigilantes; and such breaching may re
quire stewing and relatively slow journeys through a
bureaucratic mill.
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Common sense suggests that, once adopted, guidelines
ought to be used most constructively to the limit of their
meager potential—and here the role of government leader
ship is critical. Guidelines that are timidly conceived in the
name of "realism" have a weak counterinflationary bite at
best, but this is not their only frailty. The important fact to
consider is that whatever restraining influence they do exert
is bound to be short-lived. Sooner or later, they degrade
through self-poisoning with compromises and exceptions;
and then they are stabbed in the back by initial exemptions
from coverage and by noncompliance emboldened by ex
amples of defiance with impunity.
Accordingly, guidelines must be viewed as part of a larger
policy package; and, just like a "freeze," they have to be
viewed also as a bid for time. During the early phase of
credibility when they less ambiguously tend to slow wageprice metabolism, guidelines can buy time for the rest of the
package. Beyond systemic monetary and fiscal maneuvers,
this package has to include fundamental attacks on the
specific supply-demand imbalances that also underlie infla
tion. Indeed, the efficacy of guidelines might be reinforced
and extended if it were clear that the government is diligently
working to correct such imbalances. Accommodative
guidelines cannot, by mere adoption, provide basic supplydemand correctives; they can even make the imbalances
worse. Ironically, in the absence of these additional
measures relating to resource supply and use, more comes to
be expected of aging guidelines and more grievous seems
their failure to do what they cannot do.
My preference is for government leadership, from the very
start of a "fight against inflation," to respond unequivocally
to its own bugle. Neither the public nor the dragon should be
cajoled with catnip policies into believing that coexistence is
possible or desirable, with the dragon simply to be put under
house arrest as a fatted live-in pussycat. I prefer the an-
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nouncement of "unrealistic"—i.e., truly counterinflationary and hard-to-achieve—wage and price goals with in
centives for voluntary fulfillment; and simultaneous, or even
much earlier, announcement of other determined undertak
ings to rectify basic supply-demand imbalances that also feed
inflation. If "realistic" pro-inflationary "interim"
numerical targets have to be set, they should be advertised as
warnings of the dangers still faced by the nation if the incen
tives provided are not used for better counterinflationary
performance and if the corrective supply-demand actions are
not bold and timely enough.
Unqualified "realistic" targets that specify inflationary
wage and price increases as allowable confer an economic
and social respectability on a state of affairs that needs to be
rendered "unrealistic." They, unfortunately, subtly change
the agenda from the defeat of inflation to an exercise in finetuning it. I prefer that government not offer purchasingpower protection for wages that rise much more rapidly than
productivity. I prefer the official reassertion of the
"unrealistic" algebraic truth that wage increases in excess of
productivity prospects raise unit labor cost and the
"unrealistic" empirical truth that unit labor cost is strongly
correlated with product price. Were a political Micawber
having major responsibility for guideline redesign and ad
ministration to ask me what he could do for the country
rather than it for him, I would suggest that he do more than
read my papers; I would advise him to take what I have just
said to heart and to risk becoming a political kamikaze on
the job, "in the national interest."

Self-Enforceability of Guidelines
Years before the tip of TIP (tax-based income policies)
became visible, I was on record as favoring wage-deferment
bonds or tax offsets as incentives for workers to accept mere
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productivity-warranted pay increases. I did not at all view
this incentive as a new "loophole," as just another "tax ex
penditure" that ought, in a misguided spirit of "equity," be
negated by extension to farmers and others. Rather, I meant
this protection of the earnings of cooperating workers to be
an explicit income transfer from the large body of witting
and unwitting inflaters. I also hoped that the purchasingpower guarantee would look like a good deal, would accord
ingly swell the ranks of noninflaters in short enough time,
and would finally encourage unions and other institutions to
join in a meaningful "social compact" of restraint.
Although I kept writing "letters to the editor" and sought
through other correspondence as a private citizen to en
courage consideration of my idea, the scheme for "real wage
insurance" that surfaced in 1978 struck me as absurd, so I
was pleased at its demise in Congress. In a letter published in
Business Week of December 4, 1978, about a week after I
was temporarily assigned by the Department of Commerce
as a "detailee" to the Council on Wage and Price Stability, I
wrote that "the protection of the wages of workers getting
increases up to 7 percent amounts to a codification of infla
tion." I proposed instead that "a true anti-inflationary stan
dard would limit protection to workers getting increases no
greater than the productivity trend rate, say 2 percent." I
recognized, of course, that economic colleagues and assorted
political sophisticates would immediately dismiss this pro
posal as "unrealistic." On the other hand, I ventured that
"it is also unrealistic to fight a fire by recalibrating the ther
mometer" or by aiming just to contain the fire "at a twoalarm level." Yes, I prefer the "unrealism" of harassing the
dragon to the "realism" of accepting its recent ravage as a
norm.
The concept of self-enforceability of guidelines is ap
plicable in some degree to prices as well as wages. The discre
tionary range of a company might be compressed downward
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by the offer of some protection to the presumptive purchas
ing power of its after-tax earnings. The protection ought to
be limited to companies showing a significantly better record
of price restraint than other companies in the same industry
or product line.
Savers too should be encouraged. In support of guidelines
(as well as economic sense in general), more honest interest
rates ought to be available to savers—higher than the in
crease in cost of living. If such rates cannot be paid, then
some degree of purchasing-power protection should be pro
vided through the tax system. The protection should be con
fined to net additional savings of a specified percentage of
the income of persons earning up to a specified amount.

Statistics Needed for
Guideline Administration
Whatever the shape of the next monitoring program,
statistical gaps are bound to be discerned and deplored.
When the Nixon guidelines were in effect, a strong need was
felt for generally absent company productivity information.
The current guideline effort, according to my own brief ex
perience as a "detailee," could have benefited if, from the
outset, companies had been encouraged, and had also been
properly instructed, to establish price indexes and to main
tain them in inspectable form for review on demand. The
program could also have benefited from application of the
price standards to each company division or other major
component rather than to a company as a whole.
Even as experience under the Nixon program must have
stimulated company interest in productivity statistics,
backroom and boardroom ruminations over the revised
Wage and Price Standards of December 1978 must have
motivated companies to ponder the arts of price-index con
struction. After all, a company's strategy for compliance
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could have depended on what such an index showed. Com
pany statisticians must already have known, or could easily
have learned by test computations, that alternative allowable
modes of measurement need not agree on the show of com
pliance or noncompliance. Accordingly, they could have
guided their principles in the selection of favorable indexes.
In the event that company productivity information is re
quired" for a future monitoring program, it may be comfort
ing to know that many circumstances have helped improve
the statistical outlook. (The present program, incidentally,
makes very limited call for such information.) Ubiquitous
computers and "management information systems" already
provide primitive productivity measures for many companies
in the monthly welter of printouts. The pressures of continu
ing inflation and intensifying foreign competition on com
pany survivability, autonomy, and profitability have
multiplied the number of seminars offered to business of
ficials on productivity measurement* and related topics. The
growth of employment in government and in private service
industries and service activities has, meanwhile, had the
salutary accompaniment of breaking down past inhibitions
against productivity measurement on a "subproduct" basis,
which many economic statisticians conventionally demean as
a form of "work measurement." (I first touched on the subproduct method in a paper of June 1944 in the Journal of the
American Statistical Association.)
Although it is expedient to administer wage guidelines
separately (even within a single agency), the two processes
have to be pursued compatibly and their results have to be

*During my years at the Department of Commerce, I actively engaged in the presentation
of lectures on the why, what, and how of such measurement. Since this paper was written,
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research has published a little book of mine on
Company Productivity: Measurement for Improvement (1980).
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examined and evaluated in a common framework. For such
integration, I noted in my 1972 American Statistical Associa
tion (ASA) paper* the potentials of the Leontief inputoutput system, so I am pleased to see that the system has
been informally utilized in the current program. On the other
hand, another integrative statistical device proposed in my
1972 ASA paper (and in earlier publications) has not been
applied in guideline administration—the construction of
algebraically consistent and symmetric index numbers for
the key macrovariables that are relevant to monitoring.
For example, we may start with a verbal identity connec
ting average hourly earnings to three other variables of in
terest in monitoring. Such earnings are expressible as the
product of (a) the ratio of payroll to output value, (b) pro
duct price, and (c) output per man-hour. This expression
could then be used as the template or module for construc
ting symmetric indexes from data for the corresponding
microvariables—for translation of the initial "verbal
algebra" into stricter "literal algebra." The product of (a)
and (b), incidentally, is a compatible index of unit labor cost,
also highly relevant to a guideline program. The system ob
viously makes heavy data demands, so approximations and
compromises would be required in any serious attempt to
convert the formulas into numbers.
Fortunately, we may do much better with a simpler ap
proach that deals only with aggregates rather than index
numbers and that does not directly involve productivity.
This alternative approach, moreover, has two special merits:
(a) it is well suited to advancement of the cause of selfi
monitoring for inflation abatement, and (b) it also facilitates
coordination of wage-price and monetary policy. Ideally,
each company should try to satisfy this inequality,
Scjq! 1 2c0qi, where a q stands for output of a product
and a c is its unit labor cost. The sum on the left is the payroll
*See essay no. 4 in the present volume.
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for the target period 1, and the sum on the right represents
the output of period valued in unit labor costs of base-period
0. Since a certain amount of inflation may have to be
recognized as allowable, the sum on the right could be
multiplied by (1 + k). A different k is specifiable for different
classes of companies, or a uniform k could be set for all the
covered companies. Incidentally, if both sides of the ine
quality are divided by the right-hand member, it becomes
clear that the criterion relates to a Paasche index of unit
labor cost.
As I indicated in my 1972 ASA paper and earlier pub
lications, additional inequalities may be invoked for exten
sion of the monitoring process to value added or to total
value of output or both. Thus, an inequality like
£ vjqj ^ £v0qi(l + m) could be applied as a standard for net
(all-factor) price; and an inequality like
XPiqi ^ £PoQiO + n) could be set up as the criterion for
total price (or price excluding profit). If desired, some rela
tionship could be specified for k, m, and n; or all might be
required to be equal (as well as positive).
Finally, the last inequality or a variant of it could be used
in coordinating monetary and wage-price policy. Thus, as
has often been discussed, a rule could be established that the
increment of the nation's money supply in period 1 should
not exceed a certain percentage of the gross national product
as measured in prices of period 0.
In short, a wage-price program could get by with a
minimum of statistical baggage and of a kind already
familiar to cost-conscious companies. This does not mean,
of course, that the required detailed unit-cost, total unitcost, unit-profit-margin, and unit-price information for in
dividual products already is universally available. The
burden imposed by the construction of the hierarchical ine
qualities (by the way, these could be recast into incremental
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form) is relatively small, however, and should be
manageable without heroics by any firm that practices costaccounting. Quarterly (retrospective and projective) com
putations could be made as firms move through the target
year. I think the approach affords a flexibility that ought to
have wide appeal. Within the constraints of the inequalities,
resource substitutions would not need to be watched from
the outside; and different constants could be introduced into
the inequalities for different industries. Companies would be
able to navigate according to internally-generated informa
tion.
In closing, I add that the Paasche indexes implied by the
algebraic expressions presented in the preceding paragraphs
could be replaced by Laspeyres measures—or, better still, by
averages of the two, such as Edgeworth indexes. For exam
ple, we could replace Sqqj S Sc0qi by Xciq0 ^ 2c0q0,
which implies that a Laspeyres index of unit labor cost
should not exceed unity. Alternatively, we could combine the
two expressions to obtain Scjfao + qj) = £c0(q0 +qi),
which implies an Edgeworth criterion. Similar substitutions
could be made for the remaining inequalities shown in earlier
paragraphs.

1972
Price Reduction Via Productivity
Supergains: Principles,
Prospects, and Programs
My assignment is to identify "potential areas of price
reduction"—presumably, a subset of those industries
characterized by better-than-average productivity gains. In
addition to reporting here on a review of the recent produc
tivity experience of numerous industries, I shall take some
notice of correlative price changes. But I want to go beyond
a statistical account since, even if it were rendered by a whole
institute, it would still do less than full justice to the assign
ment. I feel required to say something also about the
"theory" of productivity-warranted price cuts and about
practical mechanisms for translating potentials into realities.
The range of my discussion is indicated by the three nouns of
the subtitle, which serve as divisional headings for the re
mainder of this paper.

Principles
I discuss "theory" first. Under its own name and behind
such masks as "profitability," "efficiency," and
Reprinted from Hearings on Price and Wage Control: An Evaluation of Current Policies,
Part 2, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1972.
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"technological progress," productivity has long been
recognized by businessmen, by economists, and by ad
ministrators of planned societies to be relevant to price
policy and behavior. I briefly comment on three patterns of
relationship among productivity, wages (or incomes), and
unit labor (or all-factor) cost that have been imagined or
prescribed on behalf of downward price flexibility.'
Even before I describe the three patterns, I wish to insert
three caveats which themselves belong in the "theory" of
productivity-warranted price reduction. First, not one of the
three patterns is automatically realizable through the opera
tion of existing markets. Second, productivity change is not,
and should not be reckoned as, the only valid determinant of
price change. Third, insofar as productivity performance
does indeed bear on opportunities for price reduction, pro
ductivity prospects are far more relevant than productivity
history over the recent or longer past.
These caveats need not long detain us. With respect to the
first one, monopolistic and oligopolistic forces—including
the action of unions—probably tend toward achievement of
rising, rather than stable or declining, prices in the economy
at large. With respect to the second caution, price changes
are properly influenced by numerous circumstances in addi
tion to productivity change and market imperfections.
Among these many extra influences are capital needs,
weather, custom, tastes, governmental regulations, and the
intensity of foreign competition. The arithmetic of averages
need not be satisfied, of course, by the behavior of each firm
1. Reference is usually made to wages (per hour or per worker) in the rest of this paper, but
only for convenience and not with the intent of ruling out a comprehensive incomes policy.
If all income paid to persons and property is covered by a comprehensive policy, the con
ventional labor productivity concept has to be replaced by another that is equally com
prehensive in scope. Similarly, it would no longer do to speak of unit labor cost; the proper
concept becomes all-factor cost per unit of output.
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or industry included in a comprehensive measure. As for the
third caveat, costs vary throughout the business cycle, so re
cent past experience regarding productivity and profits is not
routinely extrapolable; and, taking a longer perspective, we
should not expect a maturing, stagnating, or revitalizing firm
or industry to recapitulate in the future its earlier record of
productivity and cost changes. Inflation, unfortunately,
seems not to care a fig for the opinion of economists and
others regarding the braking power of productivity trends
observed here or there in the economy over the past x or y
years. Before the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts, the
Eisenhower Economic Reports properly stressed the produc
tivity outlook. I hope the reader bears this paragraph in
mind as I try to simplify my presentation by the use of timeneutral language in my references below to productivity.
The first model envisages the distribution of all, or almost
all, of the benefit of rising productivity in the form of price
reduction. That is, hourly wages would not increase at all;
but the purchasing power thereof would rise as generally fall
ing unit labor cost is generally translated into price cuts. This
pattern for, say, private-sector averaged permits deviations,
of course; it is compatible with the registration of price rises
for individual firms or industries that are characterized by
productivity decline and advancing unit labor cost in a
regime of typical wage stability.
In his final book, Competition as a Dynamic Process,
J.M. Clark recalled that this model, representing "hardly a
thinkable condition," was advocated by such old stalwarts
of The Brookings Institution as Moulton and Nourse. All
people would benefit in their role as consumers; wages would
not rise for workers, and prices would fall for nonworkers as
well. "Inequalities in the diffusion," Clark observed,
"would result only from the fact that products in which in
creased productivity has caused more than average decline in
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prices may play a larger part in some consumer budgets than
in others." 2
Although this model featuring vigorous price competition
may not be realistic for the economy at large, innovative
companies and industries do experience or anticipate
substantial productivity gains and can use these gains as a
partial basis for price reduction. Profit per unit could well
decline, but a price cut itself may engender a compensatory
gain in sales volume. Clark says:
Sometimes the process may uncover possibilities
of profitable sales expansion unanticipated by the
more conservative members of the industry. This is
most likely to happen when a young product is ex
ploring new potential uses. 3
Clark's remark can be extended to new users, too. It
reminds me of Ford's example, which still has counterparts
outside the automotive field, as we shall observe in the next
section of this paper. The Model T first sold for $1,200, but
later sold for as little as $295. Ford recognized a relation be
tween price reduction and sales expansion; and he asserted
that the reduction of price even served as a spur to costsaving in design and manufacture:
When we first reduce the price to a point where,
we think, more sales will result, then we go ahead
and try to meet the price. The new price will force
the cost down. 4

2. J.M. Clark, Competition as a Dynamic Process (Washington, The Brookings Institu
tion, 1961), pp. 79, 441.
3. Ibid., p. 79.
4. Quoted in Caret Garrett, Henry Ford: The Wild Wheel (New York, Pantheon Books,
1952), p. 108. See also pp. 12, 107, 109.
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The second wage-price-productivity model reflects a newer
conventional wisdom which Galbraith himself tends to
mistake for reality in The New Industrial State. This model,
mentioned in the Eisenhower Economic Reports and more
fully elucidated in the Kennedy-Johnson Reportst opts for
general price stability with wages rising in step with produc
tivity. Since differential wage adjustment appears imprac
ticable from industry to industry, unit labor cost would not
remain level everywhere; so price increases required in some
industries would need to be offset by price reduction in in
dustries with better-than-average productivity gains.
This is a model that is commonly favored for our society;
it is not a mirror of what actually happens. Writing more
than a decade ago, Clark opined that the aim of price stabili
ty with "equitable" wage adjustments would "not prove
feasible." He foresaw wage gains generally outstripping pro
ductivity gains and prices consequently trending upward:
What we are likely to get, wages and prices being
determined as they are, is a third form of diffusion,
in which wages in the more dynamic industries rise
as much or more than the better-than-average rate
of increase of productivity in these industries,
wages elsewhere follow this rate of rise as closely as
they can, rising more than productivity in the less
dynamic industries, average wages rise more than
average productivity, raising average unit costs,
and prices rise to offset this, approximately main
taining the proportionate share going to profits.
The indicated result is a "creeping inflation,"
financed by an elastic credit system that is under
pressure to furnish the monetary resources to han
dle the increased volume of business, on^penalty of
being held responsible for precipitating a recession.
Fixed dollar incomes shrink in real value, real in
terest is less than nominal interest, and conven-
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tional depreciation reserves fail to provide funds
for full physical replacement. 5
Obviously, Clark's variant, which Sumner Slichter had
visualized earlier, 6 is not a model that is amicable to price
reduction. Besides, he regarded this variant as a mirror of
reality. He noted the buoyant roles of unions and govern
ment in the passage cited; and, elsewhere in his book, he
devoted considerable attention to company practices (such as
product differentiation, "full-cost pricing," and the quest
for "target returns" on investment) that also seem to limit
the opportunity for price cuts.
Clark*s pessimism remains warranted. Even during the
present Phase II, a period of wage-price monitoring, we may
encounter reports of the use of "price discipline," not for
competitive price-cutting, but to enforce rises. Note the O.
Henry twist and the complacent tone of this news item,
which appeared in a prominent business publication at the
beginning of 1972:
Demand for steel has started to pick up, and the
Price Commission has given its blessing to price in
creases for sheet steel. So this would not seem a
likely time to cut prices. But U.S. Steel Corp. did
just that this week, with decreases of $5 to $25 per
ton on more than half its products, including pipe,
bars, structural, and most sheet products. The
reason: old-fashioned industry price discipline. In
land Steel Co. had quietly begun allowing quantity
discounts of $1 to $8 a ton, and U.S. Steel ap
parently is aiming its lower prices at these, with the
5. Clark, Competition as a Dynamic Process, p. 80.
6. A succinct, advanced version of S.H. Slichter's argument may be found, for example, in
his paper on "Labor Costs and Prices," in Wages, Prices, Profits, and Productivity,
American Assembly (New York, Columbia University, June 1959), pp. 167-180. In the
same year (March 1959), Slichter testified before the Joint Economic Committee in the
hearings on "The American Economy."
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goal of forcing competitors up to the levels approv
ed by the Price Commission. 7
The third model that entails price cuts is algebraically close
to the second one described above, and it acquired a promi
nent place in Soviet thought and practice long before wageprice-productivity controversy became a commonplace of
our own economic scene. Instead of aiming at general price
stability with wages rising in step with productivity, this rule
seeks a more moderate wage advance and, a fortiori, declin
ing unit labor cost. The object is to facilitate, not only price
reduction, but also a shift of factor-input composition in the
direction of capital. In an originally-classified monograph
that I wrote two decades ago, I stated the Soviet concept and
compared it to prevailing United States opinion in this man
ner:
The ultimate dependence of high real wages on
high labor productivity has, of course, been
recognized by Soviet leaders from the very begin
ning. . . . Out of the struggle against leveling
tendencies and the victory of planned investment, a
conscious wage policy has evolved. This policy,
often stated in garbled or elliptical form in Soviet
and satellite literature, amounts to the following:
The rate of productivity advance should exceed
(1) the rate of increase of average real wages, so
that a sufficient surplus should accrue to the state
for capital expansion, defense, and educational ser
vices; and (2) the rate of increase of average
nominal wages, so that unit labor cost would fall
and money prices of commodities could also be
reduced. If planning in terms of resources were
perfect, the first relationship would be achievable
without difficulty. If fiscal planning were correct,
7. Business Week, January 8, 1972, p. 26.
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the second would be realizable, too. In U.S., where
government "full" employment policy would have
to be implemented by indirect means (like compen
satory spending), there is more excuse for error.
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that pro
ponents of economic stabilization in the U.S. have
generally recommended maintenance of a static
price level over time and the increase of wages at
the same average rate as productivity. Since the
price level would be stable, however, real and
nominal wages would be almost proportional (not
exactly proportional because relative prices need
not remain fixed). The difference between this
wage policy and that of the USSR is the difference
between the productionist and consumptionist
philosophies. 8
In concluding this section, I want simply to mention that
the patterns of relationship here discussed can advantageous
ly be recast in terms of aggregates. I do believe that a
criterion stated in terms of output and payrolls is easier to
grasp than an equivalent statement in terms of such averages
as productivity, hourly pay, and unit labor cost. When the
next peacetime monitoring effort is required, a shift to ag
gregates should be considered.

Prospects
Turning to the available statistics, I take account below of
two compilations reflecting the variety of productivity gains
recorded in manufacturing in recent years. One set, showing
the average annual trend rates of productivity change in
1958-1969, was promulgated by the Price Commission on
8. I.H. Siegel, Soviet Labor Productivity (Chevy Chase, MD, Johns Hopkins Operations
Research Office, May 1952), pp. 19-20. An accompanying footnote translates the discus
sion into algebraic form.

Price Reduction Via Productivity Gains (1972:1)

53

May 3, 1972. The other set, showing annual productivity
series and corresponding price movements for 1958-1970,
was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for use in
the preparation of this paper. In the remainder of this sec
tion, I refrain from expressing and pursuing my usual in
terest in the quality of the data used and in the details of
measurement. 9
The Price Commission needs productivity rates for
guiding the calculation of approximate change in a com
pany's unit labor cost, but the language still used in the
monitoring instructions could easily confuse the earnest
businessman or his professional consultant. 10 The Commis
sion's reliance on trend rates implies that they are interpretable as near-term forecasts. It does appear that, in their
derivation, an effort was made to give them greater relevance
to the economic prospect. 11 Nevertheless, it remains
reasonable to entertain reservations concerning the
equivalence of computed rates for a past decade or so and
unknown preferred rates for the year or two immediately
ahead.
If the reservations are themselves unwarranted, the Com
mission's productivity figures do disclose industries that
might merit further examination for price-cutting potentials.
The weighted average of the hundreds of published annual
trend rates is between 3 and 4 percent. 12 Taking 5 percent or
9. These are discussed in Roger Bezdek's paper "Conceptual and Empirical Problems in
the Measurement of Prices and Productivity," which was prepared, like the present paper,
at the request of the Joint Economic Committee.
10. If a second-order term is ignored, the percentage change in unit labor cost is approx
imated by the difference between the percentage change in hourly wages and the percentage
change in productivity. This truism is stated like a policy decision, and obscurely besides,
in, for example, How to Compute Productivity Gains, Internal Revenue Service Pub.
S-3020, revised to June 1972. The title is misleading; the pamphlet focuses mainly on the
computation of change in unit labor cost and gives the unfortunate impression that all in
creases in such cost are "allowable."
11. "A New Productivity Yardstick," Business Week, May 13, 1972, p. 122.
12. According to the source cited in footnote 11, the 433 industry rates, weighted by sales,
average 3.3 percent; and the manufacturing rates average 3.6 percent.
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more as the criterion of better-than-average productivity
gain, we may isolate many candidates for closer study. Since
wage adjustments tend to be more uniform than productivity
change from industry to industry, better-than-average pro
ductivity rises will often signal the decline of unit labor
cost. 13 Such a decline affords an opportunity for, but hardly
guarantees, price reduction.
Falling below the adopted productivity standard of 5 per
cent per year are many familiar targets of complaint by the
antitruster and the consumer. Thus, on productivity grounds
alone, the prospects of price reduction would appear un
promising for, say, contract construction as a whole, iron
and steel (3312), automobiles (3711), machine tools (3541,
3542), primary aluminum (3334), and bread and cake
(2051). 14 Whoever balks at the inclusion of automobiles
here, however, might be tempted to lower the productivity
criterion; this industry's trend rate, 4.1 percent, is above the
weighted average for the Price Commission's list.
Rates above 5 percent per year for the period 1958-69 are
shown for many industries (some of them sizable) in that list.
Thus, a gross screening according to the 5-percent standard
would suggest that closer scrutiny for price-cutting potentials
is warranted in these cases and some others: coal mining (an
thracite, 111 and bituminous, 121), flour milling (2041), rice
milling (2044), brewing (2082), distilled liquors (2085), soy
bean oil (2092), women's hosiery (2251), tufted carpets and
rugs (2272), tire cord and fabric (2296), veneer and plywood
(2432), business forms (2761), industrial gases (2813), cyclic
intermediates and crudes (2815), industrial organic chemicals
(2818), plastics materials and resins (2821), cellulosic manmade fibers (2823), medicinals and botanicals (2833), phar13. Of course, declining unit labor cost can more easily be ascertained by comparing
changes in payrolls and output—a point made at the end of the preceding section.
14. The numbers in parentheses refer to the Standard Industrial Classification system of
1967. They identify more clearly the industries to which I often give only informal names.
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maceutical preparations (2834), fertilizers (2871),
agricultural chemicals (2879), adhesives and gelatin (2891),
carbon black (2895), petroleum refining (2911),
miscellaneous plastics products (3079), transformers (3612),
household refrigerators and freezers (3632), household
vacuum cleaners (3635), radio and television receivers
(3651), picture tubes (3672), semiconductors (3674), and
motorcycles and bicycles (3751).
From the annual productivity series supplied by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1958-1970 (printouts dated
July 19, 1972), a very similar catalogue is derivable. One in
consistency, however, stands out—for synthetic rubber
(2822). Here, the Commission trend rate is only 2.7 percent,
or below average. In contrast, the BLS printouts show that
output per employee man-hour increased by about two-fifths
in all manufacturing during the span of a dozen years but
doubled in the synthetic rubber industry.
A perusal of the accompanying price series supplied by
BLS makes it clear that significant declines have indeed oc
curred in many instances with the support of productivity
supergains. In the case of synthetic rubber, the price decline
was only slight (1.5 percent) between 1958 and 1970. In some
other instances in which productivity doubled, however, the
price cut was striking—e.g., plastics materials (30 percent),
industrial organic chemicals (18 percent), cyclic in
termediates (20 percent), medicinals and botanicals (25 per
cent), carbon black (12 percent), electrometallurgical pro
ducts (3313, 23 percent), air-conditioning and refrigerating
equipment (3585, 9 percent), radio and television receivers
(22 percent), tufted carpets and rugs (21 percent), knit fabric
mills (2256, 25 percent), and linoleum (3996, 8 percent). For
picture tubes, which experienced nearly a trebling of produc
tivity, the price cut was 46 percent between 1958 and 1970.
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Even in the generally inflationary years since 1967 produc
tivity supergains have permitted various industries to
realize—or endure—price cuts. The BLS printouts show pro
ductivity and price advances of 6 and 8 percent, respectively,
for all manufacturing in 1967-1970. Against this backdrop,
they reveal a much sharper productivity rise, 29 percent, for
plastics materials, accompanied by a price decrease of 14
percent. A productivity increase of nearly 15 percent is in
dicated for synthetic organic fibers (2824), which experienc
ed a further price decline of 2 percent in 1967-1970.
Outside of chemicals, similar combinations are also to be
found. In the textiles group, for example, knitted fabric mills
gained nearly 12 percent in output per employee man-hour
during 1967-1970 while prices fell 7 percent; tufted carpets
and rugs posted an increase of 13 percent in productivity as
prices receded another 2 percent. For radio and television
receivers, a smart gain of 26 percent in productivity was
bracketed with a fall of more than 6 percent in prices. A
more striking productivity rise for miscellaneous plastics
products (3079), 35 percent, was linked to a price retreat of
15 percent. Additional examples, such as picture tubes and
optical equipment and lenses (3831), may be cited, as pro
ductivity supergains merely supported virtually stable prices
in still other industries—e.g., in the chemical and textile
areas, photographic equipment and supplies (3861), writing
pens (3951), and linoleum.
The above report of good correlations between productivi
ty and price changes could, of course, be supplemented by a
chronicle of contrary instances. Unremarkable productivity
gains have occasionally occurred together with favorable
price performance, and better-than-average productivity ex
perience did not always entail either price stability or price
decline.
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Without a closer analysis of circumstances, previous pro
ductivity and price experience provides no sure clue to areas
now ripe for price-cutting. Good past records may not be
sustainable—in the face, say, of unusual new wage set
tlements or intensifying foreign competition. Furthermore,
poor past productivity-price records should not suggest
unimprovability and should not discourage corrective action
by, say, managements acting alone or in concert with union
leadership or with government. In the motor vehicle group
(3710), for example, the productivity performance in
1958-1970 was no better than for all manufacturing; and it
was altogether stagnant in 1967-1970, as corresponding
prices rose more rapidly than for all manufactures. Should
this sort of record in so important an area be accepted with
complacency? The same challenge is raised by the BLS
statistics for our vaunted iron and steel industry (3312).
There, only trivial productivity gains were achieved in
1958-1970, and a drop of 3 percent was indicated for
1967-1970 as the price rise exceeded the percentage increase
for all manufactures.

Programs
Since a favorable productivity basis for price reduction
cannot routinely be achieved and sustained, and since other
circumstances often militate against such reduction anyway,
some continuing systemic or institutional correctives may be
needed. Without these remedies, achievement and
maintenance of average price stability may be out of the
question as our nation also pursues the goal of reasonably
full peacetime employment. The experience of price cuts
cited in the preceding section should encourage a quest for
ways to improve the nation's performance in this regard. It is
not compulsory to accept the counsel of despair that so
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respectable an economist as Sumner Slichter was dispensing
by the end of the Eisenhower period:
One fact that stands out conspicuously ... is
that ours is a producer-dominated economy—the
consumer is the forgotten man. We have the in
stitutional arrangements that make gains in pro
ductivity produce higher wages and higher prices,
but no one even speculates about the possibility of
altering our institutions so that gains in productivi
ty will produce lower prices. The absence of con
cern for the consumer is understandable because
the consumer does not demand lower prices. 15
In commenting on systemic correctives, I feel no need to
repeat the familiar tax (and other) incentives for upgrading
technology and for transforming it into ready physical plant
and equipment. I wish instead here to mention again a pro
posal I have made for reinforcing the guidelines for
noninflationary wage behavior: Workers should be en
couraged to forego demands for supraproductivity pay gains
by the offer of purchasing-power protection for infraproductivity pay increases. My elaborations of this idea
for self-enforcement have allowed roles for wage-deferment
bonds and for tax write-offs. For symmetry, tax benefits
could also be offered to companies that voluntarily share
their productivity gains with the public in the form of lower
prices.
In speaking of institutional correctives, I like to assume
that comprehensive controls will be avoided a bit longer as
our mixed economy continues to evolve along various lines
into a monitored economy. Even if there is a Phase III that,
say, confines wage-price monitoring to the private economic
heavyweights, I look toward a Phase-Out also. This is not to
15. Slichter, "Labor Cost and Prices," p. 180.
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say that another episode of peacetime wage-price
surveillance will prove unnecessary; indeed, in another paper
in this volume, I have predicted a "third-generation"
peacetime effort (i.e., a successor to Phase II-III and to
Kennedy-Johnson jawboning), but I did not set a date. In the
meantime, as government programs proliferate for meeting
the challenges of foreign competition at home and abroad, I
assume that a certain amount of wage-price monitoring will
become absorbed into the criteria for public assistance to
private entities or for closer public-private "partnership"
(e.g., in foreign trade).
A happy recent development suggests that government
may acquire a new instrument for facilitating price reduc
tion. This instrument is at once more subtle and more per
vasively applicable than, say, the antitrust suit or the sub
sidized "rollback" of selected prices. I refer to the sudden
harvest of instances of both "voluntary" and "ordered"
price-cuts required for compliance with the Price Commis
sion's profit-margin limitations. The increasing frequency of
news reports concerning price reductions to base levels and
further reductions that cancel excess revenues generated by
higher markups means that more businessmen, government
officials, and citizens are becoming aware of the longer-term
potentials provided by Phase II regulations.
I have recently rediscovered two institutional proposals of
fered by the late Walter Reuther for price stabilization. To
day, these proposals, for a Price-Wage Review Board and a
Consumer Counsel, sound much less stringent than they did
when presented at the Upjohn Institute's anniversary con
ference of 1966. I quote in full the relevant passage in
Reuther's address:
We in the UAW have long advocated the
establishment of a Price-Wage Board of Review.
This Board would have authority to make public

60

Price Reduction Via Productivity Gains (1972:1)

investigation of situations in which major corpora
tions, powerful enough to dominate key industries,
propose questionable price increases or are believed
to be maintaining prices at unjustifiable levels.
Situations warranting investigation would include
those in which dominant corporations attribute
their proposed price increases to the collectivebargaining demands of their workers.
Corporations in this dominant position—say,
those which control 25 percent or more of a key in
dustry's sales—would have to give notice to the
Price-Wage Review Board of any intended price in
crease. The Board would then have power, before
the increase could go into effect, to call corporation
officials before it for a public hearing. At such a
hearing, the Board would demand from the com
pany all the pertinent facts; and, following the
hearing, it would publish its findings and recom
mendations and the facts supporting them.
If a corporation subject to such review alleges
that meeting the demands of a union would force
an increase in prices, then the union would be put
into the public goldfish bowl along with the cor
poration. Both parties would be required to appear
at the hearings.
To deal with the situation where a corporation
may already be charging extortionately high prices,
we propose also the provision of a Consumer
Counsel. He could initiate hearings when he has
reason to believe that a corporation's prices are too
high. He would also represent the consumer in
terest at all Board hearings.
The Board would have no power to prohibit a
price increase or to require a price cut. Its function
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would be limited to getting the facts and making
them available to the public. If the public were in
formed, however, with facts and figures making
clear that a proposed price increase, or that a
union's wage demand, is not justified, it is highly
doubtful that the corporation or the union would
persist. In a free society, informed public opinion
has persuasive force. It has great power to
discipline private, voluntary decisions that affect
the public interest and to make them socially more
responsible. 16
To conclude this section and my paper, I refer to S. 3970,
which nearly achieved enactment in the 92nd Congress and
could be adapted or interpreted to accommodate suggestions
such as Reuther's. It provides for a Council of Consumer
Advisers in the Executive Office and an independent Con
sumer Protection Agency. According to Section 203, the Ad
ministrator of the Agency "may as of right intervene as a
party" to represent consumers in proceedings before any
other federal agency. Presumably, he could represent the
consumer viewpoint in wage-price hearings as a "party at in
terest," functioning in effect as Reuther's Consumer
Counsel. Productivity and unit labor cost would surely have
a critical place in the briefs presented for price restraint or
price reduction. 17
16.. From Walter P. Reuther's paper in I.H. Siegel, ed., Manpower Tomorrow: Prospects
and Priorities, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 34-36.
17. The opinion of a Consumer Counsel or a Consumer Protection Agency Administrator
would, of course, carry greater weight if it could be backed by a plausible threat to invoke
government's market power as a large purchaser, as a "monopsonist."
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4
Productivity Statistics for a
Third-Generation Wage-Price
Monitoring Program

This paper focuses on a future that can still be influenced.
It looks ahead to the next—the third—program of peacetime
monitoring of wages (or incomes) and prices in the United
States.
At the 1968 meeting of the American Statistical Associa
tion (ASA), I presented a paper from a similar perspective on
a similar topic.* I reflected on the contemporary condition
of productivity statistics (which has not changed profoundly
since) and on the data needs of a forthcoming second "for
mal program" of wage-price or income-price surveillance, a
peacetime program that "would presumably have an explicit
statutory basis, pervasive scope, and steady applica
tion—unlike its predecessor." By "predecessor," I meant,
of course, the pioneer monitoring venture—the KennedyJohnson version of jawboning-o/m-armtwisting, which still
Reprinted with minor changes from the 1972 Business and Economic Statistics Section Pro
ceedings of the American Statistical Association.
*See essay no. 5 in the present volume.
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showed twitches of life in 1968 but was surely "gone in the
teeth" as early as 1966. As for the second program to which I
already looked forward, Phase II was hardly being incubated
in 1968; indeed, it had not even been ovulated.
The third coming can now be safely predicted, although it
would be foolhardy to proceed to particulars—to the trigger
ing events, the specific objectives, the timing, the duration,
the onerousness of the new stabilization scheme. With some
luck, the nation should enjoy a brief respite, a brief reversion
to a freer economy, after Phase II ends (with a bong,
perhaps, instead of a whisper). Such an interlude would be
all to the good, according to today's dominant mentality (in
cluding mine), at least delaying a possible eventual slide into
permanent surveillance. Recurring episodes of control
presumably pose much less risk than does a continuing pro
gram to the traditional values that still command wide loyal
ty and that retain great functionality besides.
Candor, however, requires acknowledgment that every
society tends to adjust to whatever happens; so permanent
surveillance, if it does come to ours, could represent a much
less traumatic experience than anyone may now expect. I
remember being deeply troubled, while a staff member of the
Council of Economic Advisers in the Eisenhower years, by
the implications of a threatened leap from generalized
jawboning, from "macropreachment" of the verities of
wage-price-productivity algebra, to selective fingerpointing
and selective armtwisting. How relieved I was that the crises
of the time could be weathered without open and explicit
government intervention in wage-price decisionmaking; and
I still like to think that the 1958 Economic Report of the
President helped to make a difference. 1 In any case, the
1. An appendix cited egregious weaknesses of productivity statistics and presented two
(now standard) series for the private sector. These diverged sufficiently to disturb
economists and others who wanted only one (or none).
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shocks of two peacetime monitoring programs have since
been absorbed. In particular, when NEP* came suddenly in
August 1971 under unlikely political auspices, the domestic
calm could only make one wonder: Where are the noes of
yesteryear? True, the identity of initials with Lenin's NEP
was occasionally noted in the press, but no dire ideological
conclusion was drawn; and I saw no reference to the fact that
the US program came on the 50th anniversary of the USSR's
"one step backward" toward capitalism.
The prospect of another monitoring episode is latent in:
(1) the persistence, if not intensification, of cost-push
pressures in the private sector; (2) the governmental proneness to outrun revenues, to make budgetary outlays "uncon
trollable," and to match or exceed private pay scales; and
(3) the continuing weakness of our international balance-ofpayments position. My wise and eminent friend, Professor
Joseph J. Spengler, has recently summarized in a different
way this same disposition of our mixed private-public
economy to transform itself into a governmentallymonitored one:
Today it is assumed that the economic circle can be
squared; for ... it is supposed that a society may
have guaranteed full employment, price-level
stability, strong producer pressure groups (trade
unions, business and agriculture groups, govern
ment employees), and freedom from direct con
trols. In reality, of course, it is impossible for these
four objectives to be realized simultaneously; only
two, possibly three, are compatible. 2
*Nixon's NEP was a "New Economic Program," and Lenin's was a "New Economic
Policy."
2. Quoted in a "separate statement" by O.D. Duncan and P.B. Comely included in the
1972 Report of the (Rockefeller) Commission of Population Growth and the American
Future.
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Incidentally, when I speak of a peacetime program, I
merely follow a current convention, ignoring the legalistic
and semantic niceties I mastered a generation ago as chief
economist of Veterans Administration. Specifically, a
peacetime program need not imply the absence of war, even
a war that has contributed to the felt need for a control pro
gram in the first place. The important thing is that a program
should not be part of a general mobilization scheme, a
scheme for reallocating resources massively in the direction
of defense. Stated positively, a peacetime effort is one that is
directed against "unusual" and persisting pay and price up
surges threatened by familiar concentrations of market
power, by other constrictions of supply, and by the apparent
fiscal casualness of government.
The remainder of this paper is intended to be nonpartisan,
even "apartisan," but this disclaimer does not mean that I
should welcome bipartisan neglect as benign. I am pleased to
recall that my 1968 ASA paper was inserted into the Con
gressional Record by Senator Proxmire; that an earlier
paper, called "Guidelines for the Perplexed,"* was inserted
by him, with the prefatory comment that he did "not agree
with it in its entirety," into a volume of wage-price hearings
of the Joint Economic Committee.
II
In the design of the third peacetime program, benefit will
certainly be derived from the accumulating national ex
perience in "cry©economics." 3 Not everyone will distill the
*See essay no. 9 in this volume.
3. I regard it as unlikely that the third program would be preceded by any new effort at
"gradual" cooling of the economy through monetary means—through deliberate creation,
in effect, of "unemployment in the public interest." In 1969,1 suggested that, if monetary
hemlock is again administered to the economy to purge an inflationary fever, consideration
be given to "the sterilization of repatriable dollars that inopportunely swell the money sup
ply and the recapture for public use of 'excess profits' derived by financial institutions from
distorted interest rates." (Joint paper with A.H. Belitsky, "The Changing Form and Status
of Labor," Journal of Economic Issues, March 1970, pp. 78-94.)
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same lessons from this experience or discern in it the same set
of additional or alternative policy implications. I want to
state some of my own impressions since they have a bearing
on my view of statistical needs.
First of all, I believe that any provision for the expression
of continuing, serious, high-level, governmental interest in
private price and wage decisions is bound to have some ef
ficacy, whether this efficacy can be measured or not. Infla
tion does have a psychological component (which should
not, however, be exaggerated into all or most of the prob
lem, or be translated instead into a mystery without
handles). Organized groups in our society do exert market
power, and dominant business firms in different industries
do have some control over the prices they charge. The
economics of the modern era has always been recognized as
"political economy," and it becomes ever more so. In my
opinion, even governmental exhortation has some influence
as a form of education and leadership. Furthermore, this in
tervention, like the more stringent alternatives of
surveillance, can be reinforced by budgetary restraints, by an
example of moderation in pay revision, by use of monop
sony power, by curtailment of subsidies, and by action to ex
pand supply of services when action is taken to create or
enhance effective demand.
Above all, adoption of a formal program of surveillance
should not forestall governmental action to help make pay
and price standards self-enforcing. Indeed, by "internaliz
ing" public imperatives, by supplying incentives for com
pliance, we could get much better economic results while
diminishing the danger of coercion and reducing inevitable
inequities. For example, with all the futility at the command
of an ordinary citizen, I have proposed in the past that paydeferment bonds might be issued for protecting the purchas
ing power of pay increments that fall within the guideline
limit. Alternatively, and with equal unsuccess, I have sug-
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gested that tax benefits offsetting cost-of-living rises be
allowed for rewarding the "good guys" who accept infraguideline pay adjustments—for protecting them against
the inflation abetted by the "bad guys." I assume that the
enlistment of Internal Revenue Service in the administration
of Phase II will inspire some new ideas for using the tax
system to promote greater price stability.
The remarks I have already made point to a vital distinc
tion between the trumpeted equity for some and the muted
justice for all. The uneven distribution of market power
leaves the least organized citizens especially vulnerable to in
flationary aggression and inflationary pollution by others.
Perhaps, as the historic tendency toward organization pro
ceeds further, a better equilibrium of forces will finally
emerge; or, perhaps, the indecisiveness of the routine
economic war of all against all will become clear enough to
encourage greater cooperativeness in the common good
under governmental aegis. Another possibility is that the
organization of consumers, the elderly, and others may in
crease the number of "parties at interest" seeking a voice in
private-public wage and price determinations. For the third
generation, however, I prefer to continue emphasizing the
potential of incentives for self-enforcement—a bird much
closer to hand.
In short, a monitoring effort can help to moderate infla
tionary pressures, but its limitations and dangers counsel
modest objectives, less than complete coverage, and nonpermanence. It is only one tool that has to be used in conjunc
tion with others, and it is hardly the most important one. It is
a gross tool also, ill-suited to fine or frequent adjustment of
relative prices and wages. Since it cannot achieve justice for
all, it should aim for sufficient credibility during its lifetime.
It deals with only some of the sources and aspects of infla
tion, diverting attention from fundamental causes and
mechanisms to an administrative process. Beyond a certain
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point, especially if it is long-lived, it could help institu
tionalize inflation at a rate that is more or less tolerable to
the better-situated elements of the population. Termination,
the end game, is difficult; but involvement of the Internal
Revenue Service in administration may itself encourage
public resolve to find a way and hasten the day. As for
coverage, I like the idea of experimentation in the omission
of various categories of firms and employees from
surveillance; but such relaxation should be tried only after
very comprehensive monitoring has first been installed.
At this point, I wish to add that any comprehensive
"freeze" should do more than provide time for getting
monitoring machinery into place. It should not merely
change the rhythm of inflation—i.e., delay the process only
temporarily in exchange for a subsequent compensatory
bulge. Instead, it should slow the (average) metabolic rate,
envisage no later speedup. Insofar as practicable, what is
foregone should also be bygone in pay and profit; and im
provement should be sought in the relation of output to de
mand.
Ill
A monitoring program makes very considerable demands
on the nation's public and private data base—demands that
cannot really be met. This fact counsels modest objectives
for the program and tolerant administration, too—in addi
tion to counseling the desirability of improving data systems.
The upgrading of the private data base is especially
necessary for the maintenance of decentralized economic
decisionmaking. A monitored company must survive as well
as comply. It has to live and prosper in a competitive world,
according to the best and most relevant truth that it can
ascertain, as well as conform to administrative truth. In par
ticular, a monitor may act "as if a large company's current
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productivity pace is correctly reflected by the past perfor
mance of the industries in which its activities are located; but
the company's management needs to be aware of the actual
state of affairs.
Having had occasion in the past 15 years to advise firms
and other consultants on company measurement systems, I
am impressed with the apparent dearth and the routine
character of accessible private productivity series. I am
aware that company officials might not wish to volunteer in
formation that could thereafter be forced onto the bargain
ing table as wages are negotiated. I also appreciate that more
than one logical center of responsibility for such information
may exist in a modern corporation—say, the accounting
department and a vice president's planning staff—and that
internal rivalries could keep an outsider (or an ineligible in
sider) in the dark. Furthermore, "management information
systems" can, in this age of computers, become so turgid
that the crude productivity measures sometimes included in
their welter of periodic printouts simply go unrecognized and
unanalyzed.
Perhaps, the situation of companies will be a bit more
comfortable under the third-generation program. The em
phasis in Phase II on productivity figures and the limited of
ficial guidance given for their computation must have
stimulated company interest in such statistics. Furthermore,
the word "productivity" has suddenly blossomed into com
mon speech, becoming as popular and magical as, say, "R &
D" and "automation" were not so long ago.
Above, I referred to the unlikelihood that the data
demands of a monitoring program could truly be met. One
thing I had in mind—other than the dearth of company
measures of productivity—was the difficulty of expanding
the public and private base of correlative "atomic" data on
output, price, man-hours, and so forth. If detailed and in-
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tegrated industry information were available on a "product"
basis, we could always derive relatively unambiguous output
and productivity measures therefrom. We could also obtain
symmetrical, coordinate index numbers of productivity and
other variables deemed pertinent to a wage-price or incomeprice analysis. Resort would not be necessary to techniques
of deflation, which commonly involve numerators and
denominators that do not quite match, that are only obscure
ly related in structure and content. Such techniques provide
false comfort by meeting the requirements of verbal algebra;
but, unfortunately, the operational meaning of an index
number depends instead on its data content and on a strict
literal algebra. Besides, when it is difficult even to concep
tualize the specific "product" of an economic activity (as in
many service areas), the results of deflation are more
nebulous than ever.
A second serious statistical conundrum is posed by the fact
that a monitoring program must be oriented toward the
future rather than the past. What matters in fighting infla
tion or its symptoms is what productivity mil be in the
period to which a wage or price decision applies. The record
of a recent year or of the past decade is relevant only insofar
as it forecasts correctly what productivity will be. In a period
of expected recovery, for example, productivity will surely
not change as it has in a period of observed recession. In a
period of rapid growth of output, productivity does not
move as it does when saturation of a market is approached
or reached. Even in some of the earliest guideline comments,
as in the 1958 Economic Report of the President, it was ap
preciated that productivity prospects are more pertinent than
productivity history; but history, unfortunately, has become
the center of concern.
These insuperable data problems—the difficulty of getting
correlative "atomic" data for all companies, industries, and
sectors and the difficulty of making reliable productivity
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forecasts for the same entities—should be recognized in the
design and implementation of monitoring policy and pro
grams. Statistical compromises, substitutes, and alternatives
should be devised and interpreted with sufficient sensitivity
to ideal algebraic requirements and to economic realities.
At this point, I take note of the typical separation of wage
and price monitoring. In the third-generation program, I
should like to see closer coordination of the two tasks. If the
administration of wages has to remain separate from the ad
ministration of prices, it is still desirable, and it even
becomes necessary, to estimate the economy-wide implica
tions of particular adjustments. In principle, at least, the
input-output tool, identified with the name of Wassily Leontief and painstakingly developed at the Department of Com
merce as well as at Harvard, would seem adaptable to the
purpose. Again in principle, the input-output system could
even provide a cumulative register of interindustry impacts
and repercussions as additional wage and price determina
tions are made.
Another approach to coordination would involve the
design and construction of hierarchically and laterally con
sistent index numbers for companies, industries, and higher
aggregates. The difficulty of obtaining correlative "atomic"
data, already mentioned, remains a serious practical
obstacle. By hierarchical consistency, incidentally, I mean
vertical compatibility—structural compatibility for aggrega
tion (of companies into industries, etc.). By lateral consisten
cy, I mean that the multiplicatively-related variables of in
terest to the wage and price monitors have been treated sym
metrically, in an algebraically similar manner. I shall say
more about lateral consistency below.
When wage and price administration is pursued as two
distinct tasks, two different kinds of productivity seem to be
of interest—and they should not be confused. The wage ad-
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ministrator inevitably focuses on labor productivity; but the
price administrator's interest in cost structure leads to allinput (i.e., factor and nonfactor) productivity. Of course, if
all-factor returns are to be monitored, rather than wages
(and salaries), all-factor productivity has to be used instead
of labor productivity. It is a mistake to assume that produc
tivity measures are quantitatively equivalent regardless of
differences in the scope of the denominator.
It should also be clear that any kind of productivity
measure can be written in two distinct ways that are
algebraically equivalent. Each has a "quantity" form—a
ratio of output to input. Each also has a "price" form—the
ratio, in the case of labor productivity, of average hourly
earnings to unit labor cost. An analogous expression holds
for the measure of all-input productivity. I am aware of the
administrative convenience of expressing a percentage
change in productivity approximately as the difference be
tween percentage changes in the numerator and denomina
tor; and I am aware that the "price" form may be preferred
in such usage. Whatever the form, literal algebra remains
relevant; and it is still true that labor productivity and allinput productivity are not interchangeable.
If the problem of data supply did not exist, the two
monitoring tasks could be coordinated with the aid of an
index-number system that incorporates all of the variables of
interest and that treats these variables uniformly. In some of
my other papers, I have discussed the design of algebraically
consistent index numbers for variables occurring in a com
mon context. If sufficiently detailed data were available, one
could devise, say, homologous Laspeyres indexes for all the
multiplicatively-related variables. A "small" extra constant
term could be added to each so that the product of all the in
dexes satisfies the macroidentity that guided formula design.
What I have just described is a generalization to more than
two variables of the index-number system attributed to
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Stuvel. Other multivariable index-number systems, such as
my generalization of Fisher's "ideal" measure,4 are logically
more satisfactory, but they make still heavier data demands.
Simply for the sake of concreteness, I give an idea of the
content that might be imparted to the Stuvel-type Laspeyres
indexes. A wage monitor might wish to focus on productivi
ty, unit labor cost, and average hourly earnings. A price
monitor might wish to focus on three analogous concepts
referring to all-factor input. Both, in addition, care about
prices—and, perhaps, output. The product of all eight
variables (or reciprocals, as required) is the value of output.
Accordingly, each Laspeyres measure contains eight terms in
the numerator and eight in the denominator. When each in
dex has been adjusted to include the proper additive term,
the product of all of them is the value index. The system
treats all the variables symmetrically, and the adjusted
Laspeyres measures satisfy the proper macroidentity.*
Since data problems do exist, is there not some less de
manding alternative? Yes. Monitoring could rest on only one
productivity index (as in the Kennedy-Johnson program)
and, hence, on a simpler coordinating macroidentity. The
guidelines for prices and wages (or all incomes) could, for ex
ample, be administered with the aid of an index-number
system that is anchored to the value of output and
distinguishes, say, four (multiplied) variables: prices, pro
ductivity (labor or all-factor), the reciprocal of average hour
ly earnings (or the equivalent for all-factor returns), and
payrolls (or all incomes). I shall not go into various possible
refinements—such as the matching of net (or gross) output
with gross (or net) prices in the several index formulas.
4. I.H. Siegel, "Generalized 'Ideal' Index-Number Formula," Journal of the American
Statistical Association, December 1945, pp. 520-523.
The algebra is shown in I.H. Siegel, "A Common Framework for the Index-Number
Varieties," 1967 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the
American Statistical Association, pp. 402-405.
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The search for simpler measures may fruitfully be pressed
further—toward results that also contain hints for simplify
ing the monitoring program itself. Specifically, the
guidelines rules may be cast in terms of production (output)
rather than productivity. Somewhat less mystery surrounds
the measurement and interpretation of production, and its
projection may be contemplated with fewer qualms. Further
more, since properly-weighted production is additive (from
firm to firm and industry to industry), an attractive oppor
tunity for achievement of (approximate) hierarchical con
sistency is also presented. Weighted production estimates are
becoming increasingly available for components of the gross
national product according to industry of origin; and these
estimates for industries can be matched at the company level
with much less inhibition than would be experienced in the
case of productivity measurement. The work of the Bureau
of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce on
industry output and on implicit deflators can provide con
siderable guidance. Perhaps, a program of deliberate
measurement assistance to companies would represent a
good small public investment for future stabilization efforts
and other national purposes.
To see how production could replace productivity in the
monitoring process, let us start with the Kennedy-Johnson
(and Eisenhower) precept that average hourly earnings (or
the all-factor analogue) should rise no faster in the private
economy than labor (or all-factor) productivity. Since the
earnings and productivity have the same input denominator,
this criterion is equivalent (according to verbal algebra, and
can also be made equivalent in terms of literal algebra) to the
rule that: Payrolls (or all-factor returns) should rise no faster
than output. This rule, incidentally, also amounts to the
standard that: An output-weighted index of unit labor cost
(or of unit all-factor cost) should remain at, or fall below,
100. If unit labor (or all-factor) cost is assumed to be critical
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to price determination, and if policy tolerates a rise of 2.5
percent in such cost and price, then the index limit has to be
set at 102.5 instead of 100.
Going a step further, we may envisage a third-generation
monitoring system in which companies are asked, in the first
instance, to steer their courses according to rules relating to
production, factor-payment, and total-cost statistics for
their own operations. Preferably, the statistics should repre
sent projections for a target period (e.g., the next year).
These are the rules to be followed by each company:
1. Target factor payments should not exceed target output
weighted by base-period unit factor cost. (In obvious sym
bols, Iqjfj ^Iqif0.)
2. Target total cost should not exceed target output
weighted by base-period total cost per unit. (In obvious sym
bols, Sq^! ^ £qit0.)
The first rule sets a rein on incomes; the second, on total cost
expressed in "current" dollars. A third inequality, concern
ing the difference between total cost and total factor
payments, is implicit in these two. The rules can be adapted
to reflect a tolerated income increase or price increase—by
the simple insertion of the appropriate factor on the
righthand side of the appropriate inequality.
Every company, in short, could be given greater latitude in
regulating itself according to the guideline criteria establish
ed for the third-generation surveillance program. Achieve
ment of the national stabilization objective is not jeopardiz
ed by decentralized decisionmaking if the standards are ac
tually followed. The real problem is created by the excep
tions—by deliberate or tolerated deviations from the
uniform criteria. When exceptions are unavoidable, the price
monitor and the incomes monitor should (1) make compati
ble rulings and (2) look for other instances in which compen-
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satory constraint might be feasible. The algebra of the prob
lem is much easier for the administrators to follow in terms
of production aggregates than productivity averages.
Other advantages of shifting the emphasis to production
could be cited. Much of the difficulty of measuring produc
tivity really involves production, so explicit attention to
issues involving the latter concept (e.g., the availability of
suitable quantity data and the design of suitable deflators)
may be broadly beneficial. Furthermore, stabilization is only
one of the continuing or recurrent challenges of the domestic
scene; and projected output growth can be related more
naturally than productivity change to the other economic ag
gregates with which national policy is concerned, such as the
volume of employment and the supply of money and credit.
IV
To conclude this paper, I briefly restate a few of my points
without weaving them into a complete "argument." I regard
a third peacetime monitoring effort as inevitable. Although I
expect it to have some efficacy, it will need support in the
form of, say, fiscal "prudence." I hope that the program
will be nonpermanent, and I prefer that the errors be made in
the direction of liberal administration. In particular, I
should welcome the building-in of economic incentives for
self-enforcement—at least for voluntary restraint of wages
and salaries. With respect to statistics, I emphasize needs for
focusing on productivity prospects rather than history and
for providing frameworks for coordination of income and
price monitoring. Most important, I propose a switch of em
phasis from productivity to production in the design of
monitoring rules. This shift, I believe, offers a key to easier
and more consistent guideline administration. Furthermore,
it promises a better route toward strengthening the private
data base. Improved statistics, featuring production, would
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allow companies to contribute more effectively to the na
tional stabilization objective and to retain maximum
freedom for economic decisionmaking.

1968
Wage-Price-Productivity Statistics:
Old Gaps and New Needs
Information for Future Guidelines:
An Uncomplacent View
This paper concerns a field of economic policy that is
heavily laden with statistical interest. It concentrates on the
disparity between the data and measures that would be re
quired for the flexible or "liberal" administration of a
future formal program of wage-price monitoring and the
data and measures that are likely to be available instead. By
flexible or liberal administration, we mean the permission of
wide diversity in company and union decisionmaking. The
desideratum is: Official tolerance, if not encouragement, of
something like the present broad private discretion in wage
and price determination, within the mathematical and commonsense limits imposed by a national aim of aggregate
noninflationary performance. Although we speak here of
wage-price monitoring, we do not intend to exclude the alter
native prospect that nonwage and nonsalary remuneration
This paper presented at the 128th Annual Meeting of the American Statistical Association,
Pittsburgh, August 21, 1968, was published in Congressional Record, September 11, 1968,
and also appeared in the 1968 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section
of the American Statistical Association.
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too will come under regular scrutiny, that a comprehensive
"incomes policy" will actually be adopted.
Our topic has obvious civic importance but may attract
only a small fraction of the attention it deserves. Indeed,
past and contemporary experience suggests that the subject
may continue to be slighted even by technicians responsible
for the compilation of data and for the derivation, applica
tion, and interpretation of measures. In addition to repre
senting a professional communication, this paper has lessons
for public officials, legislators, and business and labor ex
ecutives, all of whom help to make and carry out policy; and
for journalists, who could serve more effectively in
educating the larger community by becoming better inform
ed themselves.
In the discussion that follows it is assumed that:
A. Our nation-state and national economy will survive the
disintegrative social and political strains which have so
dramatically become evident.
B. Continual, ever-fuller employment will become a more
explicit federal aim, emerging as the preferred and most con
servative route among those tried or promised for the general
achievement of higher personal incomes and higher living
scales.
C. Active fiscal policy in support of this extended employ
ment objective will become incorporated in the national
style, whatever the political party in power and whatever the
name by which such policy is called.
D. Accompanying upward pressures on wages and prices
will demand an institutional counterweight, and this correc
tive will be provided sooner or later by a formal program of
wage-price surveillance. A formal program would
presumably have an explicit statutory basis, pervasive scope,
and steady application—unlike its predecessor, which was
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born in 1962 and is commonly declared to have died circa
1966, but seemed in the summer of 1968 only to have been
sleeping on a tombstone.
The reference to " disparity" in the second sentence of this
paper provides a clue to the position that is elucidated here.
An examination of the present state of the public and private
information supply, of past gains, and of portents does not
justify confidence that a future formal program of wageprice monitoring is bound to be benign. Although the deci
sion to adopt a policy commonly runs ahead of the social
stock of data, derived measures, and knowledge, the conduct
of a policy is critically affected, nevertheless, by the
availability, compatibility, and diffusion of information.
Thus, in the absence of an adequate information base, ad
ministration could well be Procrustean, simplistic, arbitrary,
uneven, capricious. The total statistical base is now woefully
inadequate for liberal guideline administration, and it seems
destined to remain so. Indeed, if the authoritarian potential
of formal monitoring does not materialize in the future,
credit will have to be given to factors other than the quantity,
quality, and distribution of wage-price-productivity infor
mation. Some possibly compensatory features of the future
program are specified later.
This judgment goes counter to the impression conveyed by
ubiquitous and recurrent reports of statistical improvement
and of continual progress toward greater and even more
precise economic knowledge. Despite the incremental ad
vances actually being made all the time in filling various
advertised gaps in the federal statistical system (and these
gains and the efforts they entail are not here disparaged), a
fundamental limitation of the data base for flexible ad
ministration of wage-price-productivity policy persists. This
root problem has been obvious throughout the long history
of index-number construction. Although it is taken for
granted by most makers and users of measures, it is not sub-
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ject, alas, to casual or incidental correction by incremental
gap-filling progress. The data limitation continually obliges
the derivation, application, and juxtaposition of indicators
that may carry an intolerable wrapper of noise around an undistinguishable core of message. As for the private contribu
tion to our national information resource, companies ob
viously have great new opportunities to enlist the computer
in support of diversity in decisionmaking without prejudice
to national guideline constraints. These opportunities are not
likely to be exploited effectively or soon enough, however,
especially in the absence of determined government leader
ship to improve and enlarge the joint public-private data
bank for the express purpose of compatible measurement of
key guideline variables from the national economy down to
the firm. Significant implementation of this purpose would
provide an information base that also is better suited for
solution of tomorrow's urgent measurement prob
lems—problems yet to be defined.
The inappropriate focus of the informal guideline pro
gram adopted in 1962 on past productivity trends obscures
another statistical complication that will have to be faced in
any serious future effort to restrain the inflationary
pressures engendered by pursuit of ever-fuller employment.
Wage criteria should be based on prospects regarding pro
ductivity and unit labor cost, not on history—and
forecasting must remain an unreliable art in a society that is
still mostly open-ended. Unfortunately, the mechanical ex
trapolation of productivity trends for the whole economy,
for its parts, and for firms is not the same as making correct
near-term projections. Furthermore, errors of optimism in
projection cannot be easily undone; the Moving Finger, hav
ing writ, cannot be lured back by political piety or
bureaucratic wit to cancel embedded inflationary excesses.
In short, the outlook for permissiveness in a regime of for
mal wage-price guidelines is dimmed by the improbability of
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a great leap forward with regard to the volume and sound
ness of measures and by a need to depend, in any case, upon
uncertain forecasting. From the statistical standpoint, Pro
crustean enforcement would appear inevitable, as experience
with the informal program instituted in 1962 may also hint.
Because of data problems and conceptual difficulties,
historical change in guideline variables cannot now be gaug
ed unequivocally for the majority of industries and industry
complexes; and, in many important instances, it is not now
being gauged at all. Furthermore, the informational require
ment for constructing guideline index numbers that are
mutually adapted and modularly compatible from the na
tional economy down to the firm greatly exceeds any
reasonable prospect of supply. Indeed, an expectation of
substantial improvement in this direction could well prove a
silly dream. Furthermore, even if the desired measures were
miraculously to become computable, the challenge of ac
curate projection would still have to be met. It appears that
to live as free men by the numbers under a new dispensation
of formal guidelines would involve a double miracle—the
capture not simply of unicorns but of unicorns that fly.
The presentation below of two sets of structurally matched
index-number formulas that are especially pertinent to flexi
ble guideline administration makes the staggering informa
tional requirement very explicit. Each set of formulas, based
on a common paradigm, deals equitably with all associated
guideline variables and would permit modularly compatible
measurement for all levels down to the individual firm. One
of the two sets, furthermore, could assist in the conduct of
integrated wage-price and monetary policy—a marriage
essential to the success of any program for continual con
tainment of inflationary forces.
Although the two index-number schemes cannot be effec
tively implemented with the information that now exists or
that is likely to become available in the visible future, they do
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provide helpful models—standards for practice, for criticism
and evaluation, and for possible technical improvement.
They offer criteria for design and analysis of constructible
compromise measures and for appraisal of available
measures—the measures that have to be used in conjunction
with each other for want of better alternatives. They indicate
desirable directions of data reform and extension, whether
or not movement along these paths is practicable. They sug
gest the kinds of test and experimental measures that ought
to be approximated wherever feasible. Finally, our algebraic
exercise is relevant, even at the present time, to an undertak
ing announced in the 1968 Economic Report of the President
(p. 92): "A new economic tableau that will ultimately pro
vide comprehensive information on output, labor input,
price, and productivity by major sectors on a quarterly
basis."
Incrementalism and the Unpolishable Flaw
The fundamental defect in our public and private informa
tion system, from the standpoint of measurement for liberal
guideline administration, is easy to state. It is: The absence
of coordinated or correlative data on a product or quasiproduct basis for quantities and prices of outputs, offactor
inputs, and of inputs derived from other places or time
periods. By quasi-products, we mean definable components
of normally identified gross products and services—especial
ly components that, by virtue of greater homogeneity, are
more amenable to aggregation. These components, which
may be called "subproducts" in the case of physical output
and "activities" in the case of services, correspond to the
"arcs" of total output cycles. 1
1. The measurement of quasi-products has been proposed and discussed before by I.H.
Siegel—e.g., in Concepts and Measurement of Production and Productivity, Washington,
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1952; and "The Concept of Productive Activity," Journal
of the American Statistical Association, June 1944, pp. 218-228.
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The flaw in the data base cannot be easily or significantly
remedied, certainly not by gap-filling here and there. The
systematic compilation and maintenance of "atomic" cor
relative data would not only prove an overwhelming task and
entail prohibitive costs, but it cannot even be pursued very
far (especially in the case of nonmanufacturing industries)
without encountering stubborn, perhaps insuperable, con
ceptual problems. Indeed, the designation of products or
quasi-products for such service industries as government and
finance and for such pursuits as research and development is
a philosophical challenge that most economists and statisti
cians have become accustomed to shun like a direct glance at
the Gorgon Medusa.
If coordinated basic data were generally available, it
would be possible to do two things that are important for
flexible guideline administration—and much else besides.
First, structurally matched, or laterally consistent, index
numbers could be constructed for the guideline variables.
Second, hierarchically compatible index numbers could be
constructed for these variables for all levels of aggregation,
from the national economy down to individual companies.
Furthermore, more meaningful quarterly or monthly
measures could be devised; and the quantitative treatment of
joint or overhead operations, inventory changes,
multiprocess end-products, nonstandardized output, and
services in general could be rendered more plausible. The
measure for each guideline variable would be certain, ac
cording to its design, to be an internal mean of
relatives—i.e., a number lying between the minimum and the
maximum change ratios computed (or computable) for in
dividual products or quasi-products. The index for any
higher level of aggregation would also be an internal average
of the corresponding measures for lower levels. Although in
dex numbers, or measures purporting to be index numbers,
are usually interpreted as internal means, the presumption
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may not be warranted. Their manner of derivation frequent
ly renders them conceptually vague and structurally
nondescript—black boxes filled, perhaps, with black jelly.
As we look about, we may well be impressed, if not
reassured, by the cheerful acceptance of the chasm between
desirable and actual information for guideline use. In
general, it is agreeably assumed that the statistical communi
ty can and will make do; that ingenuity and cosmetics may be
substituted indefinitely for coordinated data compiled on a
product or quasi-product basis; that, once acknowledged,
the fundamental flaw in the data base may salutarily be ig
nored. Little curiosity is usually shown regarding the conun
drums of quasi-product definition and quantification, and
only occasional enthusiasm is registered for a frontal assault
on these difficulties. Two decades or more ago, the industry
and product detail of the biennial and quinquennial Census
of Manufactures inspired the microdata approach to produc
tion and productivity measurement. The paucity of building
blocks was recognized; company surveys were stressed for
augmentation of the supply, but the difficulty of significant
further progress within and beyond manufacturing was also
conceded. In the subsequent era of national accounting (in
current and constant prices), the illusion has been fostered
that indirection can generally break the data impasse. Ac
cording to the new rites, sound statistical edifices may sup
posedly be erected by a quick and dirty (really, very sanitary)
application of an algebra of words. It is fashionable, for ex
ample, to deflate thick or thin veneers of value information
by more or less relevant, and often scrappy, price indexes.
This technique does readily yield facades, if not solid
buildings; and it often simulates measurement for larger
components of the economy with much less information and
effort than for smaller components. Strangely, the concep
tual and structural obscurities of deflated measures and of
others derived with the benefit of a ceremonial cancellation
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of words help them to circulate like universal coin; they are
exempt from fine-grain scrutiny and accepted too eagerly for
all contexts and purposes.
The challenge of liberal guideline administration should
remind us of the continuing relevancy of the index-number
chapters of elementary textbooks in economic or business
statistics. Although latter-day sophistication seems to sanc
tion routine resort to indirection and to low-grade verbal
algebra in measurement, we still have to imagine what direct
attempts with appropriate microdata would yield. Such
Platonic types ever provide the standards required for ap
proximation and appraisal. The object of computation, after
all, is not simply to generate numbers having agreeable labels
but, rather, to derive adequate and dependable answers. It is
useful to know the difference between what is done and what
ought to have been done instead. To bang with a sword upon
the reflection of the Medusa in the shield of Perseus is not
the same as slaying her.
The flood of public and private studies and reports offer
ing wage-price-productivity computations or calling for im
provements in this general area rarely addresses such fun
damental matters as the enlargement of the stock of coor
dinated data and the provision of laterally and hierarchically
consistent measures. The dominance of incrementalism is as
clear as it is natural. It is evident from a perusal of represen
tative contributions to the literature of the past decade or
so—e.g., a report made in 1957 to the Joint Economic Com
mittee, The National Economic Accounts of the United
States (especially Chapter 6); Economic Reports of the Presi
dent for 1958 and more recent years, including 1968; the
"Special Analysis" of federal statistics included annually in
the Budget of the United States Government; the 1962 report
of the President's Committee to Appraise Employment and
Unemployment Statistics, Measuring Employment and
Unemployment; the 1964 report of the Bureau of the Budget
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on Measuring Productivity of Federal Government
Organizations; and numerous documents issued by the Joint
Economic Committee, which held hearings and reported in
1967 on "The Coordination and Integration of Government
Statistical Programs."
Incremental statistical advance has, of course, left some
important old gaps unplugged while also not improving our
capacity to meet today's—or tomorrow's—fundamental
measurement challenges. In this connection, note should be
taken of some remarks made by the president of the
American Statistical Association (ASA) at the end of 1967. 2
Despite more than a trebling of government expenditures on
statistical programs in the course of a decade, he observed
that the outlays still amounted to "not quite one-tenth of 1
percent of the Federal budget." Despite the technical pro
gress made in the past, he could still list "better statistics on
wages, productivity, and unit labor costs" as his "first plea"
for "needed improvements" in economic measurement. In
particular, he cited the need for a comprehensive indicator of
hourly earnings in manufacturing, one that covers all
employees and includes fringe benefits. He also referred to
"the inadequacies of current measures of output per
manhour and of labor costs per unit of output." About such
measures, which have "highly important uses," he said:
They are needed monthly, they should be com
prehensive as well as comparable in their coverage,
and they should also be made available for in
dividual industries. Progress is being made in some
of these directions, but the results are scarcely visi
ble. I believe there is need for a very significant im
provement here. 3
2. G.H. Moore, "Some Needed Improvements in Economic Statistics," American Statisti
cian, December 1967, especially p. 29.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
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This statement, of course, has remarkable implications for a
radical revision of the national data base. The statement
demands, in effect, a vast commitment to compile cor
relative information for subproducts and homogeneous ac
tivities. Such a reorientation of federal statistics, however,
seems no more likely now than it did, say, when the present
author explicitly noted the same need in the early 1950s. 4
More recently and in another role, the same president of
the ASA took oblique cognizance of a persisting defect in
manufacturing production statistics and of a dubious
method of measuring manufacturing productivity. The
statistical defect has been exacerbated during the past
generation of general broad progress, and the exceptionable
technique of deriving productivity estimates for manufactur
ing seems to have become the norm:
The precision of the inferences drawn from
economic data often depends crucially upon a clear
understanding of how the data were compiled and
what they signify. As an example, take the fairly
common practice of obtaining a current index of
productivity change by dividing the Federal
Reserve index of industrial production by the manhours of employment of industrial workers. Unless
one were aware that the compilers estimate a very
large fraction of the production index from manhours of employment adjusted by extrapolated
estimates of change in output per man-hour, one
would not realize that the computation was to a
considerable degree simply reproducing the
previous extrapolations. Nor would one be con-

4. Siegel, Concepts and Measurement, p. 99.
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cerned to find out to what extent one's conclusions
were affected by this circumstance. 5
This quotation refers, in a veiled manner, to the fundamen
tal data flaw that creates a permanent quasi-gap in the main
index of industrial production and leads to a most uncritical
use of low-grade verbal algebra in productivity measure
ment. It recalls more direct—and ineffectual—allusions
made many times during the past two or three decades to the
same regrettable defect of the industrial production index. 6

Identities for Measurement
and Administration7
A central place in guideline theory and practice must be
reserved for verbal or accounting identities. Such defini
tional statements, especially multiplicative ones, provide
useful frameworks for the design of mutually adapted for-

5. G.H. Moore, "Toward Precision in Economic Knowledge," in Toward Improved
Economic and Social Measurement: Forty-Eighth Annual Report, National Bureau of
Economic Research, New York, June 1968, pp. 16-17.
6. See, for example, Siegel, "The Concept of Productive Activity" (footnote 1), pp.
227-228; and W.D. Evans and I.H. Siegel, "The Meaning of Productivity Indexes," Jour
nal of the American Statistical Association, March 1942, especially pp. 109-110. In "Pro
gress and Problems of Physical Output Measurement," an unpublished half-century review
paper presented by Siegel at the 1950 meeting of the American Statistical Association, the
following sentence appears: "The Federal Reserve index structure was kept standing [dur
ing World War II] by feats of statistical carpentry which otherwise had some dubious
aspects—like the use of man-hour series, generally with pseudo-productivity adjustments,
for Government manufacturing facilities and for industries accounting for two-fifths of the
private manufacturing aggregate in the prewar period."
7. This section derives from other writings of the present author—e.g., Concepts and
Measurement; "On the Design of Consistent Output and Input Indexes for Productivity
Measurement," in Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), pp. 23-41; "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index Numbers,"
1965 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American
Statistical Association, pp. 369-372; and Aggregation and Averaging (Kalamazoo: The
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, May 1968).
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mulas to represent the guideline variables, for a
discriminating choice among available measures, and for a
distinction between mere verbal algebra and the more
rigorous requirements of literal algebra. By contributing to
an appreciation of the difference between micromeasurement and macromeasurement, they make clear that latitude
exists for discretion in guideline administration—that the
prescription of macroconstraints on aggregate behavior does
not preclude microflexibility, as though the whole economy
were simply one firm making one product.
At the atomic level, identities are unambiguously
translatable into numbers; but, for higher levels, the cor
respondence between words or symbols and the magnitudes
representing them has to be contrived. Identities, being
definitions or tautologies, are necessarily true for the
associated variables of individual products or subproducts.
When we deal with combinations of products or subproducts, however, the congruence of words and numbers
does not automatically obtain. Thus, verbal identities have
to be made or kept numerically true for firms, industries,
and higher levels of aggregation; and two general procedures
are available for so doing, one of which is far superior to the
other according to the viewpoint of this paper.
The less desirable method of assuring correspondence be
tween words and numbers is the one frequently practiced in
index-number work. "Any old" measures are accepted for
all but one of the macrovariables associated in an identity,
and the remaining magnitude is determined residually (e.g.,
by deflation, multiplication, addition, or subtraction). The
nature of this residual measure depends entirely on the con
tent and structure of its companions; and gilt may not be ac
quired by such association. The magnitude may be volatile
and spurious; among other limitations, it may lie outside the
range of the relatives for products or subproducts.
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The second approach to congruence is preferable in princi
ple but would require a fundamental overhaul of the data
base. It takes direct account of the requirements of literal
algebra as a matter of design. It specifies the forms and in
gredients of the measures of the jointly considered variables
and assures that these variables are treated equitably. It may
also assure that the index-number formulas register changes
intermediate in magnitude between the minimum and max
imum relatives for individual products or subproducts; and
that the numerical results obtainable directly are also ob
tainable by such indirect techniques as deflation.
To give concreteness to these remarks and to provide a
corridor to the final sections of this paper, we consider three
examples pertinent to guideline measurement and ad
ministration. The first identity is the familiar one connecting
hourly compensation, unit labor cost, and productivity:
Average hourly remunerations Unit labor cost X
Output per man-hour.
When hourly remuneration rises more rapidly than manhour productivity, unit labor cost necessarily rises too, and
this increase exerts an upward pressure on prices. But the
pressure is not necessarily translated into a price in
crease—for any firm or for the whole economy. Whether or
not such translation occurs is a proper matter for observa
tion or econometric inquiry. Certainly, the translation
should not be forced by a guideline interpretation that insists
on the removal of all companies from the ingenious world in
which they actually live to a simplistic Cobb-Douglas model.
If we are not satisfied to confine attention to unit labor
cost or if we do not regard it as properly determinative of
price change, we may use an identity that brings price ex
plicitly into the picture. Doing so also requires the introduc-
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tion of a term representing the share of wages in value added
(or total factor income):
Average hourly_
Payroll
remuneration
Value added
Price X Output per man-hour.
This expression may be of greater administrative and
analytic interest, but it would also require more information.
Returning to the first identity above, we may multiply
both sides by man-hours and arrive at a statement that still
focuses attention on unit labor cost, but as the link between
two aggregates, total payroll and total output:
Payroll =Unit labor cost X Output.
This version has certain advantages over the original with
respect to measurement and administration. It is also useful
in joining growth and fiscal policies to monetary policy—a
coordination greatly to be desired for price stabilization. If
constant unit labor cost in the economy at large is deemed to
be critical for price stability, the new statement suggests that
total payroll should not be allowed to rise more rapidly than
total output. According to the quantity theory of money and
various proposals for translating this theory into practice, 8
the increase in the supply of money and credit should be
reasonably related to the prospect for output. Consequently,
the joint policy standard may be stated thus: The payroll
total should not be allowed to rise faster in the whole
economy than aggregate net output, which in turn should
govern the rate of increase in money and credit.
Four observations are in order:
A. Since the three verbal relations for guideline variables
are atomic definitions that are to be preserved at higher
8. See, for example, Standards for Guiding Monetary Action, Joint Economic Committee,
U.S. Congress (Washington: 1968).
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levels of aggregation, they need to be viewed as truisms not
subject to negotiation. Thus, if we really mean to preserve
price stability through constancy of unit labor cost, we are
not at liberty to sweeten an identity with a cost-of-living ad
justment. An identity cannot be bribed in the interest of
equity. This remark is not a value judgment; it does not pro
pose that equity should be subordinated politically to literal
price stability.
B. For liberal guideline administration, it is necessary to
concede that many different frequency distributions, many
different patterns of company (and union) behavior, are
compatible with stability of average unit labor cost and of
the price level. Indeed, if every company makes a wage ad
justment reflecting its own productivity outlook, a correctly
projected national productivity increase could still be
respected. That is, no upward pressure on the price level
need arise from labor payments, a fact easily seen from the
third identity, which features aggregates.
This preference for microflexibility within the limits of the
macroalgebra is not endorsed by the Council of Economic
Advisers, which asserted in the 1968 Economic Report (p.
124):
. . . that price stability can be achieved and main
tained only to the extent: (1) that increases in hour
ly compensation generally conform to the average
economywide improvement of output per manhour; and (2) that changes in prices in individual
sectors generally conform to changes in unit labor
costs in those sectors.
These are not really necessary, or unique, conditions for
price stability. Besides, Procrustean administration along
these lines would not conduce to "efficient allocation of
resources," which the Council also seeks through a guideline
program (p. 120).
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C. To facilitate flexible administration of guidelines, to
accommodate diversity in company (and union) behavior
(even in the absence of ideal statistics), the future formal
program of wage-price surveillance might incorporate cer
tain noncoercive features for dampening inflationary ex
uberance in the first place. Thus, the writer has proposed
elsewhere that non-negotiable "wage-deferment bonds" of
guaranteed purchasing power be issued to workers accepting
less than the productivity increase set as a national criterion.
Furthermore, syndical arrangements by government with
labor and business might stipulate avoidance of speculative
wage and price adjustments in consideration of the economic
stability afforded by active fiscal policy. The coordination of
active fiscal policy with "responsible" monetary policy
would reinforce this argument. Again, as in the most recent
steel industry confrontation (August 1968), the federal
government might act energetically and more consistently as
a self-interested monopsonist, rather than as a coercive
public authority. Finally, an important role must be reserved
to education of the nation with regard to guideline relation
ships, even though such education may nowadays be derided
as exhortation, earstroking, or macropreachment.
D. A shift of emphasis in guideline administration to pros
pective (rather than past or recent) changes in productivity
would require no alteration, of course, of the guideline iden
tities. The effectiveness and the probable flexibility of ad
ministration, however, would be affected by the ability of
appropriate officials to make reliable national productivity
forecasts.

Matched Index-Number Formulas:
Wages, Prices, and Productivity
The conversion of multiplicative verbal identities into
literal algebra is straightforward. The second of the three ex-
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pressions presented in the preceding section,
Payroll
Average hourly =
added
Value
remuneration
Price X Output per man-hour.
will now be developed into several variant sets of matched
index-number formulas, and these formulas will be combin
ed into alternative unique sets. 9
First, we rewrite the statement in symbols. Thus, we start
with E=R* P-TT, where the meaning of the capital letters is
obvious.
The next step is to cast this identity into a macrotruism for
aggregative index numbers, the numerators and
denominat9rs of which have the standard form, 2r/?7r,
when written without time subscripts (i.e., without 0 for the
base period and 1 for any other period). For E, we have a
unique expression, 2 rjpj irr 1 /^Lr0p0 'rr 0 which may be
displayed more conveniently in terms of the time subscripts
as lll/OOO. For R, P, TT , however, we do not have unique
measures, or even one set of measures. Indeed, six different
sets of formulas satisfy the requirements of both verbal and
QU
m
m
literal algebra:
000

~~

Oil
111
Oil
101
001
110
010
100
000
100
000

001
010
000
111
101
010
000
110
100
111
101

000
Oil
010
001
000
111
110
111
110
101
100

9. The method here employed is discussed at greater length by I.H. Siegel, "A Common
Framework for the Index-Number Varieties," 1967 Proceedings of the Business and
Economic Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association, pp. 402-405.

Statistical Gaps & Needs (1968:1)

97

Looking down each column at the right, we see that four
distinct aggregative indexes exist for R, for P, and for TT
Two of the four are Laspeyres and Paasche analogues, and
each of these two occurs twice; the remaining two measures
might be called "intermediate" varieties, since they have
weights relating to the periods 0 and 1.
How can we harmonize the six variant sets of measures?
One way, which is especially attractive, is to take the sixth
root of both sides of the identities. This method treats the
macrovariables symmetrically. Besides, the result for each
macrovariable is a geometric mean—a generalized Fisher
ideal index. 10 Since we can make each aggregative index an
internal mean of relatives (by restricting it to positive terms
only), the generalized index for each macrovariable is
necessarily an internal mean also.
Other modes of harmonization are less satisfactory; for,
although they preserve symmetry, they can lead to external
means for the macrovariables. Thus, a second way to adjust
begins with the Laspeyres or Paasche variety for each
macrovariable and adds the same unknown constant to it;
this constant is then determined from the identity binding all
the macrovariables. The result for each macrovariable turns
out to be a generalized Stuvel index. 11 A third way also
begins with the Laspeyres or Paasche "kernel" for each
macrovariable, but the unknown constant is a multiplier in
stead. Still another adjustment process involves raising the
selected kernel indexes to a constant power.
Now, we give greater specificity to the symbols. For each
product or quasi-product, we suppose that e, r, and TT refer to
several kinds of workers having different hourly rates; that
output is measured net in a value-added sense; that price is
10. I.H. Siegel, "The Generalized 'Ideal' Index-Number Formula," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, December 1945, pp. 520-523.
11. Siegel, "Common Framework for the Index-Number Varieties."
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measured gross; and that more than one variety of nonfactor
input, each having a distinct price, has to be subtracted from
gross output. Stripped of time subscripts, the prototype ex
pression for every numerator or denominator may then be
written as
qSme
\
p
pq-SPQ
Sm J
The letter S designates a sum of items corresponding to a
product or quasi-product; it is to be distinguished from £ ,
which is used for a grand total. The symbol m stands for
man-hours, q for a gross product, p for a gross price, Q for a
nonfactor input, and P for a corresponding nonfactor price.
All the terms corresponding to r, /?, and IT are normally
positive.
Instead of taking output as net and price as gross, we may
switch these two adjectives and make appropriate ad
justments in the prototype aggregate. We should note, in this
connection, that, for each product or quasi-product, total
value added may be written not only as
p (q- SPQ\ but also as q (p- SP® \
\
P I
\
q I
Four additional points merit mention as we bring this sec
tion to a close:
A. The measure of net product implicit in the index system
described two paragraphs earlier resembles, but is not the
same as, that identified with the names of Fabricant and
Geary (and, apparently, with the names of Svennilson and
R. Wilson, too). Indeed, our implicit measure of net product
requires less information; it involves, not so-called "double
deflation," but deflation by gross price only.
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B. An output or productivity measure emerging from
three-variable multiplication is more complex than, and need
not show the same numerical changes as, the two-variable
formula developed at the WPA National Research Project12
in the 1930s and later used for guiding computations of the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
C. Any change of terms in a verbal identity leads to a dif
ferent prototype sum. The magnitudes shown by variant
measures for a particular macrovariable can be affected
since a change of terms amounts to a change in weighting
pattern.
D. The amount of coordinate information required for
each product or quasi-product exceeds the usual supply, as
this paper has noted throughout.

Matched Index-Number Formulas:
Unit Labor Cost
Use of a simpler identity,
Payroll=Unit labor cost X Output,
as a framework for guideline measurement and administra
tion places a lighter load on the base of coordinated data. It
leads to two variant sets of expressions for the
microvariables. The payroll index on the left is again assum
ed to be fixed; and, for each macrovariable on the right,
Paasche and Laspeyres varieties emerge. The geometric
mean of the two variant sets yields Fisher's ideal indexes for
unit labor cost and output.
We may write the verbal identity in symbols as W=C • Z
and proceed as before to obtain two sets of structurally ar12. H. Magdoff, I.H. Siegel, and M.B. Davis, Production, Employment, and Productivity
in 59 Manufacturing Industries, 1919-36, WPA National Research Project, Philadelphia,
May 1939.
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ticulated formulas. The prototype aggregate is Icz, and the
invariant payroll index is Xcz/ 2c= 11/00.
In particular, we may specify that total output is to be
measured net; and that all the indexes are to be "condensed"
expressions consistent with the more complex formulas
derived in the preceding section. The prototype sum, without
subscripts, is
,_ SPQ\

which is obviously equivalent to

Such consistent formulas, linking two identities, would be
especially relevant to efforts to coordinate fiscal policy and
monetary policy.
Of course, other identities involving unit labor cost may be
adopted as frameworks for the derivation of matched for
mulas pertinent to guideline administration. For example,
we may break output into the product of productivity and
man-hours and derive another identity,
Payroll=Unit labor cost X Output per man-hour X
Man-hours,
that requires a three-variable prototype aggregate.
Babel, Yes; But Clamor?
This paper has focused on the inadequacy of the present
and prospective supply of data and measures for the liberal
administration of a future formal guideline program.
Whatever the condition of the statistical base, continual,
pervasive, and regular wage-price surveillance is likely to be
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adopted; and, if Procrustean or authoritarian administration
proves avoidable, credit will presumably have to go to
nonstatistical features of the monitoring system.
Liberal guideline administration would be decisively
favored by the availability of projections of: (1) laterally ar
ticulated index numbers for all guideline variables that are
also (2) modularly compatible for all economic levels down
to the individual firm. Such measures are easy to design
within the frameworks of verbal or accounting identities
especially appropriate to particular settings. Two distinct
sets of formulas are illustrated in this paper; and, since
variant subsets can always be harmonized, all the guideline
variables may be treated equitably. The existence of com
pany measures consistent with indexes for higher levels of
aggregation would allow wide variation in the behavior of
firms without prejudice to attainment of the macroconditions set for noninflationary national performance.
The measures just described, however, are not implementable with the kind of information now at hand. They re
quire the development and maintenance of a vast base of
coordinated atomic data for products and quasi-products;
and accomplishment of this task would not only prove pro
hibitively expensive but also be impeded by formidable con
ceptual and technical difficulties. Even if the data problem
could be resolved successfully, another nasty challenge, only
hinted in the preceding paragraph, would have to be met: the
reasonably correct projection of guideline indexes at all
economic levels (since prospects are more pertinent than
history to any serious effort of wage-price stabilization).
Although the existing information system is always being
improved, it cannot now provide, and should not be ex
pected routinely in the future to provide, voluminous cor
relative data compiled on a product or quasi-product basis.
Companies should be encouraged to develop such data with
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the aid of the electronic data-processing equipment to which
they nowadays have easy access; but any progress toward an
articulated national system depends critically upon determin
ed federal leadership. Advances normally made in the supply
of published statistics are incremental, rather than fun
damental; the typical gap-filling improvement does not in
cidentally augment the supply of atomic data capable of
combination and recombination in alternative ways to meet
the recognized problems of today and the problems of
tomorrow that are yet to be defined. Indeed, only correlative
atomic data are truly "general-purpose'*; the index numbers
of output, productivity, wages, and prices that are often call
ed "general-purpose" are misnamed although their pro
liferation and strengthening should ever be welcomed. Only
a vast supply of coordinated atomic information would per
mit the computation of structurally matched index numbers
appropriate to particular contexts and uses. In the absence of
such data, the index numbers that have to be used may yield
results that are not altogether satisfactory; they can always
meet the low-grade requirements of verbal algebra, but the
demands of literal algebra are more exacting, and the risk of
confusing noise with message is great.
We conclude with a sentence that could have served at the
beginning as leitmotiv. Although it conies from a paper
presented at a Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth in October 1958, it is still timely. Early that year, the
Economic Report of the President helped to dampen the en
thusiasm that was building up in the business community for
the official establishment of a numerical beacon that might
help to moderate wage demands. The Report made its con
tribution by phrasing the productivity criterion for noninflationary wage increase in terms of prospects (forecasting was
then regarded with more of the skepticism it still deserves);
and by including an appendix that dwelt on weaknesses of
productivity statistics and that offered two private-sector
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measures not quite in accord with each other. Later,
however, in 1962, a numerical beacon was established—a
light that failed. Now, as we contemplate a more formal
guideline program, the sentence of 1958 still has something
to say to all who care about flexible administration:
So crude are existing quantitative tools compared
to the ones required that clamor for more detailed
and more complete basic statistics would surely
seem as appropriate as the babel of diagnosis and
prescription heard throughout the land. 13
13. See Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement, p. 38.

1968
The Kerner Commission Report
and Economic Policy
Parti
Implications of the Kerner Commission Report
for Economic Policy
This statement, organized around three heads, considers
some of the remarks, findings, and recommendations of the
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (the Kerner Report) in the light of the Joint
Economic Committee's letter of invitation. The points of
departure for my first two sections are the two sentences in
the Report that refer most explicitly to the Employment Act
of 1946; these sentences were cited, though not quoted
literally, in the Committee's letter. Following the Commit
tee's lead in one other respect, I have used the commercial
edition of the Report, energetic promotion of which seems to
have relegated the handsomer but tardier official version to
obscurity.
At the outset, I should admit to a certain vacillation be
tween two views of the future in the preparation of this statePrepared statement accompanying oral testimony of June 4, 1968, before the Joint
Economic Committee.
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ment. The first view, which it is natural to assume and
prefer, is that the established order will prove adequate to
the stern challenges impending at home and in the interna
tional arena. Domestically, according to this view, the task,
say, of greatly improving the economic and social status of
racial minorities will be resolved more or less satisfactorily,
in good enough time. The stresses will be accommodated
with flexibility and resilience, and the needed adjustments
made without essential impairment of the viability of the
Republic. On the contrary, the foundation of popular sup
port would even be strengthened. This is the vision that
animates the Kerner Report: "to make good the promises of
American democracy to all citizens—urban and rural, white
and black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and every
minority group" (page 2).
A grim alternative possibility is an extensive breakdown of
the sense of community—which would, among other things,
prevent balanced pursuit of national objectives at home and
abroad. Symptoms pointing to breakdown include not only
the flight to suburbs and racial disorders but also outbreaks
on the campuses, public-service strikes, and occasional
violence in labor-management disputes. If the use of "focus
ed rage" becomes a pervasive practice, the functionality of
the nation-state and the national economy would be hobbled
drastically. Even if not pervasive but systematic, the practice
could introduce significant duress and distortion into the
legislative process, the administration of laws, and the
allocation of federal funds.

Meaning and Future of the Employment Act
The Commission's first reference to the Employment Act
represents the usual sort of simplistic paraphrase, rather
than a faithful or studied interpretation, of the 109 words 1
1. I have counted "self-employment" as one word.
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constituting the single sentence of Section 2, the Declaration
of Policy. The Commission states:
In the Employment Act of 1946, the United States
set a national goal of a useful job at a reasonable
wage for all those who wish to work. 2
The Declaration, however, actually says much more than
this, and also much less. If it did not, it could not have gain
ed impressive bipartisan support in 1946, and it might not
since have proved so flexible for accommodating greatly dif
ferent theories and styles of implementation:
The tortured negotiated sentence of Section 2 cautiously
circumscribes both the nature and extent of the federal com
mitment. It does not even mention "full employment," but
refers to "maximum employment." It does not obligate the
federal government to offer, provide, or guarantee jobs. It
says nothing at all about "a reasonable wage," contrary to
the Commission's assertion. It does not presume to speak for
"the United States" or "to set a national goal" for jobs
without regard to the prerogatives and duties of the private
sector and of the other layers of government. It does not
consider employment as an isolated economic category, and
it acknowledges the coexistence of other federal duties. It
declares, in short, this "continuing policy and
responsibility": With proper attention to other prescribed
federal functions and to customary private and nonfederal
governmental roles, the federal government is committed
(1) to contribute to "conditions under which there will be af
forded useful employment opportunities, including selfemployment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work"
and (2) "to promote maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power."
2. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam
Books, 1968), p. 414.
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A return, from time to time, to the language maze of Sec
tion 2 would supply a wholesome reminder that the Act
serves better as a potential master framework for coor
dinating public and private economic policy than as an ab
solute, unequivocal federal pledge to maximize employment.
Despite differences in circumstances and emphasis, the
various Councils of Economic Advisers have sought, or have
been forced to discover, more or less balanced blends of
economic objectives. Indeed, a Council has to assume, or is
soon obliged to acknowledge, the curvature of the economic
space in which we live. Exclusive or zealous concentration on
maximum employment, for example, would soon lead to
troublesome readings in some other economic dimensions,
such as prices and the international balance of payments.
Pursuit instead of, say, a good record for price stability
might too soon entail an intolerably high unemployment
rate.
A cursory review of the Economic Reports of the various
presidents makes it clear that the legislative charter has, in
deed, been broadly construed. In his valedictory Report,
President Truman listed three purposes of the Employment
Act, the first of which was to provide a framework for public
and private collaboration toward common economic ends.
The other two were also more general than employment
maximization—"to prevent depressions" and to signify a
national resolve to maintain "a full and growing
economy." 3
The Reports of the Eisenhower years that followed
reflected a keen and persistent concern for the stabilization
of prices and international payments. In the valedictory
Eisenhower Report, as in the penultimate one, it was even
proposed that the Employment Act be amended "to make
3. Economic Report of the President, January 1953, pp. 8-11.
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reasonable price stability an explicit goal of national
economic policy." 4
The Kennedy-Johnson era has seen a daring test of the
range of plausible combinations of readings on the primary
economic gauges. The systemic tools of fiscal and monetary
policy have been used very actively for the encouragement of
growth as the universal solvent of unemployment and other
ills. (Growth also brings new problems, of course; and its
failure to cure the stubborn residual ailments that it more
fully exposes may complicate these ailments by depressing
the patient—and his friends and relatives. I return to this
matter in the next section.) Specific "structural" remedies
were also applied to unemployment; and, by exhortation of
labor and management to live according to the productivity
principle, an attempt was made to extend the base of policy
maneuver provided by the production-cost stability inherited
from the late Eisenhower years. (The introduction in 1963 of
an annual Manpower Report of the President, compatible
with the Economic Report, illustrates the interest in com
plementary and coordinated structural attacks on
joblessness.) Activism and the expanding impact of Vietnam
hostilities have finally produced impressive distortions in
commodity and money prices and international payments;
and the 1968 Report, not so cocky as its predecessors, starkly
repeats the lesson of inevitable interdependence of the major
economic variables.
If a broad construction of the Act remains generally ac
ceptable in the coming years, what next evolutionary steps
4. Ibid., January 1961, p. 67. Unofficial evidence of the uneasiness felt with regard to the
balance of payments in the late Eisenhower years is provided by the following exhibit, a
classical haiku shared at the time with my colleagues on the staff of the Council of
Economic Advisers:
While I sing and splash
In my scented bubble-bath,
Who tugs the golden plug?
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seem natural? The antecedent clause echoes my earlier com
ment on the threats of parochialization and fragmentation of
our society, or worse; but it also anticipates that coordinated
national economic policy will remain pursuable. Given such
a resolution of the strains already evident, we may project a
more determined transition from a "mixed" economy
toward a "monitored'* one, in which "responsible"
behavior will be increasingly demanded of individuals and
groups wielding strategic economic power. One avenue of
development is the reinstitution of guidelines—but
guidelines that take account of productivity prospects in
stead of past trends.
A second direction of plausible evolution is the social con
straint of private power to set wages and set prices. Syndical
arrangements of the federal government with management
and labor organizations offer one such approach; these ar
rangements could be rationalized on the ground that active
governmental policy in behalf of growth and sustained de
mand diminishes the risk element in economic outlook and
accordingly warrants diminution of speculative wage and
price increases. Perhaps, something like "wage-deferment
bonds," which I have proposed elsewhere, will one day find
favor; the idea would be to protect workers who accept wage
increases within guideline limits against the ravages of infla
tion attributable to less "responsible" decisionmakers, in
cluding government.
A third indicated direction is the harmonization of the
older Federal Reserve Act with the newer Employment Act.
A common interface for policy becomes evident when the
guideline criterion is restated in terms of aggregate output
and payrolls (or total incomes). That is, the supply of money
and credit should bear some reasonable relationship to the
volume of output, which in turn provides a governor for
noninflationary total wage (or income) payments.
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That pressures for emergency resolution of stubborn
residual problems of unemployment will intensify is in
dicated not only by violent actions and by the general tenor
of the Kerner Report but also by the findings of two other
advisory bodies cited therein. These bodies, engaging in
casual pontification, first misstate the import of the Employ
ment Act and then propose concentration on the provision
of jobs for particular segments of the population. It is
desirable, however, to continue construction of the Act as a
broad-spectrum charter for the balanced pursuit of
economic policy, with a heavy accent on employment. The
Act should not be used as a mandate for crash programs
relating to jobs. The primary task of resolving, say, hard
core unemployment in urban centers should be left to new
special-purpose laws and to the more determined administra
tion of existing special-purpose laws. Successful implementa
tion of the Employment Act can, of course, provide a
favorable setting for such governmental endeavors.
The summary volume issued in February 1966 by the Na
tional Commission on Technology, Automation, and
Economic Progress illustrates the danger of casual pontifica
tion, especially when good channels of public communica
tion are available. In advocating federal sponsorship of
"public-service employment," a proposal echoed by the
Kerner Commission, the Technology Commission asserted
that "we take seriously the commitment of the Employment
Act of 1946 to provide * useful employment opportunities for
all those able, willing, and seeking to work.' " Words such
as "provide" and "promises" certainly go far beyond the
description of the federal job role written into the Act; and
the term "recommitting" is gratuitous or disingenuous. 5
5. Technology and the American Economy, Vol. I, February 1966, pp. 35, 37. The quota
tion from the Act on page 35 incorrectly includes the word "all"; the one on page 37 incor
rectly includes the words "all of."
In addition to the notion of "recommitment," we find frequent reference in both
popular and technical literature to the "Full Employment Act of 1946"—a misnomer. Both
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The second body cited by, and obviously having some in
fluence on, the Kerner Report is the President's National
Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty. Findings issued in
September 1967 recommend "that the Federal Government
take more vigorous action to reach the goals of the Employ
ment Act of 1946." This recommendation, strangely, is
followed by a rare verbatim reproduction of the Declaration
of Policy, which the Rural Poverty Commission "endorses"
without any printed evidence of an actual reading. After
stating that the "goals" of the Act "have not yet been reach
ed" (inasmuch as "millions of Americans are unemployed or
underemployed," even in the absence of recession), the
Rural Poverty Commission makes this remarkable proposal:
The Federal Government, in cooperation with the
States, should initiate comprehensive social plan
ning, setting forth concrete goals to be attained by
specified target dates.
Indeed,
It should be definite public policy to reduce the na
tional unemployment rate from its current level
near 4 percent to the lowest possible fractional rate
of unemployment, as rapidly as feasible.
Brave and sage exhortation is then given to show the atten
dant difficulties of such a program. Without directly criticiz
ing the Council of Economic Advisers, this prestigious body
comprised essentially of noneconomists advises that
"monetary and fiscal policies must be used in a timely man
ner," that "recession must be avoided," that "excessive in
flation should also be avoided," and that "a more equitable
and humane economic policy must be achieved." 6
of these common errors are repeated in a recent "Call to Americans of Goodwill" that
demands of the Congress, among other things, "immediate creation of at least one million
socially useful career jobs in public service" (New York Times, June 3, 1968).
6. On this paragraph, see The People Left Behind, A Report by the President's National
Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty (Washington: September 1967), pp. 18-19.
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In concluding this section, I cite another seemingly
authoritative statement that tends to encourage
misunderstanding of the Act, to support its conversion from
a comprehensive framework for economic policy into a mere
basis for extreme unemployment proposals. At a meeting in
December 1967, the Executive Director of the Rural Poverty
Commission said:
The Commission calls upon the Federal Govern
ment to fulfill literally the language of the Employ
ment Act of 1946. Specifically, the Commission
recommends that the U.S. Government stand ready
to provide jobs at the national minimum wage to
every unemployed person willing and able to
work. 7
Contrary to the implication of the first quoted sentence, a
"literal" implementation of the Declaration of Policy would
necessarily be balanced and hedged, rather than simplistic
and misleadingly "straightforward." Furthermore, the
recommendation contained in the second quoted sentence is
offered as though it logically follows from a supposedly cor
rect reinterpretation of the Declaration. Even in the Rural
Poverty Commission's report, however, this recommenda
tion (on "guaranteed employment") is separate from the
recommendation concerning "vigorous" enforcement of the
Employment Act, mentioned in our preceding paragraph. 8

Has the Employment Act Failed?
The second sentence in the Kerner Report that refers to the
Employment Act also deserves comment. Coupling the Act
7. National Growth and Its Distribution, Report of a Symposium on "Communities of
Tomorrow," December 11-12, 1967, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: April
1968), p. 45.
8. See the third recommendation of the Commission on Rural Poverty in People Left
Behind, p. 19.
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with federal measures explicitly referring to manpower im
provement, the sentence renders an unduly pessimistic ver
dict:
Despite these [federal] efforts [at manpower
development and training], and despite sustained
general economic prosperity and growing skill
demands of automated industry, the goal of full
employment has become increasingly hard to at
tain. 9
This evaluation is not warranted by facts presented in the
Kerner Report and by other available statistics. Actually,
substantial advances in employment levels and substantial
reductions in unemployment rates have been recorded in re
cent years in spite of the large numbers of new labor force
entrants, the sizable rural Negro inmigration into the cities,
extensive industrial relocation and merger, and changes in
productivity, technology, and tastes. Nonwhites, further
more, have shared in the improvement although their
economic situation is still generally desperate.
The statistics cited by the Commission after the sentence
quoted above refer to current status, rather than to time
trends. They show national unemployment at about 2
million (the correct figure is somewhat larger), underemploy
ment at about 10 million, hard-core unemployment in the
central cities at 500,000, and unemployment rates among
younger slum residents at several times the national percen
tage for the entire labor force.
These and other status figures cited elsewhere in the
Kerner Report cannot prove that "the goal of full employ
ment" imputed to the Act "has become increasingly hard to
attain." However "maximum" or "full" employment is
defined, the implicit unemployment target must remain well
9. Report of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 414.
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above zero percent—as high, perhaps, as 3 percent, repre
senting about 2.35 million of the persons in the current
civilian labor force. The persistence of such numbers seems
almost inevitable for an economic order like ours. Much of
this unemployment is transitional and may not require heroic
or new remedial measures. Public policy, on the other hand,
does not dismiss a "small" residual unemployment percen
tage as inconsequential. It has also recognized increasingly
that the concentration of unemployment according to race,
sex, age, or location merits attention even if the group af
fected is not sizable.
Figures that do show economic improvement over time for
nonwhites are scattered throughout the Kerner Report. On
page 253, for example, it is observed that "unemployment
rates among Negroes have declined from a postwar high of
12.6 percent in 1958 to 8.2 percent in 1967." In the same
place, an important status figure is mentioned: "Among
married Negro men, the unemployment rate for 1967 is 3.2
percent." (If these were stabler times, one might op
timistically observe that this was the rate for all married
males in the labor force in 1963, and that the rate for the lat
ter has since fallen to about 1.6 percent.) On page 282, it is
noted that "the proportion of nonwhites employed in whitecollar, technical, and professional jobs has risen from 10.2
percent in 1950 to 20.8 percent in 1966, and the proportion
attending college has risen an equal amount." In the same
place, mention is made of the growth of a Negro middle
class—but only as an additional irritant, alas, to the increas
ingly alienated Negro have-nots.
What about the future? Only two pages before the
sentence about the Employment Act, the Kerner Report
sounds almost reassuring that we are on the right track with
respect to corrective measures (page 412):
Much has been accomplished in recent years to
formulate new directions for national policy and
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new channels for national emergency. Resources
devoted to social programs have been greatly in
creased in many areas. Hence, few of our program
suggestions are entirely novel. In some form, many
are already in effect.
All this serves to underscore our basic conclu
sion: the need is not so much for the government to
design new programs as it is for the nation to
generate new will.
The "new will" would presumably manifest itself in the
voting of larger federal funds (for which Vietnam re
quirements now compete), in improved coordination of pro
grams (within and between governmental layers) for more ef
ficient service, and in increasing involvement of business
firms and foundations in urban revitalization (the establish
ment of the Urban Coalition and the National Alliance of
Businessmen is acknowledged on page 418).
Statistics and program information not included in the
Kerner Report also gainsay the verdict rendered in the sec
ond quoted sentence on the Employment Act. A Census
tabulation, for example, shows a reduction in the absolute
number of nonwhites below the poverty line between 1959
and 1966 as well as a decline in the corresponding percent
age—from 54.6 to 41.4. On the whole, however, whites have
fared much better than nonwhites; their percentage below
the poverty line was 18.0 for 1959 and 11.8 for 1966. (Never
theless, absolute figures for 1966 show that penury remains a
widespread blight; 20.1 million whites and 9.6 million nonwhites were still below the poverty line.) 10
10. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Income in 1966 of Families and Persons in the United
States," Current Population Report, P-60, No. 53, December 28, 1967, Table H.
A newer Current Population Report, "The Extent of Poverty in the United States: 1959
to 1968," P-60, No. 54, May 31, 1968, presents the same figures, as well as other pertinent
information.
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The latest Manpower Report of the President should also
be mentioned. It, too, offers statistical evidence of advance
by nonwhites in various aspects of employment and
unemployment—as well as evidence, of course, of egregious
failures (e.g., to reduce teenage unemployment) and of per
sisting and pervasive economic afflictions. The document is
of interest here, however, for two additional reasons.
One reason is that both the President's prefatory Man
power Message to the Congress (January 23, 1968) and the
Secretary of Labor's introduction point to the long term
gains made during the regime of the Employment Act. Over
the years, the focus of attention has shifted from the gross
national problems of moderating recession and of sustaining
and increasing total employment toward regional problems
of economic improvement and now toward problems con
fronting specific categories of individuals. The "remaining
targets" that command federal attention, the Secretary
notes, include the hard-core unemployed, the seasonally
unemployed, youths between school and work, inactive
older workers, racial minorities, and the jobless handicap
ped.
The second reason that the Manpower Report is of interest
here is its description of federal programs directed at these
"remaining targets" and presumably responsive to the
Kerner Report. For example, it discusses JOBS (Job Oppor
tunities in the Business Sector), a government-industry
"partnership" for training and hiring the hard-core
unemployed. It also discusses the National Alliance of
Businessmen (but I do not see the acronym, NAB!). It
describes CEP (Concentrated Employment Program) and
CAMPS (Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System),
which potentially meet the need mentioned in the Kerner
Report for interagency and intergovernmental coordination
of manpower and related services (including manpower ser
vices provided under the emerging Model Cities Program).
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The Secretary of Labor confidently reports that "we now
have the knowledge," acquired through experience under
various programs, to help the hard-core unemployed. ! '
The President and the Secretary of Labor should not be
expected to proclaim costs and setbacks as loudly as they
proclaim successes, but it is fair to observe that the progress
made during the era of the Employment Act has itself helped
to exacerbate the disappointments widely felt over persisting
minority misery. Though hampered by expansion of Viet
nam hostilities, by inflation, and by the gold drain, active
fiscal and monetary policy has contributed very substantially
to the reduction of national unemployment drag. But there
are feedbacks: Active fiscal policy has itself contributed to
our inflationary and balance-of-payments difficulties—and
to monetary and other distortions that have not yet
registered their full social costs. It is true, besides, that the
start and stall of a well-advertised "war on poverty" in a
"great society" have helped to generate and also to frustrate
a "revolution of rising expectations." What I want to point
up here, however, is that a clearer revelation of disparity of
status adds fuel to such a revolution—as the Kerner Report
noted. The stubborn remaining problems of joblessness and
low-grade employment in our society have been exposed to
easier view against a background of increasing general af
fluence. The evils existed before, and solid historical im
provement has also been achieved; but they now stand more
fully revealed and are amplified, repeated, and dramatized in
our entertainment and news media. The obvious ubiquitous
signs of unequal economic and social status have a
psychological effect which apparently cannot be matched by
the citation of any record of historical improvement.
The noncorrespondence between evidence of historic gain
and the fact of current despair is poignantly reflected in
11. On this paragraph and the two preceding ones, see Manpower Report of the President,
April 1968, passim.
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some recent remarks by the President. In a speech in Chicago
on April 24, he rightly observed:
Our society still bears burdens and scars from
times before we were born. But we have acted to
relieve those burdens and to heal those wounds.
Nowhere else—in no other society on this earth, are
so many so devoted to leaving this earth better than
they found it. It is this purpose that is throbbing
through this Republic now.
On May 20, he said the following in a speech in New York:
To me, the fact that we recognize a gap between
achievements and expectations represents a symp
tom of health, a sign of self-renewal, a sign that our
prosperous nation has not succumbed to com
placency and self-indulgency.
The temper of these comments accords with the outlook of
the Kerner Report, even though the Report's treatment of
the past and present may well discourage the average white
reader—and the nonwhite reader, too.
The difference between history and status, between objec
tive and psychological fact, should still matter to any social
"scientist" even if he is committed to activism. It is not
necessary to accept the verdict that the Employment Act has
more or less reached its limits, that the economic and social
gap between whites and nonwhites can no longer be narrow
ed significantly through the job route. Despite propaganda
against which no profession is proof, work is likely to remain
a vital category of human activity in the future, either in our
own society or in any stable successor. Work has not been
rendered vestigial or ceremonial by automation, cyberna
tion, or any other barbarism of the new lexicon; it remains
important for personal dignity and political cohesion as well
as for economic production. An outmoded materialistic con-
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cept that does not die identifies production with manufactur
ing and similar processes only; but service production has for
many decades been definitionally and otherwise respectable,
and it is destined to continue its impressive expansion as an
employer. The link, in short, between work and income does
not need to be severed; and a social scientist can still look
forward to as long and honorable a career in studying
employment as in sponsoring guaranteed incomes.

Kerner Commission
Employment Recommendations
Work, especially in a nonmenial job with a future, is
deemed vital by the Kerner Commission for counteracting
poverty and unrest in the ghetto. In the chapter on recom
mendations, the Report says (page 413):
Unemployment and underemployment are among
the persistent and serious grievances of disadvantaged minorities. The pervasive effect of these con
ditions on the racial ghetto is inextricably linked to
the problem of civil disorder.
Furthermore, in supporting a national program of income
supplements for the needy, the Commission remains mindful
of the value of work. The aim should be "to provide for
those who can work or who do work, any necessary sup
plements in such a way as to develop incentives for fuller
employment" (page 466).
After describing desirable employment goals and
strategies, the Kerner Report proposes programs in six areas:
(1) consolidation and concentration of efforts to recruit and
place workers; (2) removal of barriers to employment and
promotion; (3) creation of a million new jobs in the public
sector in three years; (4) creation of a million new private
jobs in three to five years; (5) economic development of
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areas of urban and rural poverty; and (6) encouragement of
Negro ownership of businesses in the ghetto. Some of the
facets of these programs will be mentioned in the course of
the discussion that follows.
Although public and private action along the recommend
ed lines is already underway, it may not at all proceed on the
scale and at the speed recommended by the Commission.
Three reasons suggest themselves: (1) technical difficulties,
especially in the accomplishment of an extensive organiza
tion or reorganization of manpower services while a vast
throughput is also sought; (2) competition of proposed pro
grams with other public and private commitments and objec
tives; and (3) the slow generation, at best, of a "new will" to
resolve decisively the basic problems related to civil disorder.
I discuss these points in turn.
The Commission's statement of required "basic
strategies" gives some idea of the magnitude of the tasks en
tailed (page 415):
Existing programs aimed at recruiting, training and
job development should be consolidated according
to the function they serve at the local, state, and
Federal levels, to avoid fragmentation and duplica
tion.
The Kerner Report recalls the difficulty experienced in
reorienting the Employment Service. It proposes the creation
of a federally chartered corporation to coordinate the job
programs for the private sector—"a single cooperative na
tional effort . . .with the assistance of business, labor and
industrial leaders at national, regional and local levels"
(page 418). This corporation would operate "through
regional and local subsidiaries" (page 422). Arrangements
would also have to be made "for the flow of trainees from
public-sector jobs to on-the-job training in private com
panies" (page 416). Specially trained supervisors are re-
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quired for helping the hard-core unemployed through the in
itial job experience (page 417). While these administrative
and logistical tools are themselves being forged, it is propos
ed that, in the first year, 250,000 of the million public-service
jobs be created and 150,000 of the million new private
jobs—or 300,000 private jobs if a timely tax credit is
enacted. These goals are much more ambitious than those
proposed in present government plans.
Additional technical obstacles impede attainment of the
Kerner Report's objectives with respect to scale and speed.
An employing agency or firm has to define or restructure
jobs for the hard-core unemployed and other persons of
limited skill, to design career ladders, and smoothly to ac
commodate these into established work systems. To set up
even dead-end jobs and integrate them into established
public and private organizations would still require time,
skill, and tact. The Report notes, furthermore, that "a sure
method for motivating the hard-core unemployed has not yet
been devised" (page 416). If trainees in new public-service
jobs, moreover, are paid "not less than the minimum wage
or prevailing wage in the area for similar work, whichever is
higher" (page 421), objections could well be raised by unions
representing experienced workers; or an impetus would be
given to demands by such workers for wage increases to
preserve differentials.
What I have just said could serve as the first of my obser
vations on the competition of new employment proposals for
the disadvantaged with other private and public com
mitments and objectives. Private employers, of course, wish
and need to make profits, and stockholders expect
dividends. More affluent companies can, of course, afford
better than the others to pursue social purposes, and they
may not need much persuasion to recognize the probable at
tendant benefits to their public image. Below the federal
level, governmental jurisdictions are notorious for reluc-

[On] Kerner Report (1968:2)

123

tance to levy new taxes and to raise debt limits; and many
plagued urban areas already have woefully inadequate
revenue bases. As for the federal government, new undertak
ings are discouraged by demands for Vietnam (and other
purposes) in a period in which the protection of the value of
money and the maintenance of competitiveness in foreign
markets are also deemed to be important restraining objec
tives. Tax credits, recommended by the Kerner Commission
for rural development as well as for private job creation, are
rarely enacted with enthusiasm; and they will not now be em
braced eagerly.
At the beginning of its chapter on recommendations
(which cover education, welfare, and housing in addition to
employment), the Kerner Commission addresses itself to the
nation's fiscal condition and capacity (pages 410-11). It cites
two facts as fundamental—the vast productivity of the na
tional economy and the responsiveness of the federal revenue
system to economic growth. While acknowledging that the
national cornucopia is not inexhaustible and that the alloca
tion of funds among alternative objectives may require hard
choices, it does not see an insuperable problem. Despite Viet
nam and other demands, we have "enough to make an im
portant start on reducing our critical 'social deficit.' " In
deed, figures cited by the Commission do "demonstrate the
dimension of resources—apart from changes in tax
rates—which this country can generate." Unfortunately,
however, the Commission makes no reference to constrain
ing factors, such as inflationary pressures and the nagging
balance-of-payments deficit. Furthermore, the Commission
fails to estimate the annual cost of its proposals and to pre
sent alternative budgets that also accommodate other major
national purposes (including, say, price restraint). If such
steps had been taken, the meaning of the Report would have
been rendered more concrete, and compromise and construc
tive adjustments would be easier.
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A comment is required on public-service jobs. It is a
mistake to think only of new low-skill and low-training
employment opportunities when we consider the induction
of the hard-core unemployed into the world of work. Actual
ly, significant jobs could be provided for a very wide assort
ment of occupations and at all levels of skill if the various
layers of government saw themselves as the logical employers
of first resort, 12 not last resort, for certain services that the
private sector cannot or would not normally supply. These
new or expanded services pertain to health, education, antipollution, recreation, police and fire protection, mail
delivery, urban development and reconditioning, and many
other categories of public interest. Although governments
alone are the potential entrepreneurs, they could enlist exten
sive private participation on a contract basis. These
government-operated or government-sponsored undertak
ings could provide on-the-job training opportunities and
career ladders for new workers as well as jobs for better
qualified manual, service, office, technical, professional,
and managerial employees. But, of course, time would still
be required—and a "new will," too—to meet these longneglected public needs. Thus, "new will" is demonstrably
absent to meet perennial, accumulating, public-service re
quirements in general. The "white society," in short,
neglects itself too; it does not tend to neglect the area of the
Kerner Commission's primary concern on racist grounds
merely.
These references to a "new will" bring me to my third,
and final, point. A widespread reading of the Report is not
likely to generate the public zeal that would assure attain12. See essay no. 8 in this volume.
Since governmental action as employer of first resort is the key to an important remain
ing economic frontier, and since the sense of community might be seriously impaired by the
adoption and extension of income guarantees that are divorced from work, I see increasing
merit in the verbalization of the Beveridgean concept of full employment (i.e., more jobs
than seekers) as a social ideal, as an eventual goal, for the United States.
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ment of the Commission's goals of scale and speed. First,
there really is no monolithic, superorganic "white society"
that hears, and then decides to honor or to ignore, the Com
mission's recommendations. The polarization of popular
"white" sentiment on what to do, how much, and when is
rendered unlikely, furthermore, by the failure of the Com
mission to draw up a budget accommodating the Report's
employment and other objectives with remaining national
purposes. (The Secretary of Labor, incidentally, has taken
the position—both in the latest Manpower Report and in
testimony on legislation proposing more ambitious jobcreation programs than the Administration favors—that it is
up to the people to make known their appraisal of the Com
mission's recommendations.) 13 Still worse, the Report seems
to have neglected the opportunity that it had to tap the reser
voir of good will already existing in the white majority. This
leaves us with an open question: Will activism by racial
minorities, will marches and camp-ins, will new disorders
supply the moral equivalent of "new will"? This question is
seasonal and seasonable.
The experience of reading the Report (a nonfiction
equivalent of Moby Dick) gives me the hindsight to have of
fered the following advice to the Commission if I had been
asked in advance about the generation of a "new will" and
the movement toward "a true union."
First, the findings ought to have taken explicit account of
a need for balanced pursuit of national objectives. Such a
pursuit is implicit in the Employment Act; and all other
federal legislation concerning manpower, as well as other
needs, has to fit into some kind of a plausible whole. The
larger-systems approach and cost-effectiveness analysis, of
which so much is heard, ought to be applied, even crudely
13. Washington Post, May 10, 1968; and Manpower Report of the President, April 1968,
p. 10.
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and experimentally, across governmental programs and
across periods of time. Alternative trial balances should ac
cordingly have been prepared or commissioned. The prob
lem might have been commended to the Council of
Economic Advisers, to such nongovernmental bodies as the
National Planning Association (which has a Center for
Priority Analysis), and to organizations maintaining
econometric models. We should, for example, be able to
consider how much inflation would be generated or how
much might be tolerated to accommodate the Kerner Com
mission's recommendations regarding employment, educa
tion, welfare, and housing. What are the implications of the
recommendations for the end-game in Vietnam? How much
constraint on new expenditures for urgent domestic pro
grams is really implicit in our inflationary and balance-ofpayments difficulties? Should the tax burden be increased
beyond the Presidential request? These are not easy ques
tions; but we do need to progress toward a calculus, however
rough, to facilitate national intergroup bargaining on vital
issues that could also be settled far less peaceably. We need a
calculus of consensus for the engineering of consensus. 14
Second, as a positive incentive to white men of good will, a
timetable should have been established that sets significant
yet clearly achievable employment goals for the first year.
Correlatively, the Report could have encouraged a general
understanding that, even with earnest dedication in the white
community, the full recommendations respecting employ
ment and other categories are not easy to meet. An
auspicious beginning might thus have been assured; a possi
ble contribution to the cycle of overexpectation and overreaction among whites and blacks would also have been
14. It may soon become technically feasible and publicly useful to interpret Sections 3(a),
4(c), and 5(b) of the Employment Act to require routine annual estimation and revelation
of the monetary and manpower implications of alternative (desired or plausible) com
prehensive mixes of public and private programs and actions.
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avoided. In this connection, the Report could have made
more of a statement on the "difficulty of really improving
the economic status of the Negro man" (pages 255-56):
It is far easier to create new jobs than either to
create new jobs with relatively high status and earn
ing power, or to upgrade existing employed or
partly-employed workers into such better-quality
employment. Yet only such upgrading will
eliminate the fundamental basis of poverty and
deprivation among Negro families.
Finally, if an even conciliatory spirit could not have been
maintained in the preparation of the Report, more en
couragement should still have been offered to the white ma
jority, on which implementation so largely depends. For a
journalist writing the introduction to the commercial edi
tion, it may seem a sufficient coup for the Commission to
have stated the name of the shame as "white racism." But
implementation—that is the thing. The "we" of the Report
are mostly white; the tainted "white society" and "white in
stitutions" are essentially "the nation" that is being asked
"to generate new will" and to move toward "a true union."
Would it not, therefore, have been better "strategy" (to use
a word appearing so often in the Report) to encourage the
white majority to don the armor of crusading concern than
to accept the poisoned shirt of corroding guilt? After all,
even the establishment of the Commission and the publica
tion of its Report must be attributed at least as much to white
hope as to black despair.

Part II
Answers to Supplementary Written Questions
of Joint Economic Committee
Question No. 1: On page 23 of your statement, you write
that "the Commission fails to estimate the annual cost of its

128

[On] Kerner Report (1968:2)

proposals and to present alternative budgets that also accom
modate other major national purposes (including, say, price
restraint)." Don't you think that those are tasks for such
organizations as the Upjohn Institute, NPA, and the Joint
Economic Committee, rather than the Commission in its
report completed under pressing constraints?
Answer to Question No. 1: Part III of the Kerner Report
has the title "What Can Be Done?" and Chapter 17, con
tained therein, presents "Recommendations for National
Action." The quoted sentence and the succeeding one in my
statement refer to an opportunity that was missed (a) to
render "more concrete" the proposals made by the Commis
sion in Chapter 17 and (b) to facilitate "compromise and
constructive adjustments." The Commission, indeed, ac
complished a remarkable amount of work between the end
of July 1967, when it was established, and March 1968, when
the commercial version of its Report appeared; and, in this
brief period, the Commission necessarily had to rely heavily
on completed and ongoing economic research. As I point out
later in my statement, the problem of designing "alternative
trial balances" could, nevertheless, "have been commended
to the Council of Economic Advisers, to such nongovern
mental bodies as the National Planning Association (which
has a Center for Priority Analysis), and to organizations
maintaining econometric models." From Dr. Colm's
testimony, I was pleased to learn that the National Planning
Association has already been addressing itself to appraisal,
in monetary and manpower terms, of the Commission's
recommendations. NPA's existing capability to do so surely
owes something to contract support provided by the U.S.
Department of Labor under authority of the Manpower
Development and Training Act.
Perhaps, as the state of estimating arts improves (or as in
hibitions to make projections continue to dissolve), more
research groups will engage not only in the construction of
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alternative trial balances that are useful for compatible and
comprehensive policy design but also in the quantification of
the manpower implications of different policy mixes. The ex
tensibility of this idea to the implementation of the Employ
ment Act is obvious. The time may soon be right, in other
words, to interpret Sections 3(a), 4(c), and 5(b) of the Act as
requiring the translation of anticipated or desired total
public and private economic performance (including the Ad
ministration's legislative program) into coherent sets of
financial and manpower accounts.
Question No. 2: I think all of you see a need for extensive
public employment to take up the manpower slack. This
poses another basic problem. What do we really mean by
"job creation"? On the one hand, we know that there are
substantial numbers of vacancies. Why can't these be filled
from the ranks of the unemployed, in your opinion? Now,
on the other hand, it appears to me that many of the jobs
that are going begging are very low-paying, low-prestige jobs
which the unemployed do not want. How do we resolve this
question?
Answer to Question No. 2: Concerning what "we really
mean by 'job creation,' " three things should be said:
1. "Job creation" is definable in many ways, but the con
cept is functionally most significant when it allows for a
process of mutual adaptation between (a) the available
individuals and (b) the work that potential employers
(private and public) want done. With regard to available
individuals, the adaptation process may entail enculturation, motivation, basic education, job training,
and adequate supervision. With respect to the work to
be done, the process may entail the design of jobs hav
ing appropriate content or the provision of graded, ar
ticulated, job sequences to form career ladders. The
adaptation process obviously involves costs, in money
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and time; appropriate arrangements for sharing the cost
burden, however, often do not exist, and the required
time cannot always be spared by needy individuals or by
would-be employers.
2. Although our society is regarded as work-oriented, it
never has devoted itself as zealously as it should to the
creation of jobs for those who want them or ought to
have them. Work is important not only for economic
purposes but also for political and social cohesion; ac
cordingly, even if work generally becomes less onerous,
it remains necessary as a form of "social dues." Since
the disjunction of income and work is now being press
ed, it becomes increasingly desirable for our society to
consider establishing conditions for Beveridgean "full
employment" as a more wholesome alternative. Ac
cording to Beveridge, the full-employment standard re
quires that there be "always more vacant jobs than
unemployed men, not slightly fewer jobs." These jobs
should be "at fair wages, of such a kind, and so located
that the unemployed men can reasonably be expected to
take them."*
3. As we continue to create jobs in the private sector, we
also need, in line with the preceding paragraph, a more
decisive assumption by government (at all jurisdictional
levels) of its rightful role as employer of first resort.
Enough work, already well described, remains to be
done in the public sector to supply amenities for a grow
ing population and to enhance the quality of living. It is
not sufficient, however, to talk of the work to be done;
this notion of unmet needs has to be transformed into
"job creation," into active demand for workers. That
•If Lord Beveridge were writing Full Employment in a Free Society in 1980 instead of 1944,
he would not have confined attention to "men." Similarly, if the Kerner Report and my
testimony were prepared in 1980, neither would have referred to "Negroes" rather than
"blacks."
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is, jobs have to be defined, titled, and translated into
slots actually to be filled. Funds have to be pro
vided—by additional taxation and, perhaps, by a shar
ing of federal tax revenues with state and local jurisdic
tions. If government acts as employer of first resort to
satisfy unmet public needs, the created jobs are likely to
pay well enough, to carry prestige, to represent a full
assortment of skill requirements, to provide career lad
ders, and to include opportunities for meaningful onthe-job training of the hard-core unemployed, of per
sons of varying degrees of skill and education, and of
teenagers.
Concerning the coexistence of job vacancies and
joblessness (or only tenuous and circumscribed attachment
to the labor force), two observations are offered:
1.The number of vacant jobs usually reported for a
geographic area is smaller than the number of
unemployed persons—or of persons who should have
jobs, whether or not they actually are in the labor force.
(See, for example, New York Times, May 6, 1968.) The
problem is not simply one of qualitative mismatch.
2. Anomalies may be due not only to racial discrimination
but also to numerous other factors—e.g., age or sex
discrimination, union barriers, inadequacies of skill and
education (or even overeducation), self-image in light of
past work history, satisfaction with welfare or
unemployment benefits, availability of superior training
options, draft status, language difficulty, unsure
literacy, health defects, motivation lack, exaggerated
expectations, inconvenient job location, transportation
cost (money and time), and unattractiveness of pay or
working conditions.
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To reduce the gap between vacancies and joblessness, we
should, as a nation:
1. Move toward the Beveridge concept of full employment
as a sounder social alternative to a general attenuation
of the link between work and income.
2. Maintain employment incentives (as the Kerner Report
proposes) in the design of any income-supplementation
schemes.
3. Seek determined action by government (at all levels) as
employer of first resort.
4. Support existing government programs (JOBS, CEP,
CAMPS, Model Cities, Neighborhood Youth Corps,
Operation Mainstream, New Careers, MDTA training,
etc.) and private endeavors (e.g., those of the Urban
Coalition and the National Alliance of Businessmen)
that seek to improve the employability and employment
of racial minorities and that indoctrinate younger slum
dwellers in the values of work; and expand or develop
such manpower programs in directions indicated in the
Kerner Report.
5. Improve work prospects of teenagers through better
counseling and guidance services in the schools and
also, perhaps, through establishment of a "youth
wage" below the statutory minimum.
6. Emphasize the cultural adaptation and greater func
tional literacy of disadvantaged children, as well as the
general elevation of their educational attainment.
Question No. 3: What, in your opinion, is the practical
minimum unemployment figure that we can use as a target
under the Employment Act?
Answer to Question No. 3: In my statement, I referred to 3
percent of the civilian labor force (about 2.3 million persons)
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as the implicit unemployment target for a society such as
ours. This figure may be impracticably low in view of (a) the
experienced difficulty of maintaining reasonable price
stability as active fiscal and monetary policy pushed
unemployment down toward 4 percent in recent years; and
(b) structural changes related to the increase in the number
of young persons, the greater participation of women in the
labor force, and rural-urban migration. On the other hand,
improvements in the labor-market performance of racial
minorities and teenagers as the result of specific manpower
policies would help us to move toward 3 percent. The
unemployment rate for married men, largely comprising ex
perienced workers, has fallen to about 1.6 percent; and this
low figure offers hope. Finally, we may be able to improve
the Phillips curve by two devices I mentioned in my state
ment: (a) the introduction of wage-deferment bonds and
(b) syndical arrangements with labor and management to
limit wage and price increases in consideration of the greater
stability of employment and income attainable through
balanced government policy. (I have to add that, whatever
the national unemployment rate, we cannot afford to be
complacent if the incidence is high for any fraction of the
labor force identifiable by race, sex, age, or location.)
It may be useful to look at the unemployment rate of 3
percent and its absolute equivalent in another way. The
number of persons currently reported as unemployed
(seasonally unadjusted) is actually not much above my figure
of 2.3 million. The challenge may accordingly be restated as
one of maintaining something like our lately realized low na
tional unemployment level while regaining price stability.
Thus restated, the challenge may sound less insuperable.

1968
7
Fuller Employment
With Uptrending Prices
The 1968 Economic Report
Some Costs of Effectiveness
The latest Economic Report of the President continues to
exude a proper pride in the feats of "active discretionary
policy," but it also reflects the discomfiture occasioned by
some of the attendant costs. Among these costs are the
"wage-price spiral" in which the nation is said already to be
gripped and a persistent related condition of "inflationary
bias." Like the very high cost of money, the threatening gold
drain, the nation's weakening competitive position in the
world's markets, and the intensifying strains of urban life,
these objectionable symptoms cannot be dissociated from
the achievements of seven years of sustained economic ex
pansion.
Even before the packaging and promotion of a "new
economics," it was widely appreciated that fiscal and
monetary policies which were intended to spur growth could
foster an updrift of prices as well as gains in employment.
This lesson has been taught with varying degrees of
Reprinted, with permission, from Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. II, No. 1, March 1968.
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definiteness and thoroughness by the world's experience with
central banking and with expansible paper currencies, by
federal efforts before 1961 to assure the supply of both guns
and butter, to encourage "reflation," or to stretch out
booms, by communist planning, by forced-draft production
in fascist or other totalitarian regimes, and by socialistic
welfarism supported by "incomes policies." The
employment-price connection has also troubled economic
thinkers; Keynes 1 visualized it early, and so did many of his
British colleagues. In recent years, the relation between the
unemployment rate and price advance has become a lively
topic for investigation and discussion (especially in terms of
"Phillips curves") on both sides of the Atlantic. 2
The benefits in employment and production claimed for
the new activism have helped to conceal, or to divert atten
tion from, its seamy side. The greatest success came with the
demonstration, under Democratic auspices, of the magical
consequences of implementing a Republican cliche: of "let
ting the people spend more of their own money." In the first
flush of euphoria following the 1964 income-tax reduction,
an endless vista of additional tax cuts was projected; the na
tional economy had become a widow's cruse of fiscal
dividends. But a still newer, or much older, economics soon
began to assert its own truths as "exogenous" forces con
tinued to penetrate the boundaries of the imagined "isolated
state." The Eisenhower legacy of slack, which apparently
contributed a firm base of unit labor cost for the activism of
the two subsequent administrations, was eventually used up.
The Vietnam cloud has grown much bigger than any man's
hand, although the 1968 Economic Report gives little notice
1. A cogent reminder that Keynes's General Theory proposes a guidelines policy is provid
ed by J.H. Hotson, "Neo-Orthodox Keynesianism and the 45 ° Heresy," Nebraska Journal
of Economics and Business, Autumn 1967, pp. 34-49.
2. A good survey is provided by M.E. Levy, "Full Employment and Inflation: A 'TradeOff Analysis," Conference Board Record, December 1966, pp. 17-27.
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to the dark shadows now cast everywhere. Nevertheless, the
Report does acknowledge, and it even insists, that military
spending after mid-1965 has added sufficient inflationary
pressure to warrant an income-tax rise. Costs and prices have
been moving upward, and it is risky to apply effective
brakes. The foolish fetishism for gold that was attributed at
first to French peasants and to Swiss gnomes has become
recognized as a far more pervasive expression of doubt about
the soundness of the dollar; and even contemptuous
Americans eagerly eye the prices of palladium and platinum
futures. The adverse balance of payments has become an
unambiguous contraint. Worst of all, although Social
Security taxes can still be increased, an income-tax surcharge
sought for deliberate dampening of demand has been long
delayed by a skeptical Congress. Heraclitus was wrong in
believing that the way up and the way down are the same; in
Washington, at least, they are not.
"New standards of economic performance" have emerg
ed, according to the 1968 Report, with the demonstration of
the power of discretionary policies during the past seven
years; but the public may already have gone beyond what the
Council has in mind. Consistently high employment has
become quickly incorporated into the pattern of expecta
tions; and the attention of people at all income levels focuses
on remaining concerns, including the price uptrend, the ac
companying hardships and nuisances, the impending
dangers. Popular "systems evaluation" easily comprehends
both the benefits that appear early and the lagging associated
costs, and it may even give undue weight to the latter. Thus,
a remark made in the spring of 1967 by a renowned academic
economist is more likely to satisfy professional colleagues
than to meet the "new standards of economic performance"
gaining general support:
I want to try activism until it is demonstrated that
activism is wrong, but I hope the statute of limita-
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tions will keep us from discussing the balance-ofpayments aspect of that. 3
For the economist engage, such a view would nowadays seem
irresponsible.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a brief examina
tion of wage-price issues and policies as presented in the 1968
Economic Report and to a restatement of guideline needs for
the monitored economy toward which we apparently are
heading. For the purpose of this paper, the Report includes
both of the contributions bound in one volume: the Presi
dent's message to the Congress, which, strictly, is the
Economic Report of the President, and the longer, technical
supporting document constituting the Annual Report of the
Council of Economic Advisers. Separation of the reports,
reintroduced in the Kennedy Administration, does not
always work to the advantage of the economist qua profes
sional (or even qua politician), especially when cir
cumstances no longer permit him to look like a demiurge. As
our comments indicate, the separation also risks creating on
occasion, as in 1968, an awkward impression of unequal
determination on the part of the President and his advisers.
A Soft Crusade
Though we are caught by the spiraling tail of an infla
tionary dragon, the 1968 Economic Report does not propose
heroic counteraction. Executive strategy is directed primarily
toward starving the beast, provided that the Congess ap
proves; it relies heavily on fiscal measures, especially an
income-tax surcharge that has long been delayed (the new
escalation of the Social Security tax, strangely, goes unmentioned). The President will also continue to exhort labor and
3. P.A. Samuelson, inA.F. Burns and P.A. Samuelson, Full Employment, Guideposts and
Economic Stability, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1967, p. 164.
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business not to feed the monster as they have done before
and as the Council too readily expects them to keep doing.
Furthermore, a new Cabinet Committee on Price Stability is
being established to make studies and recommendations, to
hold conferences and, generally, to encourage more
"responsible" private (and public) decisionmaking.
The two explicit wage-price ingredients of Executive
strategy, which are of special interest for this paper, do not
promise decisive results. Desirable though it is in a free soci
ety to give most authoritative voice to macroeconomic
truisms and to urge labor and business to act with restraint,
the actual anti-inflationary contribution of exhortation is
bound to be minor in a situation like the present one. Unfor
tunately, the Council of Economic Advisers, which is also
prestigious, diminishes the force of the President's statement
of resolve by discounting in advance, in its own contribution
to the 1968 Report, the outcome of appeals for "sacrifice."
The same political discretion that must have guided, say, the
Council's remarkably limited notice of the deep economic
and social implications of Vietnam hostilities could just as
well have persuaded the Council toward a more tactful treat
ment of the probable response of unions to rising living costs
and to the rising minimum wage.
As for the second ingredient of explicit wage-price policy,
we should not expect too much from a Cabinet Committee
on Price Stability in a free economy that is already "overcommitteed" and in which the outstanding structural
sources of inflationary bias (even governmental ones) are
already well known. The new Committee recalls predecessors
of the Eisenhower era; the world then little noted, nor has it
long since remembered, what those committees did or even
said, and press accounts lauding the establishment of the
new Committee have uniformly neglected these precedents
(or models?). Of course, since the federal style is now much
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more activist, it is natural to view even the establishment of a
committee as a dynamic step.
The moderateness of the action proposed in the 1968
Report, despite the urgency of tone of the many descriptions
of the wage-price challenge, reflects an important difference
between the newer and older interpretations of the Employ
ment Act. The difficult-to-parse policy declaration that con
stitutes Section 2 of the Act ends with the words "to promote
maximum employment, production, and purchasing
power.'* These are the words to which the new activism
largely confines attention, and the goal of "maximum
employment" is ranked above the rest. Furthermore, in the
pursuit of this goal, the conditioning phrases in the rest of
the labored sentence do not seem to be taken as inhibiting. In
the 1968 Report, the Council states that "high employment
of resources—especially manpower—is obviously a top
priority," so we have to learn to master, somehow, the ac
companying inflationary bias. True, sufficiently restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies could halt the advance of wages
and prices, but the probable cost in joblessness would be
"unacceptably high." The President voices the same thought
in the 1968 Report: such restrictive policies "would serve the
objective of price stability only by sacrificing most of our
other key economic objectives."
In contrast, the Eisenhower Reports, as may be seen in
those for 1960 and 1961, more literally confronted the am
biguities, checks, and balances written into Section 2. They
reflected a deep concern for correct partitioning of the
"shared responsibility" for economic performance among
the various levels of government and between the public and
private sectors. Those Reports stressed the coordinate im
portance and the coordinate pursuit of the multiple objec
tives of the Act; and they even recommended that the Act be
amended "to make reasonable price stability an explicit goal
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of economic policy," although the advertised inflationary
hazards of the 1950s had apparently come under control.
Does the moderateness of the wage-price stance of the
1968 Report signal a respite in the evolution toward a
monitored economy? Not really. The remedies that are
prescribed hardly match the seriousness of the diagnosis, but
activism may simply have no better medicine to offer for the
moment, given the values held by the doctors—and,
presumably, the public too. Furthermore, since the Report is
a politically affected statement that keeps many considera
tions in view, it surely takes note that 1968 is a year of
Presidential election. In the preparation of the 1968 Report,
account must, therefore, have been taken of the bitterness
expressed in the business community on the few earlier occa
sions of vigorous enforcement of price guidelines. Account
must also have been taken of the general abhorrence of
"peacetime" wage and price controls, which Congressional
catechisms recurrently oblige governmental officials to ex
press. Finally, the future is fraught with grave uncertainties
at home and abroad, and exogenous factors may well deter
mine the critical governmental wage-price actions of 1968.
Among these factors are the course and the spillovers of the
Vietnam conflict and the changing foreign assessments of the
strength of the dollar. Activism, it would seem, has come to
a standstill—waiting, perhaps, for events to give us a new
push, even into the forbidden city of controls.
Darkened Counsel
The President and the Council agree on the importance of
restraining wage-price increases in 1968, and they agree that
exhortation has a place; but the Council volunteers a
pessimistic appraisal of the prospects, thus blunting the im
pact of the President's own firmness. In the paragraphs that
follow, the two positions are outlined.
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The Presidential message speaks gravely of this "time for
decisions" and of the dangers of temporizing. "In the com
ing weeks and months," business and labor will have to
"behave prudently in setting prices and wages" or "risk an
intensified wage-price spiral." Stability, however, cannot be
achieved "all at once." The goal is actually longer-range:
"reasonable price stability in a steadily growing, highemployment economy." This observation foreshadows the
announcement concerning the Cabinet Committee, but the
President also has in mind the need for quick tax action "to
expand Federal revenues" in the current inflationary con
text.
In a section of his message on "the return to price stabili
ty," the President more explicitly describes stabilization as a
"persistent, long-term problem" but repeats that "we must
do what we can to minimize price increases in 1968." He
describes what constitutes "responsible wage and price
behavior" and sketches the mission of the new Cabinet
Committee. "I must again," the President declares,
"urge—in the strongest terms I know—that unions and
business firms exercise the most rigorous restraint in their
wage and price determinations in 1968." Indeed, "we must
make a decisive turn back toward price stability this year";
and, in this connection, he commends adherence to the
guideline criteria.
The Council's contribution to the 1968 Economic Report
contains a whole chapter on "the problem of rising prices."
It rejects the "temptation" to dismiss as a "minor inconve
nience" the inflationary bias entrained by "minimum
unemployment and high utilization of our productive
resources." The Council acknowledges that inflation can do
"serious and pervasive harm"—that it "impairs economic
efficiency, redistributes income capriciously, and weakens
the Nation's competiveness in world markets." The Council
asserts "the pressing need to re-establish and to maintain
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price stability," a need to slow the uptrend this year. Indeed,
" every effort must be made to slow the rate of price increase
in 1968," and wage settlements "appreciably lower" than
those of 1967 would be helpful. The Council^ like the Presi
dent, says that government will continue to urge wage-price
restraint in 1968; and it recognizes that such restraint will de
mand "some immediate sacrifices."
So far, so good; but "sacrifices" by whom? Resolution
quickly pales. In the very next paragraph, the Council
retracts; and, in an obiter dictum, it even tends to undercut
the President's position. The Council abandons not only the
posture just taken but also the posture of 1967, when it
refused to sanction supra-productivity wage increases despite
the pressure of rising living costs. The Council unneutrally
and gratuitously asserts that, in 1968, "it would be patently
unrealistic to expect labor to accept increases in money
wages which would represent essentially no improvement in
real hourly income." After this bit of eclectic realism, the
Council reaffirms the productivity principle for noninflationary wage settlements as stated in 1967!
The next remarks of the Council seem reconciled to a long
journey back toward price stability. Some day, stability will
somehow be reached again, but "only when wage set
tlements once more conform to the productivity standard,
and only when business engages in responsible
price-making." This conclusion may be intended as an in
troduction to the discussion that follows on the Cabinet
Committee on Price Stability, but it does not allay the
uneasiness already engendered.
The treatment by the Council of the new 14 percent rise in
the minimum wage also works against the President's posi
tion. This rise, the Council asserts, "will have an even
greater impact than did the 1967 increases, which mainly
restored the minimum wage to a more typical relationship
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with the average wage level in the economy." Earlier in the
1968 Report, the Council says that the 12 percent advance of
1967 and the extension of coverage exerted "an important
influence on both union and nonunion wage increases." In
the 1967 Report, on the other hand, the Council argued that
the rising minimum provided no warrant for a general wage
adjustment: that workers in high-wage industries, having
already experienced gains, should be content with less-thanaverage money increases so that low-wage workers might en
joy a rise in real wages. Could not the tenor of this 1967
obiter dictum have been adopted in 1968 to support the
President's stand?
The Council's 1968 assessment of the minimum wage sug
gests that consideration ought to have been given to the ques
tion of repeal or revision, to counter the unintended infla
tionary impact. A revision is also suggested by other ap
parent dysfunctionalities of the rising statutory minimum,
such as interference with the goal of higher employment of
urban persons with low education and little skill. In this con
nection, it should be noted that the Council's 1968 chapter
on improving the status of the poor claims neither a past nor
a prospective beneficial contribution from the rise in
minimum wage.
Another embarrassment to the case for early return
toward price stability is offered in an inadvertence regarding
the expectation of a "moderate" upward drift even in times
of slack! For 1961-1965, a period of slack, the Council's con
tribution to the 1968 Report asserts that a rise of 1 to 1.5 per
cent per year in consumer prices is "not significant,"
especially "because improvements in quality and the in
troduction of new goods add to consumption opportunities
even when they are not fully reflected in price indexes as
reductions in prices." This observation has intriguing and
unexplored implications for guideline monitoring, but it is
only half an observation. Should we not, in price indexes,
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also take account of quality declines, of forced uptrading
through the disappearance of cheaper (though satisfactory)
lines of merchandise, of time losses in shopping (due, say, to
crowding or to service deterioration), and of purchases re
quired merely to compensate for degradations of physical
and man-made environment?
Obviously, the Council can choose between comment and
silence without compromising its professional integrity; and
its failure to reinforce more consistently the President's
austere position on wage-price stability is highlighted by its
discreet forbearance on other matters. Reference has already
been made, for example, to the guarded acknowledgment of
the Vietnam hostilities in the 1968 Report. A less touchy, but
very relevant, subject that is neglected altogether in the 1968
Report is the retroactive federal pay adjustment enacted in
December 1967. 4 This three-step ,pay adjustment con
spicuously violated the guideline principle in 1967 and will
do so again in 1968 and in 1969. The first stage provided a 6
percent rise for postal workers and an average rise of 4.5 per
cent for other civilian personnel. The July 1968 adjustment
will amount to 5 percent for postal employees. Since the 1968
and 1969 revisions for other civilian employees will reflect
rising scales in private industry, supra-productivity gains
should be expected in both instances. It is instructive to con
trast the silence of the 1968 Report on this major pay adjust
ment with the fanfare accompanying the revision of federal
pay schedules in 1966. To reinforce the guideline principle at
that time, the Administration insisted on, and persevered in,
limiting the average rise to 2.9 percent for salaries and to 3.2
percent for salaries plus fringe benefits. 5 The monitor clearly
needs monitoring for the "responsibility" of his own wage
4. Special Analyses: Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1969, p. 74.
5. John Sheahan, The Wage-Price Guideposts, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1967,
pp. 54-55.
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practices in an inflationary period and in the absence of
general controls.

A New Cabinet Curio
To the Troika and the Quadriad is now added what might
be called a Quinquevirate—or, since harmony is to be ex
pected, simply a Quintet. The 1968 Report tells of the forma
tion of a Cabinet Committee on Price Stability consisting of
the Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, the
Budget Director, and the Council Chairman. "As required,"
other agency heads will participate in the Committee's work,
which will be "coordinated" by the Council Chairman and
performed with the aid of "a small professional staff."
The mission of the Committee is to help reconcile sustain
ed high employment with reasonable price stability, par
ticularly by focusing governmental efforts on the resolution
of "structural problems that impede economic efficiency
and contribute to inflation." Five activities are described;
they include the making of industry studies, examination of
the government's own incongruent policies, enlistment of
business-labor-public cooperation, the conduct of con
ferences, and design of remedial legislation. Regular
meetings will be held, and special ones too for urgent pro
blems; but the Committee "will not become involved in
specific current wage and price matters."
Although the designation of a group of high-level officials
to show a continuing concern for price stability should be
welcomed, the ultimate accomplishment of such a group will
probably prove disappointing. For one thing, these officials
are already fully engaged. For another, the challenge ad
dressed to them is impossibly huge and cannot be met by a
small staff within any realistic time frame. Only a piecemeal
approach is feasible, rather than a grand redesign. Finally, as
we concentrate on the long-run, structural, inflationary bias,
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we are not certain to be providing the defenses needed
against exogenous threats in the current wage-price predica
ment.
The Cabinet Committee is new, but in a sense it is deja vu.
The work cut out for it has been attempted before in
peacetime, although on a modest scale. The 1967 Report
cites heroic efforts by the Council to promote guideline
adherence, and these efforts give some idea of the magnitude
and complexity of the Committee's task. It is also striking
that, during the late Eisenhower years, a high-level instru
ment of similar name existed: the Cabinet Committee on
Price Stability for Economic Growth. The Vice President
headed this Committee, and the Council Chairman served as
a member. Furthermore, the Council Chairman at that time
also participated, along with the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Federal Reserve Chairman, and a special Presidential
assistant, in "an informal group which discussed problems
of financial policy with the President." Archival evidence, if
no other, further shows that a Committee on Government
Activities Affecting Prices and Costs functioned during the
Eisenhower period; and the Council Chairman was again a
member. The most important of the Eisenhower policy in
struments for the area of interest to us was the Advisory
Board on Economic Growth and Stability, established under
Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953. Headed by the Council
Chairman, it had high interagency representation and met
regularly (even weekly). 6
Although these Eisenhower forerunners had very small
special staffs, if any, and they flourished, or languished,
when Federalism had a lower metabolic rate, they should not
be dismissed as irrelevant snow-jobs of yesteryear. They did,
like the new Cabinet Committee, have access to a vast and
6. See for example, Economic Report of the President, January 1960, pp. 77-78, and
January 1961, pp. 73-76.
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diversified federal apparatus already in being. Their failure
to leave teeth marks on our time reflects not only a dif
ference in temperament but also the pluralism of our society,
the multiplicity of competing detailed objectives within the
federal government itself as well as in the private sector, and
the inherent difficulty of engineering deliberate and sizable
structural change. An activist disposition is not necessarily
decisive, for activism is still the spearhead of one interest and
the threat to another. Besides, when many agents of change
work on many problems at one time, they soon run into each
other; and, as Archimedes made clear, it is necessary to have
a place to stand in order to move the world.
In any brief list of topics which merit the Committee's at
tention and are commensurate with its probable resources,
the rehabilitation of wage-price guidelines would have to
rank high. From the 1968 Report, it is clear that a free soci
ety has a very limited range of techniques for complementing
or replacing systemic ministrations of monetary and fiscal
policy in the quest for maximum employment with
reasonable price stability. Among these techniques is the
monitoring of national wage-price criteria. The rest of this
paper concerns the revision of guidelines for containment of
the inflationary bias discussed in the 1968 Report. Stress is
placed on the maintenance of an economic and social milieu
that is basically recognizable.

Toward New Guidelines
Another essay in this volume, "Guidelines for the Perplex
ed," notes the "trend toward permanent Federal wage-price
monitoring" and states two needs—to slow this evolution
and to channel it, "in any case, in benign directions." These
two challenges are related; for, in slowing the change, we
should be exercising, preserving, strengthening, and renew
ing virtues of our political order.
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Education (including "exhortation") and emergent ex
perience, rather than force, would have to be assigned domi
nant roles in the administration of any effective new
guidelines program. This is true for any society, but it is
especially true for a democratic one that is vigilant to retain
its essential character. A new guidelines system is bound to
include features antagonistic to the customary freedoms en
joyed by various individuals and groups. The freedoms that
are prized at any time can, of course, be changed, replaced,
and supplemented; they do not have to be denied, and fun
damental freedoms should not be casually or irreversibly
degraded. The challenge to education under our democratic
aegis is to internalize new social values, to encourage unac
customed voluntary economic action and restraint in the
general interest. Assurance that the government itself is
"responsible," that it remains significantly responsive to the
public will, would facilitate the task of education. With
respect to emergent experience, we should recognize that a
heightened fear of formal controls, or another interlude of
such controls, might itself contribute to the modification of
attitudes, practices, and patterns that now inhibit the effec
tive operation of guidelines.
The 1968 Report mentions various advances and needs in
the realms of statistics and forecasting, but the requirements
of a workable guidelines program for our type of political
order remain far from satisfied. Progress is desirable in these
realms at the national, industry, and company levels to
enhance the vigor of a society committed to the widest prac
ticable diffusion of opportunities for economic decisionmaking. Statistical information and technical knowledge can
support not only the more harmonious pursuit of national
objectives but also the constructive exploration of diversity
at various subordinate levels.
Although voluminous statistics are already available on
wages, prices, and productivity, there are still many con-

150

Fuller Employment & Rising Prices (1968:3)

spicuous gaps; but, instead of repeating the familiar lacunae,
we wish to highlight here the nonexistence of index numbers
that are especially appropriate to guidelines administration.
The required measures of wages, prices, and productivity
would ideally refer to the same scope and be conceptually
consistent and algebraically symmetrical. Such compatible
measures should be approximated on a product basis for
particular companies, industries, economic sectors, and the
total economy. The measures might be of the aggregative
variety and patterned, say, in accordance with this identity:
Hourly earnings=Prices X Output per man-hour
X (Payrolls H-Product value).
To assure algebraic symmetry (so that all the economic
variables are treated with equal respect), we might then make
adjustments that yield generalized Fisher or Stuvel index
numbers or some other unbiased variety. Furthermore,
"output" should be measured net, and "product value"
should refer to value added; and prices should be consistent
ly defined. If such a set of indexes were approximated for the
whole economy, the product value would correspond to na
tional income; and the ratio shown in the identity would
represent the share of wages in the total income. 7
Under the best of circumstances, such coordinate indexes
could not be computed exactly (for example, because of the
obscurity of the "product" of various economic activities,
including much of government); but what is striking is the in
adequacy of the vast national data base for the derivation of
reasonable approximations to the ideal measures. For a
7. Among the writings of I.H. Siegel on the topic of this paragraph are: "On the Design ofConsistent Output and Input Indexes for Productivity Measurement," in Output, Input,
and Productivity Measurement, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 25, Princeton, 1961,
pp. 23-41; "Productivity Measures and Forecasts for Employment and Stabilization
Policy," included in this volume, and "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index
Numbers," 1965 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the
American Statistical Association, pp. 369-372.

Fuller Employment & Rising Prices (1968:3)

151

serious guidelines effort, consideration should be given to
the development of such special-purpose approximations.
The data, incidentally, would be applicable to many other
uses for which economic information is now compiled.
Thus, they would serve such different needs as marketing,
input-output analysis, and the construction of superior im
plicit price deflators for components of the gross national
product. If the European interest in value-added taxes
spreads to the United States, we may expect an impetus to be
given to the compilation of the required data on the com
pany level.
Projections of the real national product have an important
place in active discretionary policy, and they also fit logically
into a guidelines program. The productivity that is relevant
to the setting of annual wage targets is not an average for
some past period but a rate for the future. The proper rate
may be a trend projection or a nearer-term (say, annual)
prospect, and a case could be made for preferring the more
conservative figure in such a pair of outlook estimates (if
both are positive). 8
The Reports for the years 1962-1968 suggest a single wagepercentage standard corresponding to the national produc
tivity performance; however, variation according to com
pany and industry performance is at least as reasonable and
should not be discouraged. Indeed, variation has a sound
basis in marginal productivity differences, even for the
"same" kinds of workers in different settings and equipped
with different amounts of capital. Wage conformity through
imitation and through efforts to maintain supposedly
customary differentials is not a superior principle which the
Cabinet Committee on Price Stability should take for
granted or which should escape reconsideration in any new
8. Projected, rather than historical, productivity change is emphasized in "Guidelines for
the Perplexed," included in this volume, and also in the last Eisenhower Reports (for exam
ple, the one for 1958).
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guidelines design. This view is in opposition to the apparent
acceptance in the 1968 Report of even a minimum-wage rise
as a sufficient reason for a general upward movement
without regard to productivity.
The wage-price-productivity connection may be restated in
a simple equivalent form, and this alternative discloses im
portant opportunities for public and private policy. The
identity shown earlier may be rewritten:
Payrolls =Unit labor cost X Output.
Thus, instead of dealing with hourly earnings and produc
tivity, we consider here the totals from which they are deriv
ed: payrolls and output. Unit labor cost replaces two other
terms in the original identity: price multiplied by the ratio of
payrolls to product value. The new version of the identity in
dicates at once that unit labor cost remains unaltered when
payrolls rise at the same rate as output.
Three implications of the restatement should be noted.
First, a common handle of macro-policy is provided for the
Council and the Federal Reserve. The Council is concerned
with the relation of payrolls to output; the Federal Reserve,
with the relation of output to the supply of money and
credit. A rough master criterion for equilibrating the whole
economic system with a view to price stability is thus in
dicated for the two agencies: Aggregate payrolls, output,
and money and credit should advance at reasonably com
parable rates. The projected increase in national output is
the key figure; the other two figures should be adjusted ac
cordingly.
The second implication is that firms, industries and sectors
may easily explore opportunities for variation in micropolicy without jeopardizing the national performance. It is
sufficient for each component of the economic system to
keep the rise in payrolls within the range of the correspond-

Fuller Employment & Rising Prices (1968:3)

153

ing projected output. Such behavior would still be compati
ble with aggregate control of inflationary bias. Furthermore,
companies obviously have considerable latitude, at least in
principle, to pursue flexible wage administration. The im
portant thing is to have adequate statistical tools.
The third implication relates to these tools. National
stabilization with wide micro-variation is achievable even in
the absence of the vast supply of statistics required for a
more literal monitoring of the wage-price-productivity con
nection. Leaving price and productivity statistics in their
present condition, we could concentrate on the development
of output indexes that have unit labor costs as weights. For
example, these measures might be aggregative in form; and,
for the sake of algebraic neutrality, both the Paasche and
Laspeyres variants might be approximated and then combin
ed in a geometric mean according to Fisher's "ideal" for
mula. This composite measure would also permit the easy
derivation, from payrolls, of the Fisher index of unit labor
cost. Indeed, we could just as well have stated the minimum
new statistical need for a guidelines program in terms of
Paasche and Laspeyes indexes of unit labor cost incor
porating output weights. Here, as in the earlier treatment of
coordinate wage, price, and productivity measurement, we
skip discussion of the stubborn technical problems that
abound. 9
To encourage general adherence to the national wage stan
dard, to discourage excessive intercompany variation, and to
bolster its own practice and reputation of "responsibility,"
the government might consider issuance of "wage-deferment
bonds." 10 Such federal bonds, non-negotiable and bearing a
9. On technical matters, see I.H. Siegel, Concepts and Measurement of Production and
Productivity, Washington, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1952.
10. These bonds were proposed in "Guidelines for the Perplexed." They take proper ac
count of cost-of-living changes, whereas proposals to super-add a price adjustment to the
productivity factor simply assure the intensification of inflationary pressures.

154

Fuller Employment & Rising Prices (1968:3)

low rate of interest, would be protected in purchasing power
until redemption. If the projected national gain in real out
put or in productivity is y percent, a worker who is scheduled
for a pay rise of y percent or less should be able to elect pay
ment of all or part of his increase in inflation-proof bonds. A
worker scheduled for a rise of more than >> percent would not
be eligible for any such protection. Deferral of redemption
might be administered for national convenience; thus, heavy
cashing might be delayed to times of flagging aggregate de
mand. In short, an economic incentive is devisable for the
reinforcement of exhortation and other kinds of education.
If the incentive also proves socially effective, this experience
should contribute to subsequent voluntary individual con
straint.
In difficult shortage areas such as medical and hospital
care, the government could improve the poor price record by
determined exercise of its monopsony power. It is a large
purchaser, and it is a still larger underwriter of public
demands for health goods and services.
Total federal behavior in health, education, and some
other fields could be made more "responsible" by the
establishment of this good rule: Any government program
that places heavy demand on skills in short supply should be
complemented by a program designed to assure early
availability of the needed personnel. This rule would reduce
the unfavorable price impacts of popular demand-generating
legislation—or change the timing and scope of such legisla
tion. A supply-inducing program should, of course, take ac
count of probable market responses in the absence of federal
initiative, the training capabilities of nonfederal sources, and
so forth.
We conclude this paper with an acknowledgment that
many difficult problems have not been touched and with two
additional comments. Attention has not been given, for ex-
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ample, to the thorny issues of wage moderation in the public
service industries, including those operated by states and
localities. The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability will
surely have occasion to ponder the feasibility of, say,
measures to reduce crisis bargaining and procedures for
obligatory arbitration.
One of the remaining two observations concerns the en
couragement of unions and business management to col
laborate with active discretionary policy. The pursuit of
fuller employment without damaging inflationary accom
paniments requires acceptance of this idea by private decisionmakers: The assurance of a climate favorable to con
tinuous high-volume production and near-maximum
employment warrants a longer-run outlook in private plan
ning and strategy, and this changed outlook should include
reduction of the speculative component of target prices and
target wages. The scaling down of such private goals should
actually contribute to their more ample fulfillment. This
observation is made as a suggestion, rather than as an en
dorsement of the activist federal policy that has been pur
sued.
The final observation concerns, the danger that various
federal decisions may inadvertently increase the persisting
problems of structural unemployment against which active
discretionary policy constantly butts. Thus, for the 1968
Report, the federal decision to reduce the use of railroads for
mail transportation is not a matter of importance; for a later
Report, however, it may well be, as passenger trains are
discontinued in increasing number and as certain com
munities become stranded. We should recall the federal con
tribution to the distress of Appalachia made by earlier deci
sions to encourage petroleum production. In this era of
sophisticated budgetry, computer-assisted cost-effectiveness
evaluation, and active federal policy, an increasing range of
speculative inputs should be taken into account by the in
creasingly burdened creditor of last (and even first) resort.

1967
8
On Manpower, Forecasting, and
Public-Private Roles:
Three Evolving Concepts
Nature of Chapter and Book*
This chapter is intended as a setting for the rest of the
volume rather than as a systematic summary or synopsis.
Having been written last, however, it could, and does, take
some account of the papers, discussion, and statements mak
ing up the remainder of the book.
Three topics were selected for treatment here, as the
chapter title indicates. They are comprehensive enough to
subsume much of the content of the book—if the object were
indeed to provide a brief survey of the whole. Two of the
terms, "manpower" and "forecasting," relate to the central
concern of the volume. For this reason and also because their
signification and scope are neither standardized nor static,
these two terms merit early scrutiny. The third term in the ti
tle, "public-private roles," refers to a major environmental
factor—to the political and economic institutions, policies,
Reprinted from I.H. Siegel, ed., Manpower Tomorrow: Prospects and Priorities, Augustus
M. Kelley, New York, 1967.
*The references here and below to "chapter," "book," and "volume" are; of course, to
the work from which the present essay is reprinted.
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and actions that largely shape the manpower outlook. The
shift toward public, especially federal, initiative has already
registered a substantial impact on the employment and the
qualifications of manpower, and it is bound to have even
more decisive influence in the future.
The rest of the book is comprised essentially of responses
given by different experts to the two questions defining the
theme of the Upjohn Institute Conference of October 1966.
These questions rather literally provided the focus for the ef
forts of all the Conference participants—the 6 principal
speakers (see Part I), the discussants (Part II), and the more
than 40 invitees who complied with a request for advance
submission of independent replies (Part III). The wording of
the questions was as follows:
1. In the next two decades or so (a span equal to the
present lifetime of the Institute), what manpower
developments, issues, and problems do you expect
to emerge or dominate?
2. Given these prospects, what directions should be
taken by the research program of an organization
concerned with manpower policy (such as the Up
john Institute)?
As the remainder of this volume attests, two seemingly
simple questions have called for an impressive variety of
responses. On first perusal, it is the diversity of the replies
that is striking. Manpower forecasts obviously vary, as other
forecasts do, in boldness, emphasis, and level of detail. Ex
perts differ in the prospects they delineate, the priorities they
propose, and the policies and programs they recommend.
Points of similarity and degrees of concurrence among the
contributors become apparent, however, on closer study,
after the various manners of speaking have been penetrated
and after consideration has been given to the omissions as
well as to the replies proper.
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For several reasons, no attempt at a synthesis of the
various contributions is made here. Many of the persons in
vited to the Conference, after all, are recognized authorities.
Besides, a composite or eclectic picture would represent only
another, and a competing, view. Furthermore, since a con
tribution that is slighted or overlooked in what purports to
be a synthesis tends thereby to be devalued, it may also be
given insufficient attention by the reader. There is a risk in
such neglect, for the true anticipatory significance of an ex
pert's opinion does not, of course, depend on the current
popularity or degree of acceptance.
Accordingly, not only the Upjohn Institute but also the
other organizations and the individuals seeking guidance in
research, policy formulation, program design, or ad
ministration ought leisurely to make their own
discriminating reviews of the total Conference output. They
should conduct these reviews from their special standpoints
for their special needs. A ready-made sausage or hamburger
of consensus would surely please a gourmet much less than
the bifteck hache suggested to him by the same supply of
potential ingredients.

On Manpower
Most of the Conference contributors probably confer on
the word "manpower" a much broader meaning than it had
in earlier times—say, in World War II, when there was a
well-known War Manpower Commission; or in the 1950s,
when it became desirable to establish a Scientific Manpower
Commission and to begin popularizing a companion word,
"womanpower." The treatment in Professor Joseph J.
Spengler's Conference paper of the cultural, psychosocial,
demographic, and other factors conditioning the manpower
outlook makes it clear that the "organism" and the "en
vironment" comprising the "system" are actually difficult
to differentiate in this case; that, moreover, even if a sharp
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discrimination were possible, any serious inquiry into the
manpower outlook would necessarily entail inquiry into the
larger context also, the conditioning and conditioned "en
vironment." 1 Similarly, Dr. Paul N. Ylvisaker's sensitive
survey of the contemporary scene indicates how hard it is,
for example, to divorce the urban problems of segregation,
alienation, and unemployment from the domestic issues
associated with the Vietnam conflict. This speaker did,
however, encounter one articulate objector to his counsel for
Upjohn Institute to broaden its research sights, as the sum
mary of the proceedings reveals (Part II); and this evidence,
as well as the content of various other Conference contribu
tions, explains the qualified phrasing of the topic sentence of
this paragraph.
The other principal speakers also exhibited a predilection
for the broad view. Thus, Dr. Arthur M. Ross refers in his
paper to the goal of "full realization of the human
potential," and Mr. Walter P. Reuther talks in a similar
vein. At a minimum, this goal embraces development for
nonwork and for leisure as well as for paid work. That is, it
covers postemployment adjustment, or retirement, and
education and training for self-satisfaction throughout life
and for the maintenance of long term employability. Dr.
Alfred C. Neal, who was sought by the program committee
to represent the "business viewpoint" at the Conference
directed his whole paper toward education—a minor and
wholesome surprise. His definition of education, however, is
comprehensive: "not only formal schooling but the lifelong
learning process, including training on and off the job."
Professor Paul W. McCracken, starting naturally with Sec
tion 2 of the Employment Act of 1946, concentrated on the
erratic nature of the public monetary and fiscal policies on
1. Use is made here of terminology due to W.R. Ashby, Design for a Brain: The Origin of
Adaptive Behavior, 2nd ed., New York, Wiley, 1960, pp. 36-41.
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which the stability of aggregate economic demand so critical
ly depends. It is no wonder, then, that Professor John T.
Dunlop, in the statement that he submitted in advance of the
Conference, decries the "imperialism" of "manpower
policy," which claims jurisdiction over general economic
policy and education policy too.
Enlargement of the scope imputed to manpower, to which
Dean William Haber's closing comments (Part II) also call
attention, is understandable in light of the expansion of
federal concern during recent years. In the 1950s, a stern
challenge to the security and international prestige of the
United States was perceived in Soviet advances in higher
education, general economic capability, military prowess,
and nuclear and space technology. Part of the response to
this challenge is reflected in the National Defense Education
Act of 1958, in the substantial increase of federal support for
industrial research and development activity, and in other
measures taken to strengthen the base of scientific and
technical manpower. In the 1960s, the federal commitment
widened dramatically with the sudden public confrontation
of persisting problems of unemployment, regional distress,
urban decay, old age, and poverty; with decisions to pursue
space exploration, supersonic transportation, and other
beckoning technical opportunities on a substantial scale; and
with acknowledgment, in a political and social context
restricting the supply of military manpower, that the loss of
potential servicemen due to deficiencies in health and educa
tion is unconscionably high. A substantial change has
evidently occurred within a very short period in the publicprivate division of responsibility for manpower supply,
development, and utilization—a circumstance noted in
various Conference contributions and further explored in the
final section of this chapter.
The comprehensiveness of the current federal meaning of
"manpower," which necessarily influences usage in the
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nonfederal domain too, is visible, for example, in the
Department of Labor's backup document for the April 1967
Manpower Report of the President. (Both of these, inciden
tally, were prepared in accordance with the Manpower
Development and Training Act of 1962.) The first sentence
of the "Introduction," echoing the phrase used by Dr. Ross,
refers to "the fifth year of an active manpower
policy—which seeks, as its ultimate goal, to enable every
American to realize his full potential and to utilize it fully in
his own and the Nation's interest." The objectives of this
policy are declared to be three—"developing abilities,
creating jobs, and matching workers and jobs." Implemen
tation "has involved action in many fields, including educa
tion, training, vocational rehabilitation, area and regional
development, placement and other employment services,
aids to worker mobility, and removal of discriminatory bar
riers to employment." It has also involved collaboration
with the lower governmental jurisdictions and with
nongovernment groups—a matter also treated in the ter
minal section of this paper. 2
The Labor Department's supplement to the 1967 Man
power Report of the President refers to another term that
has become increasingly synonymous with "manpower" in
the broad current sense. It restates the federal goal as "fuller
utilization of human resources." The words "human
resources"—and other related terms, such as "human
capital"—have become widely accepted or tolerated in re
cent years despite their suspicious overtones of serfdom and
slavery. The new respectability of these terms is attributable,
in part, to the obviously growing federal "investment" in
people—even though this "investment" is not evidenced in
2. The Department of Labor document, bound with the Manpower Report of the Presi
dent, is actually a Report on Manpower Requirements, Resources, Utilization, and Train
ing presented by the Secretary to the President in accordance with Section 107 of the 1962
Act, as amended. The references in this paragraph and the next are to p. 1 of this Labor
Department report.
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an altogether satisfactory manner in the national product ac
counts, the most honored single quantitative register of
economic activity. Another reason for rising respectability is
more technical: It has recently become fashionable to take
professional cognizance of the inability of a crude quan
titative measure of labor input and a still less adequate
measure of "physical" capital to explain exhaustively the
recorded growth of output over the years. 3
At this point, it might be added that a new journal devoted
to "human resources" has as its subtitle "Education, Man
power, and Welfare Policies." An editorial note in the first
issue makes this observation on the recent interpenetration
of traditionally distinct domains:
When, at the beginning of the decade, the U.S.
Department of Labor heralded "The Manpower
Revolution of the 1960's," they [sic] referred to
projected changes in the nation's labor force. As
significant as these changes have been, however,
the real manpower revolution can be found in two
other areas: the unprecedented growth of federal
involvement in the fields of education, training,
and welfare; and the sharp expansion of research
under the general rubric of investment in human
resources. 4
The term "manpower revolution," incidentally, has also
been prominently utilized in the title of 10 volumes of wideranging hearings generated during the 88th Congress by a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. 5
3. With regard to this paragraph, see a 3-volume report on Federal Programs for the
Development of Human Resources, Subcommittee on Economic Progress, Joint Economic
Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., especially Volume I, pp. 1-86.
4. Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1966, p. 3.
5. The hearings were held in 1963 (the tenth volume has a 1964 date). The contents of the
volumes are listed in An Index to Hearings on the Nation's Manpower Revolution and to
the Publications of the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965.
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The foregoing comments indicate the desirability of
clarification of the meaning of "manpower"—the establish
ment of its proper limits with respect to other categories, of
its useful subcategories, and so forth. For ordinary speech
and for many daily transactions, sharp definition is not at all
critical, but greater precision and standardization are needed
for the purposes of research, statistics, and law and for a
wide variety of communications. "Common sense" and
"practicality" tend to condone vague definition; so does
pride among professional workers who welcome the recogni
tion of manpower as a worthy research field, who see this
recognition as a strategic step toward ultimate reintegration
of the social disciplines or even as a gambit toward a new
"humanism."
Whether or not a narrow "productionist" construction of
manpower is preferable to a broader "consumptionist"
orientation is hardly at issue for the moment. The import of
what is being said here is that "taxonomy" or "typology" or
"systematics" can contribute to the orderly progress and
cumulative benefit of manpower research, that these are not
dispensable Germanic methodologies best reserved for doc
toral dissertations. They can help us, indeed, to make useful
distinctions between manpower as "organism" and its
multidimensional "environment"; to choose the appropriate
microlevels and macrolevels of discourse and analysis; to ex
pose to constant view the shifting interface between work
and nonwork; to examine the changing fine-grain structure
of work; to identify the many relevant physical and nonphysical dimensions of the environment;6 to detail the

6. It is easy to overlook the relevance of the foreign-domestic division of the environment
when manpower developments and prospects are contemplated. Peaceful international
transactions (e.g., the "brain drain" and other migrations) and military stimuli make direct
and indirect contributions to labor supply that should not be neglected.
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modes, mechanisms, determinants, consequences, and loci
of interaction of manpower and the environment. 7

On Forecasting
What has just been said about definition and methodology
applies to studies of the manpower outlook as well as to
manpower investigations relating to the present or the past.
The more distant the forward time horizon, the more plastic
do the categories that we distinguish become; and the wider
and deeper is the part of the "environment" that obviously
influences, and is in turn influenced by, the "organism."
The relevant ambient circumstances ought to be given con
sideration in any attempt at forecasting; and, if little or
nothing is said about them, something about them is never
theless implied.
While some of the contributors did spell out their major
assumptions regarding the future environment, others left
these conditioning and complementary circumstances
unstated. An explicit forecast regarding manpower,
however, always involves, willy-nilly, a compatible implicit
forecast about virtually everything else. Thus, a minimum of
assumption does not mean minimum implication. Of course,
the content of the implicit component of a forecast is not
necessarily intelligible to the maker, nor need it be fully ap
preciated by anyone else. The forecaster himself may feel a
7. In addition to Professor Dunlop's comments (Part III), cited earlier, see R. J. Lampman,
"Toward an Economics of Health, Education, and Welfare," Journal of Human
Resources, Summer 1966, pp. 45-53. Also pertinent are the remarks of I.H. Siegel with
respect to the study of "growth" in Capital Formation and Economic Growth, Princeton
University Press, 1955, pp. 572-578; and with respect to the study of "technological
change" and related concepts in "Conditions of American Technological Progress,"
American Economic Review, May 1954, pp. 161-177, and "Scientific Discovery, Invention,
and the Cultural Environment," Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal of Research
and Education, Fall 1960, pp. 233-248. Useful ideas may be found in the discussion of
"realms" and "orders" by R.M. Maclver, Social Causation, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1964, pp. 269-290; and of "levels" by Mario Bunge, The Myth of Simplicity: Prob
lems of Scientific Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 36-48.
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lesser burden in vaguely implying, rather than definitely
foretelling, something about the "environment" of his
target of explicit concern.
According to the two thematic questions, all the Con
ference contributions were intended to illuminate the future
as far as the 1980s. Differences in personality, philosophical
commitment, experience, and so forth found expression in
an expected variation of emphasis on elements of continuity
and elements of flux. Opposite poles of opinion regarding
constancy and change seem to be represented in the Con
ference comments and the pre-Conference statements of
Father Joseph M. Decker and Professor Louis Levine.
On the whole, a "responsible" conservatism and op
timism tend to dominate the contributions, although the
tone is typically not complacent. "Normal" assumptions are
made about the avoidance of major wars or depressions.
Dangers already evident or familiar are commonly ex
trapolated, but they presumably remain manageable or are
not regarded as insuperable. Little attention or weight is
usually given to possible miscarriages of recommended
policies—to their potential for contributing, say, to
unintended social breakdown by a transmutation of quantity
into quality. These general impressions, however, may
reflect a predisposition or bias of the writer, for which the
reader will want to supply correctives as he judges the
materials for himself in his search through the book for the
"goodies" that appeal to him.
Whatever the reader's own conclusion, he should
recognize the pressure for "functional optimism" to which
the "responsible" forecaster is subject. Measured opinions
will usually be given of the future by the expert who has "no
axe to grind," who has a scholarly orientation, who is not
lobbying for sizable new grants or for political influence.
Statements made by him "for the record" are "balanced,"
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keyed to the warrantable, to the plausible. His expressed
views may well differ from his intuitive private hun
ches—from the long shots that cannot be buttressed by pro
fessionally respectable argument, that for one reason or
another are not confided to the large invisible public. Fur
thermore, the reality of present and past experience weighs
heavily on a reputed expert who agrees to "stick his neck
out." Like the inchworm that pokes into the unknown space
around him, he remains firmly fastened to the known apple.
Were he to assume catastrophic or revolutionary change in
the environment as a basis for discussing the manpower
future, he might no longer be regarded as responsible; or he
might find his audience hopelessly diverted, confused over
his failure to grasp what is really important in his own
message.
The optimistic bias of responsible forecasting may be part
ly instinctual, but it also has a rational source and it is rein
forced by experience. Forecasts are obviously subject to er
ror and to revision; and, more important, the future itself is
subject to influence by deliberate, selective, and timely in
tervention. Thus, the responsible forecaster's optimism ex
presses a confidence that has a realistic basis; it is different
from, and competitive with, passive complacency. It
betokens the forecaster's sense of constructive involvement,
direct or vicarious, in the shaping of the common future, his
justified belief that objectionable prospects are in some
degree correctable or avoidable. Below, more will be said
about forecasts that contemplate instrumental intrusion; at
this point, we wish only to observe that a sense of participa
tion permits a forthright and clinical acknowledgment of the
seamy side of the fabric of our future existence. Challenge,
rather than depression, is the spirit appropriate to a reading
of, say, Professor Spengler's exposition of 11 determinants
of the manpower outlook, the description of welfare
enclaves by Dr. Ross, Dr. Ylvisaker's reflections on the cities
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of the dreadful night, Professor Harry Malisoff's comment
on the trials of the urban teacher and student, Mr. Edward
A. Robie's and Dr. Walter E. Hoadley's remarks on
managerial succession, or Mr. William Papier's appraisal of
factors threatening to make government a sink of inefficien
cy. One can look upon an emerging basilisk and turn to
stone; one may instead attempt to slay it.
A few other characteristics of the forecasting art and of
the milieu in which it is practiced should be noted. First of
all, the world in which we operate as we look ahead is too
much with us. It is noisy with misinformation, while also
rich in information. In this world, unsure unconventional
wisdom coexists with, or can even drive out, doubtful or
doubted conventional wisdom. It is not easy to distinguish
what is objectively and ascertainably true from what is sim
ply believed or accepted as part of the "data base"; for
glamorous journalism now frequently invades, smothers, or
displaces serious scholarship. The new interdisciplinary
style, furthermore, often has an antidisciplinary first impact
and a slow constructive followup; and, in the vacuum of in
tellectual authority that is created by the first impact,
Gresham's law can extend its applicability to the realm of
thought.
Language becomes extreme under the influence of jour
nalism and with the collapse of established authority. Any
phenomenon or trend may be rated as at least a
"revolution" 8 or an "explosion." Exaggerated, half-true,
8. A word about the term "manpower revolution" itself is appropriate here. In the
foreword to the report emerging from the 1963 Congressional hearings, it is stated (p. v)
that, "in general terms, the revolution may be characterized as a shift from a blue collar to
a white collar labor force"; that "this revolution has, of course, been under way for several
decades"; and that, "in many respects, the shifts now occurring have been evolutionary,
not revolutionary, the logical end results of forces set in motion by the industrial revolution
in the 19th century." A correlation of all these ideas suggests that the word "revolution" is
not really descriptive but obviously has the shock value of exaggeration. Confusion is add-
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unproved, or improvable commonplaces can become
canonized by repetition. For example, it is widely asserted
and accepted, with little or no qualification, that "the pace
of technological change is accelerating"; that technology,
"automation," and the computer are accomplishing a
drastic net "labor displacement" and job "destruction";
that noncommodity employment opportunities are not really
"productive" and not as valid economically as outmoded
blue-collar tasks; that the "lag between invention and com
mercial application" is all but disappearing. Many
forecasters with professional qualifications, even "responsi
ble" ones who are too impressionable, may be expected to
become convinced that their own obsolescence is just around
the corner as mechanical brains thrive, cavort, and
reproduce.
Despite mathematical and other technical advances,
forecasting remains largely "directional." It is still
significantly true that the forecaster faces difficulty in
foreseeing not only what will happen but also how much and
when. Preventive or early corrective action is hard to take
for such reasons, but other practical problems also persist
and should not be underestimated. Thus, it is not always
clear just what action is most appropriate, and political
agreement to take this action cannot always be engineered.
Besides, even the action itself has a quantitative aspect that
may not be fully understood (how big a "dose" is needed?),
and it has a time constraint for application that may be at
variance with the time cycle of the decisionmaking
machinery. These observations have a bearing on the fre
quently expressed interest in "early-warning systems" and
ed, furthermore, by the reference in the conclusion of the report (p. 103) to the "manpower
revolution" as "just in its beginning stages"! (See Toward Full Employment: Proposals for
a Comprehensive Employment and Manpower Policy in the United States, Subcommittee
on Employment and Manpower, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1964).
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information "clearinghouses" for cushioning the employ
ment impact of technological change or plant shutdowns.
They also have a bearing on the theory of organization and
organizational change, which Professor Rensis Likert and
others take up in Part II.
The frustrations just mentioned with respect to the quan
titative and timing aspects of future problems and of future
remedial actions are often stated in terms of * 'sabotage*' by
competing wills and authorities. The idea that "we" know,
individually or collectively, just what to do and when, that
"we" can "plan rationally" for the future, without serious
disappointment, is a very attractive one. Failures in achiev
ing visions have to be charged then to the hostile or ignorant
"others": to nature; to foreign nations pursuing their own
"short-sighted" objectives; to the anonymous "vested in
terests" or to identified "power structures" that persevere in
stiff-necked or "antisocial" courses, that insist on acting in
accordance with their perverse and narrow values and in
terests. 9
At this juncture, we should distinguish explicitly the two
basically different kinds of forecasts. The more familiar
forecasts are presumably made by neutral or disinterested
observers. The second kind involves the forecaster as an ac
tor or as an agent, as a person committed to the realization
(or to the frustration) of the prospect under consideration.
Each of these categories includes varieties that likewise are
worthy of professional discrimination and lay notice:
Within the first main class, two varieties should be
differentiated: prediction (or prophecy), which
9. The Congressional report cited in the preceding footnote observes (p. 21) that "the
future is not easily foreseen"; then reassures that "economic knowledge is presently ade
quate to create employment and manpower policies capable of meeting and adjusting to
any future development"; but, alas, pricks the bubble by adding "if only our will is equal
to our knowledge." Economic knowledge may not yet be so precise, nor is it the only rele
vant knowledge nor necessarily the highest knowledge; and the "will" may properly be
dulled by other public and private values and interests that compete with concern for full
employment and other manpower objectives.
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refers to unequivocal statements about what will
happen; and projections, which refer to conditional
(if-then) statements about the future, to the im
plications of various assumptions that need not be
(or may not prove to be) correct. Within the second
major category, we distinguish two subdivisions:
programming, relating to statements that the
forecaster or his principal attempts to validate
through manipulation of variables under direct
control, through use of resources and powers under
command; and propaganda, relating to statements
to be fulfilled through influence on other decisionmakers by communication of information or opin
ion. 101
As the federal role in the manpower field expands, and as
scholars become attracted to the enlarging opportunities to
affect grand policy, the second class of forecasts—program
ming and propaganda—acquires increasing importance.
This class is important even now, and it is well represented in
blueprints for the future produced and promoted under
nongovernmental auspices. Skipping over the vast external
literature, we note that Mr. Reuther's paper in this very
volume expresses, as desirable prospects for the whole na
tion, some of the goals of his own union; and these prospects
are not expected to come automatically into being without
deliberate organizational action and influence. "Our essen
tial challenge over the next years and decades," he declares,
on behalf of the larger society, "is not, as the phrase goes, to
'adjust to change' but to direct it, to master it for human
ends." He also speaks, in the title of a recent book (by Den
nis Gabor), of "inventing the future."
10. See essay no. 10 in this volume; and I.H. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long-Run
Forecasting," Journal of Business, July 1953, pp. 141-156. For a comprehensive explora
tion of varieties of forecasts from a different point of view, the reader may wish to consult
Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture, New York, Basic Books, 1967.
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The feasibility of programming is a fundamental commit
ment of modern civilization. Rightly or wrongly, today's
leaders look, say, to technology for the solution of economic
and other human problems, even the problems associated
with prior technological achievements. It seems a shame that
the honor of giving classic expression to this basic sentiment
of the "Western" world-view should fall to Karl Marx, who
proclaimed in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845) that
"philosophers have only interpreted the world in various
ways, but the real task is to alter it."

On Public-Private Roles
As many Conference participants pointed out, the provi
sion of services looms large in the manpower outlook; and
government, especially federal government, will play an ex
panding direct and supporting role in the development and
employment of the required personnel. This growth of the
federal economic presence will not, however, represent a
simple displacement of other political jurisdictions or of
private enterprise. Rather, it will reflect, in the main, the
assumption or acquisition of federal responsibility for
(a) the definition and supply of new widely-felt public needs;
and (b) the design and implementation of "higher-systems"
approaches that enlist the institutions and potentials of state
and local governments and the private sector.
Proliferating federal manpower-related policy can be trac
ed back in a literal-minded way to one sufficient ultimate
source: the Constitution. Behind the current slogan of
"creative federalism" and the superseded one of "partner
ship," we find stated in the Preamble to the Constitution the
enduring resolves to "provide for the common defense" and
to "promote the general welfare." What is now called the
improvement of "human resources" would be included
under the latter aim. Defense has, of course, provided a
much less arguable basis for federal policy than welfare over
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the years; and it has, accordingly, often served as the
stronger ground for legislative enactments having a heavy
welfare accent. Furthermore, the welfare objective has, until
recently, been fostered, as a rule, through improvement of
the productive system, rather than by the direct advancement
of consumption standards and of the quality of living. With
adoption of the Employment Act of 1946, however, a com
prehensive master objective, economic "growth," has
emerged, and this federal goal embraces both defense and
welfare. Changing circumstances, furthermore, have
favored in the past few years a franker confrontation of our
economic and social inadequacies and a fuller acknowledg
ment of the claims of consumption in the promotion of the
general welfare.''
In defining and meeting "new widely-felt public needs,"
the federal government operates on at least two fronts under
the welfare banner. Thus, it has to face new challenges in
maintaining and improving the climate of domestic
economic activity in the spirit of the Employment Act. Con
ference contributors have referred to many such
challenges—e.g., the avoidance of price-wage-productivity
distortions, of substantial or uncontrollable inflation, of
critical deterioration in the balance of payments, of strikes in
the local public services (including government) and other
sensitive industries (such as air and rail transport). On the
second front, federal activity seeks to reduce the discomforts
and blights of urban life, to overcome the disabilities of
racial and other discriminations, to depollute and restore the
physical environment, to upgrade health care, to strengthen
elementary education, to raise the qualifications of workers
through training, to enlarge the supply of specialized person
nel, and so forth.
11. The preceding two paragraphs are based in part on a paper by I.H. Siegel and Edgar
Weinberg on "Technological Change and Public,Policy," presented at the 1966 annual
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and summarized in
Technology and Culture, April 1967, pp. 318-319.
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Despite public debate on "demand" and "structure" in
relation to unemployment, it is clear that federal action en
compasses both. Indeed, "active manpower policy" is ad
dressed to the structural limitations of workers themselves
and of their environment, especially the labor market. The
stimulation of aggregate economic demand through
monetary and fiscal policy cannot dissolve all unemploy
ment, but it provides a setting in which active manpower
policy can function more effectively.
While much is said nowadays about possible constructive
contributions of the federal government as an employer of
"last resort," too little is said about its potential as employer
(or financier) of "first resort." In acknowledging the new
widely-felt needs that cannot be met in the first instance
through private initiative and the conventional market
mechanism, the government is actually developing new
dimensions, new frontiers, of economic opportunity.
However unglamorous, the exploitation of such new areas of
service production and employment is just as vital to the
future of the country as the conquest of outer space or the
sea floor. Despite apocalyptic—or pseudo-Utopian—visions
of subsidized mass idleness, work is essential to social ex
istence and political cohesion; and the government has
shown increasing interest in underwriting additional worth
while employment that will also contribute to the continuity
of our corporate life. As Mr. Reuther observes, work is a
source of dignity, not only of economic sustenance; and Dr.
Ross makes the same point. If work disappeared, an early
rediscovery would be required to prevent the collapse of
civilization—not only "as we have known it" but also any
better version.
The federal government cannot, however, "go it alone,"
and it does not really try. It enlists, as the opening paragraph
of this section notes, the participation of other levels of
government and of private institutions. Social invention,
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which has an undeservedly poor reputation, really thrives in
this relationship. Thus, in the realm of federal-nonfederal
cooperation, the market mechanism is actually utilized very
extensively outside the area reserved for political decision;
new kinds of organizations (e.g., not-for-profit corpora
tions, state technical-assistance agencies, and communityaction agencies) have been founded; new varieties of incen
tive contracting have been devised; and cost-effectiveness
analysis and other managerial tools have been adapted and
adopted for the improvement of resource allocation and of
general operating efficiency. Bipartisan interest in federalrevenue-sharing and tax-credit schemes suggests that the
fiscal basis of intergovernmental partnership is due to be
strengthened in the future. This change would permit more
effective programming or governmental planning, at least in
principle.
In conclusion, we have reason to contemplate the man
power future with confidence—indeed, with more con
fidence as we show less complacency. There is reason enough
to eschew complacency. As Professor McCracken em
phasizes, the record of broad federal—or totalgovernment—economic forecasting and policy leaves much
to be desired. It appears, furthermore, that simplistic ag
gregate fiscal gimmickry may not only prove unavailable and
inadequate for spurring general economic activity and main
taining high-level employment but could also interfere with
the timely and balanced pursuit of appropriate private objec
tives and of specific worthy public programs. Whatever the
merits ascribable to cost-effectiveness analysis, operations
research, and other comprehensive approaches, the proper
harmonization of competing public-private, intrapublic, and
present-future demands remains a difficult and uncertain
business. It is also uncomfortably true that the dreams of
"planners," if realized, can become the nightmares of "the
people." More could, of course, be said to discourage com-
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placency, but then more would only have to be said to
restore confidence in our future collective ability "to pro
mote the general welfare"; and the reader would also be
longer prevented from learning how the Conference par
ticipants thought this historic objective might be advanced
during the next two decades or so in the field of manpower.

1967
9
Guidelines for the Perplexed
Perspective and Setting
A basic assumption of this paper is that wage-price
guidelines will, in one form or another, become a feature of
our economic order, even if the specific venture begun in
1962 terminates first, perhaps in a whisper rather than a
bang. This prospect is here considered to be part of a more
general trend—the evolution of our "mixed" economy into
a "monitored" one, in which a widening spectrum of
erstwhile private behavior will become subject to federal
screening for social "responsibility."
Guidelines are not strictly economic, either in conception
or execution, so our discussion also touches on noneconomic
features of price-wage monitoring that should interest
readers as "interdisciplinary" citizens. From the standpoint
of citizenship, those aspects of a future monitoring system
that are not yet irrevocably fixed or beyond the range of
popular influence merit particular attention. Among these
aspects are the degree of voluntariness, the explicit legal
basis for "informal" controls, the mode of establishing na
tional target figures, and the scope allowed to private deciThis article is the revision of part of a longer paper prepared for presentation at the annual
meeting of the Southern Economic Association in Atlanta on November 11, 1966. It was
first published in Journal of Economic Issues, June 1967.
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sionmakers for variation around these targets. Alternatives
to guidelines also have to be given due consideration.
The outlines of a monitored economy need not long detain
us. 1 In the emerging dispensation, it appears that state and
local governments will be much more subservient than they
already are to federal initiative and finances, and the balance
of power within the federal government will have shifted
even more strikingly from the Congress toward the Presi
dent. This trend is encouraged by the pervasiveness, even the
paramountcy, of public concerns for effective national
security and for nearly-full employment, toward the achieve
ment of which federal action can make decisive contribu
tions. 2 The scope and scale of technological change, actual
and advertised, aggravate both concerns while also providing
means for assuaging them. The Declaration of Policy of the
Employment Act of 1946 provides a convenient framework
for the design and implementation of federal programs per
taining to jobs.
While progress toward the monitored economy is not
widely endorsed as such, 3 it is abetted by common attitudes
and by innumerable governmental decisions having specific
1. For additional remarks, see "Productivity Measures and Forecasts for Employment and
Stabilization Policy" included in this volume; and P.B. Kurland, "Guidelines and the Con
stitution: Some Random Observations on Presidential Power to Control Prices and
Wages," in Guidelines: Informal Controls in the Market Place, ed. G.P. Shultz and R.Z.
Aliber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 209-241.
2. International threats to our gold supply and to the strength of the dollar could provide a
powerful future stimulus to adoption of public wage-price stabilization measures (especial
ly if a satisfactory and timely reorganization of the world monetary system cannot be ac
complished).
3. In the first of his recent Reith lectures, J.K. Galbraith has observed, particularly with
reference to the United States, "where faith in free enterprise is one of the minor branches
of theology, . . .evolution may well be a better source of socialism than ideological pas
sion." He includes wage and price restraint among the examples of our government's ex
panding economic role. He emphasizes the "strongly convergent tendencies as between in
dustrial societies . . . despite their very different billing as capitalist or socialist or com
munist." See The Listener, November 17, 1966, pp. 711-714.
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objectives that may seem to be unrelated or even to have an
opposite import. When steps are discussed and taken to pro
mote the national safety or the general availability of jobs, it
may be natural to assign too little weight to conjectural
negative long-run implications and to contemplate the par
ticular intended benefits with too much optimism.
Ideological erosion of the two-party system by "me-tooism"
in domestic affairs and by bipartisanship in the international
sphere is both a cause and effect of the general underappreciation of the adverse concomitants of remedial action. It
is both a cause and effect of complacency, consensus, and
conformity, and of their identification with the "public in
terest."
If the trend toward a monitored economy is indeed inex
orable, the parameters of such an economy are, surely, also
plastic. In looking ahead to, say, the 1980s, one need not be
resigned to an unhappy rendezvous with destiny in 1984. The
future can be invented—or prevented—in some degree, even
in the social realm. Those who prefer what is nowadays
disparaged as "Puritan ethic" to an inchoate but ominous
"American gothic" need not yet despair. As citizens and by
legal means, they can act, with some hope of success, to slow
the trend toward guideline monitoring (by seeking occasional
reversals and detours) and to channel the trend into more
benign, and away from less liberal, paths. 4
The primary focus in this paper on the longer run hardly
precludes acknowledgment of the current venture into
guideline monitoring and the problems besetting it. Indeed,
the present monitoring program is not assumed here to be
dying or dead, even though any daily newspaper or weekly
magazine so assures us. Accordingly, this paper is intended
4. Economists who missed or do not recall the brief preface to the second edition (1947) of
Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York, Harper, may find it still
worth reading.
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in part to be responsive to the challenge issued in the spring
of 1966 by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad
visers:
If we do not like the current voluntary controls, we
need alternatives which are constructive and
superior. All of us in government will appreciate
your participation in helping us to find them. 5
Some of the suggestions made below, such as the one to
reinforce stabilization guidelines by the issuance of "wagedeferment bonds," are surely pertinent to the present
economic context. This, or any other, item shrugged off now
as eccentric or impracticable may, nevertheless, contain a
useful hint for the later redesign of guidelines. Furthermore,
our comments on guidelines and their alternatives may prove
helpful even to those who reject the "philosophical"
premises.

Ingredients of Strategy
The rest of this paper is concerned with the double social
aim of (1) slowing the trend toward permanent federal pricewage monitoring and (2) channeling this trendy in any case,
in benign directions. In addition to the suggestions made
below, more general ones are also pertinent, such as reinvigoration of the two-party system, cautious preappraisal of
proposed irreversible structural changes in government (for
example, a four-year term for House members), encourage
ment of the concept of states' responsibilities (entailing more
adequate non-federal taxation for local needs) alongside the
ritualistic insistence on states' rights, rejection of redundant
or routine extensions of federal welfarism, vigilant assertion
and exercise of Constitutional rights by individuals and
5. Gardner Ackley, "The Contribution of Guidelines," in Guidelines: Informal Controls
in the Market Place, p. 78.

Guidelines for the Perplexed (1967:2)

181

organizations in their pursuit of lawful objectives, Congres
sional insistence on its legislative role and its coordinateness
with the Executive, and avoidance of unrealistic or sentimen
tal commitments in the international arena that may be
detrimental to the nation's internal cohesiveness and to its
other long-run selfish interests.
Such statements as those above, of course, are easily
dismissable as "nonoperational," as stating vague or naive
objectives appropriate to a first civics text instead of stating
the ways to achieve them. But objectives and perspectives do
have to be stated before they can be elucidated, and they are
certainly relevant to action. We should consider that even the
enthusiastic activism of the cult of economics and politics a
go-go is not sure of the routes zestfully plotted and of future
destinations. Sometimes, as history repeatedly reminds us, it
is better just to stand there and think a while than to do
something that happens to have been recommended by an
itinerant or casual expert; or by a " scholar-tician" privileged
to sit for a spell at a console of state and to practice his
curiosity at public risk, without a requirement to post a per
sonal performance bond.
The ensuing discussion of wage-price stabilization em
phasizes economic competitiveness and decentralization,
policy flexibility, and the diffusion of information and
understanding as means to slow the progress of wage-price
monitorship and to channel it in benign directions. More
specifically, five points are treated, the last one in some
detail:
1. In the assortment of policies considered for
stabilization, not only is it desirable to include
timely tax increases, prudence in government
spending, and the easing of certain supply bot
tlenecks, but it also seems wise not to rule out
categorically the adoption of legislated controls.
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2. Government "macropreachment" (Professor
Dunlop's striking term), 6 so often disparaged as in
effectual exhortation, is actually an instrument of
instruction and leadership that should be used even
more energetically to propagate the macro-truisms
of wage-price stabilization and thereby to increase
public understanding for fuller voluntary com
pliance. Besides, the government already has
economic and other levers it could quietly and fair
ly manipulate with favorable wage-price effects.
3. Business, labor, and other groups opposed to
Procrustean interpretations of guideline targets, to
selective and discriminatory enforcement, and to
apparent lapses in the "responsibility" of govern
ment's own behavior should, within the law,
vigorously make their positions known, court
broader public support, and exploit the sensitivity
of elected and appointed officials to criticism.
4. Deliberate and sustained efforts should be
undertaken to (a) improve government statistics on
productivity, prices, and wages, (b) enhance
general awareness of the limitations of available
statistics for stabilization purposes, despite the
merits also possessed, and (c) encourage construc
tion of comparable company measures for the sup
port of more independent and better informed
private decisionmaking.
5. Many additional adjustments and refinements
are required in the determination and administra
tion of guidelines, to assure more effective achieve
ment of technical objectives in an environment that
6. J.T. Dunlop, "Guideposts, Wages, and Collective Bargaining," in Guidelines, pp.
81-96.
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remains wholesome. This very general statement
will be elaborated in the final part of this section.
On Formal Controls. With respect to the first of the five
points listed, it is not necessary to stress the importance of
choosing from a wide assortment of anti-inflation policies,
but it is unfashionable for anyone to offer a kind word
nowadays for formal controls. A kind word, however, is in
order, even though persons of middle age and older seem
generally to have concluded, on the basis of experience, that
legislated price and wage curbs should be shunned as
anathema. Such curbs are not necessarily less effective than
the lately favored alternatives of governmental Canutemanship. They are not addressed any more foolishly to symp
toms than guidelines are; and neither approach, of course,
penetrates deeply into the underlying political and economic
causes of inflation. 7 And do not guidelines, even more
ludicrously than formal controls, encourage personification
of pertinent economic forces, the identification of these
forces with "good guys" and "bad guys"? Do they not
facilitate overconcentration on the wage-price events of a
few industries and companies that supposedly have unbri
dled market power, while prices rise elsewhere with little
notice?
Guidelines may have temporary or local staying effects,
and they do have an educational potential not yet effectively
developed, but foreign experience with them over a number
of years still offers little reassurance for us. In USSR, where
guideline principles were well understood in the 1920s and
where central planning has from the start been a basic reality
of economic life, both exhortation and rigid controls have
7. This is a good place to observe that inflation theory, related to guidelines but much
broader in scope, still has gaps and lacks organic unity despite a long history of profes
sional and lay preoccupation. See Martin Bronfenbrenner and F.D. Holzman, "A Survey
of Inflation," in Surveys of Economic Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), Vol.
1, pp. 46-107, especially the opening paragraph.
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generally failed to halt impressive price-wage-productivity
distortions. 8 Experience in Western Europe, furthermore,
does not encourage confidence in the efficacy of guidelines, 9
and the Gilbert-and-Sullivan denouement that is now being
enacted in Britain and elsewhere may reinforce earlier
doubts.
Most important for us, however, is the fact that formal
controls, resting on a basis of explicit law, afford certain ad
vantages to aggrieved citizens—and also to the public at
large. They do not necessarily prejudice the outlook for the
American style—a continuing wide diversity in economic
thought and action. We should be impressed that formal
controls fit into a vaunted tradition of "laws rather than
men," are supposed to be uniformly enforced, and are
generally regarded as irksome. The last clause is especially
important. Admittedly objectionable, formal controls are
more likely to be amended or repudiated as they prove inade
quate; and they are also more likely to be repealed when they
have served their announced purpose, or when the cir
cumstances that inspired their adoption have essentially
changed.
This kind word for legislated controls should not be
misconstrued as a recommendation—and surely not as a
judgment that their imposition has been warranted in recent
circumstances. Rather, this word is offered as a caution
against the easy assumption that "whatever is, is right" and
adequate, that guidelines once they have been invoked can
8. See I.H. Siegel, Soviet Labor Productivity (ORO-T-125, Chevy Chase, MD: Johns
Hopkins Operations Research Office, 1952), pp. 19-20; and Isaac Deutscher, Soviet Trade
Unions: Their Place in Labour Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1950), pp. 100-109.
9. See, for example, J.M. Edelman and R.W. Fleming, The Politics of Wage-Price Deci
sions: A Four-Country Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965); Economic
Council of Canada, Third Annual Review: Prices, Productivity and Employment (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, November 1966); and D.C. Smith, Incomes Policies: Some Foreign Ex
periences and Their Relevance for Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, October 1966).
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really contain intense or prolonged inflationary pressure and
would naturally be accepted as equitable despite uneven
compliance. Living, as we do, in the most possible of all
worlds instead of the best possible one, we have too few
policy instruments to rule out formal controls in advance.
On Exhortation. With respect to the second of our five
points, a kind word also seems to be necessary for exhorta
tion. Government, especially democratic government,
depends vitally on the verbalization of truths for all, even
though these truths may lack obvious handles for all who
should care. It is not always appreciated that every President
who has served since adoption of the Employment Act has
had to face the dilemmas of wage-price stabilization and to
acknowledge in Economic Reports the familiar macroconstraints of noninflationary development. 10 Intellectuals
who are glandularly disposed toward activism may be in
tolerant of "macro-yak" by a nonfavorite president or on
certain topics, or in manifestos or books other than their
own. What is vaguely called "freedom," however, will cer
tainly last longer, or be displaced less traumatically by a
Hegelian variety, if use of the jawbone as an instrument of
public instruction keeps a much higher priority than its use
as a weapon of force.
This is far from claiming that Executive macropreachment
can comprise a total policy. Rather, in helping to slow the
decay of contemporary-style "freedom" or to make the im
pending order more tolerable, exhortation can play an im
portant political and economic role. Monitoring, as we have
already seen since 1962, tends to require some hectoring;
what begins as earstroking can end as browbeating and even
worse. It would be foolish, therefore, to overlook the con
tribution that macropreachment can make toward establish10. Appendix A of Guidelines: Informal Controls in the Market Place omits reference to
guideline talk in the Truman Economic Reports (both annual and midyear).
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ment of a basis of public understanding of the common
necessity, toward creation of the conditions of voluntarism
and consent. The internalization of external constraints is
certainly a preferable alternative to the open application of
government sanctions against a sullen majority or a sizable
stiff-necked minority. Internalization is related to
Puritanism and to creeds held in even lower esteem, such as
communism, but it is also the essence of education and enculturation. Men still should raise a standard to which the
wise and honest, and the confused, can conceivably repair
even if the event is no longer believed to be in the hands of
God.
The probability that methodical macropreachment would
reduce the need for stern or ill-tempered administration of
guidelines should not be ignored either during the remaining
lifetime of the present venture or before any other monitor
ing effort is formulated. Indeed, it is fair to conjecture:
Whatever the informal controls may have accomplished
since 1962 could probably have been accomplished, with the
aid of more intensive macropreachment and with fewer
dramatic "confrontations," by a system even less formal
than the informal guidelines. Instead of proclaiming and en
forcing general price-wage standards, the federal govern
ment might do just as well by (1) acting as a self-interested
monopsonist and (2) more purposefully using in the broader
interest the legal powers it already possesses as a creditor,
guarantor, debtor, underwriter, co-financier, or policeman
of antitrust. It could quietly face the steel, aluminum, and
copper industries and other suppliers as a hard customer. It
could influence construction prices by speeding or delaying
outlays for deferrable projects. It has a large variety of pro
grams and roles, and it reaches into every significant in
dustry and every geographic area. It could more deliberately,
even more "responsibly," affect the supply of, and demand
for, the scarcer services (for example, in the health field) and
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the prices at which they are provided. Serious and sustained
advertisement of the price-wage-productivity macro-truisms
could meanwhile be contributing to a favorable public
climate for labor-management discussions and pricing deci
sions.
In retrospect, historians of the current guideline venture
may, of course, decide that what the preceding paragraph
proposes was essentially the strategy that had been pursued.
They will see more clearly that the public collisions of
government with industry and labor were actually very few.
They may record that these collisions had far less decisive ef
fect than the unexciting and hardly publicized day-to-day ac
tions of government and private officials. Can we learn this
lesson in advance and use it to slow the transition to a
monitored economy or to render that economy more benign?
On Private Vigilance. Our third point refers mainly to the
private posture regarding guidelines. (We say "mainly" even
though state and local governments do not necessarily have
to relax into roles as federal satellites and can still compete
meaningfully and appropriately with federal power in service
of the public. This possibility should be understood although
the word "government" is often used, in this paper as
elsewhere, as if the different political jurisdictions really
make up a monolithic system, or as if only the federal power
is pertinent.) The actions and positions of individuals and
organizations can surely influence the shape of a guideline
system, affect its administration, and condition its evolution
and viability.
The definition of social "responsibility," it is worth
remembering, is not yet an exclusive federal prerogative.
Private groups so minded can continue to uphold and prop
agate a concept that tolerates unequal achievement with
equal opportunity, that contemplates wide diversity of
economic behavior in pursuit of private advantage within a
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framework of evolving law and with due regard to the com
mon weal. Furthermore, government behavior itself still is,
and ought to remain, subject to review, criticism, and rebuke
by the citizenry; and the standard of "responsibility" ap
plied by "the people" need not be the same as the one
fostered by whatever public officials happen to be in charge.
The monitor, in short, can still be monitored, but private
economic and political muscles have to be exercised diligent
ly and regularly if atrophy is to be avoided. In particular,
private groups may wish to insist on flexibility in wage and
price determinations, with bargaining assigned its familiar
role though tempered by macropreachment. This flexibility,
of course, can prove algebraically compatible with the
establishment of, and more uniform adherence to, national
norms. Private groups, furthermore, ought to find reassur
ing the apparent effect of their earlier adverse reactions to
jawbone weapon-play in the administration of the current
guideline program. Official reliance on jawbone "yak-tion"
has obviously become the rule, even though the dramatic ex
ceptions have a lingering psychological impact.
On Statistics and Education. The fourth point relates to
needs for information and knowledge (we shall skip T.S.
Eliot's third category, wisdom) respecting productivity and
other concepts pertinent to wage-price stabilization. The
universal tolerance of low-grade "verbal" algebra tends to
obscure an unfortunate gap in our statistics: the lack of
structurally unbiased index numbers of productivity, wages,
and prices meeting the rigorous requirements of "literal"
algebra.' l Such measures are not easy to construct, especially
because of their data demands; but how many people in
terested in guidelines even know about their conceptual
relevance and would care about their unavailability? The
11. See I.H. Siegel, "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index Numbers," 1965 Pro
ceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American Statistical
Association, pp. 369-372.

Guidelines for the Perplexed (1967:2)

189

relatively few technically-informed people are too busy, as a
rule, worrying about more conspicuous gaps or theoretical
flaws in the supply of relevant statistics; or they are engaged
in advocacy and have necessarily accepted for their purposes
the information that is at hand; or they believe, or for other
reasons may be willing to assure their principals, that
available series, including indexes based on crudely deflated
aggregates, are good enough as "first approximations" (sec
ond ones never seem to be made!) and that variant measures
usually yield tolerably similar numbers.
The general shift of professional interest since the 1930s
from microeconomics toward gross economic phenomena,
toward national economic accounts, toward other aggregate
measures, and toward federal fiscal policy has also tended to
deflect attention from needs for better statistical building
blocks. If productivity, price, and wage statistics were
available for more industries, even if they did not meet the
rigorous requirements of "literal" algebra, both government
and private decisionmaking would surely.be benefited. In
principle at least, such information would facilitate average
compliance with national price-wage criteria despite
deliberate interindustry variation.
The continuing wide diffusion of decisionmaking capabili
ty in economic affairs would be favored by the availability
not only of more and better industry statistics but also of
more and better company indexes. If companies had bat
teries of measures concerning their own productivity, price,
and wage performance, they could make nimbler explora
tions of the opportunities for wage-bargaining and pricesetting around any formulated national targets. If the con
struction of such measures could also take account of the
principles of "literal" algebra, then companies would ac
quire precision tools for decision.
It may be feared, of course, that the systematic develop
ment of company measures would enhance the danger that
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federal finesse of existing private power to make economic
determinations will occur. Our thought, however, is that
these statistics would not necessarily be revealed, that they
would have the same status as accounting and managerial
records normally not published. Even countries that started
with central planning have become increasingly interested in
the merits of economic decentralization, the workability of
which requires the availability of coordinate statistics for dif
ferent levels of aggregation. Happily, what has been called
"planning" in the United States has typically envisaged con
tinuance of a traditional decentralization; and the contribu
tion of company data to the continued diffusion of decisionmaking power in an economy that improves in total stability
has not gone unrecognized. 12
The outstanding limitations of the national data base for
the purposes of price-wage stabilization should be made bet
ter known. Indeed, a federally-funded educational program
would be worth far more than the trivial cost involved; and it
deserves consideration as a government effort together with
more systematic and sustained macropreachment. The pro
gram should aim at upgrading the sophistication not only of
the public at large but also of special groups concerned with
wage and price decisions.
Everyone, it seems, wants to be different in the same way,
and the custodians of decision and their oracular janissaries
do not appear exceptional in this regard. Could it not be
made fashionable to acknowledge major data gaps and the
theoretical difficulties of meaningful measurement? More
attention would then be given by the press, government of
ficials, and business and labor executives to needs for
12. A statement issued by the National Planning Association just before celebration of the
first decade of-the Employment Act might be recalled here: "We need better private plan
ning by each group to avoid a centrally directed economy. Better planning must be based on
better statistical data and estimates." See Gerhard Colm, ed., The Employment Act: Past
and Future (Washington, DC, 1956), p. 83. Many companies, of course, have statistical
and economic facilities for the guidance of management.
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statistical remedy. A more wholesome attitude would
develop toward estimation of the direction and magnitude of
the difference between preferred measures and computable
or available compromises. A desirable enterprise would find
encouragement: the construction of at least provisional na
tional measures that are technically more appropriate for the
joint and co-equal consideration of productivity, wages, and
prices.
In short, if guidelines seem necessary, an appreciation that
the size of the national data base is not a sign of robustness
and relevance ought to be promoted. A more energetic quest
for improvement of the statistical supply has to include ap
propriate research on the less tractable problems of concept
and measurement and the enhancement of public under
standing of the true state of the art. An educational effort
would keep fresh the difference between a mistake and a
mystique and help us to leaven technicism and quantification
with common sense. This effort would seem attractive on
cost-effectiveness grounds.
Toward Guideline Improvement. 1 * The fifth point, as in
dicated earlier, will be treated at some length. The sugges
tions that follow are not at all exhaustive, but they should
suffice to indicate the variety of aspects from which the
determination and administration of wage-price guidelines
might be reexamined, with some advantage to the current ex
ercise and with even more advantage to a future design.
Comments already made about statistical needs remain perti
nent, but they will not be repeated in this section.
The first suggestion offered under the fifth point is farreaching in its practical implications: To consider payment
of non-negotiable, low-interest "wage-deferment bonds" as
13. Based in part on "Productivity Measures and Forecasts for Employment and Stabiliza
tion Policy."
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government compensation for the inflationary loss of pur
chasing power sustained by persons whose wage increases in
the same year have not exceeded the guideline percentage. 14
This kind of compensation would remedy the injury suffered
by the "good guys" at the hands of "bad guys," or suffered
through operation of the economic forces that the latter per
sonify; and its availability might also encourage the govern
ment to behave more "responsibly" in an inflationary set
ting. Unlike escalation adjustments in wages for cost of liv
ing, the issuance of bonds does not translate immediately in
to added pressure on prices. Perhaps the term of the bonds
or the interest rate could be set so as to defer heavy redemp
tions to a period of uncertain or declining aggregate
economic demand.
Adoption of this idea might reinforce acceptability of
another, which is sound in principle but can be implemented
only roughly: To set any annual guideline criterion for wages
at the more conservative of two projected figures, one reflec
ting the year's expected productivity change and the other
reflecting the anticipated longer-term (say, five-year average)
trend. For inflation control, of course, projections, especial
ly for the short term, are much more pertinent than the
record of past economic performance, which has been em
phasized instead in the current guideline venture. For a
period in which annual productivity gains are slackening, the
availability of wage-deferment bonds would make it easier
for unions to accept the more conservative wage adjustment
here suggested. (Incidentally, if a productivity decline is pro
jected for a particular year, a zero, rather than negative,
wage adjustment would be "conservative.") It might further
be suggested that the productivity projections used for
guidelines be the same as, or compatible with, the ones used
14. At the Atlanta meeting on November 11, 1966, the author included the alternative of an
equivalent income-tax deduction.

Guidelines for the Perplexed (1967:2)

193

by the Council of Economic Advisers in its other work—say,
in anticipating changes in the Gross National Product and
the major components thereof.
Consistent with the preceding two thoughts is the next sug
gestion under the fifth point: The government should con
cede that bargained wage increases may properly go beyond
the general wage criterion, but it should also use appropriate
means to discourage (a) automatic translation of
ultraproductivity wage gains into price increases in the same
year and (b) automatic mimicry of such wage gains
elsewhere. In the regime that seeks fuller employment with
minimal inflationary leakage, that wishes to avoid formal
controls yet achieve the macro-conditions of price-wage
stability, that also prizes flexibility in private decisions and
variation in results, the discouragement of (a) and (b) may
require additional machinery for discussion and reporting to
supplement macropreachment, the use of monopsony and
other power, and the issuance of wage-deferment bonds.
Macropreachment should be broadened to include insistence
on hard bargaining by management; franker acknowledg
ment of the special difficulties posed by union power and
union rivalries; recollection of the relevance of marginal pro
ductivity to regional, intercompany, and interindustry pay
differentials, even for the "same" work or occupation; and
assertion that improvement in the outlook for income securi
ty itself warrants moderation in the quest for higher re
muneration by business and labor.
Another suggestion under the fifth point is easy to imple
ment, would simplify guideline discussion in general, and
would assist administration from the national level down to
the company level. It requires: Restatement of the wageproductivity-price relationship in an algebraically equivalent
way that focuses on totals— thus, the percentage payroll rise
should be no more rapid than the expected rise in real out
put. Such a revision makes clear the wide latitude that exists,
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not only in the economy at large but also in individual in
dustries and companies, for flexibility within the guidelines.
Only the totals have to be kept in balance: hills that pile up in
some places should also mean hollows elsewhere. A wage
"creep" or "drift" reflecting, say, the transfer or upgrading
of employees can be adjusted in the job mix. The grant of an
unusually high pay increase to certain classes of workers
should mean a more modest average increase for the rest. If
part of a payroll rise represents a deliberate cost-of-living ad
justment, the same funds cannot, of course, be available for
compensation on other grounds in addition—even produc
tivity.
In the reconsideration of guidelines, additional attention
should be given (1) to the width of the sector in which pro
ductivity performance is relevant and (2) to the scope of the
incomes to be covered. As for the width, one may wonder
why, say, agriculture should be taken into account as well as
the non-agricultural industries in the establishment of a payrise criterion intended to apply to only some workers engag
ed in only a part of the latter sector. As for the scope,
perhaps it is desirable to seek a total "incomes policy,"
rather than just a wage-moderation policy, stipulating, say,
that the rise in total value added, expressed in current
dollars, should not exceed the expected gain in real net out
put. This standard would emphasize, for example, that since
blue-collar workers are not responsible for the total output
of a firm, attention should not be confined to their compen
sation only. Furthermore, if the cost-push mechanism is
deemed plausible, then "irresponsible" profit inflation has
to receive as much attention when it occurs as "irresponsi
ble" wage inflation does when it is not occurring but is only
feared. Incidentally, our total-income criterion need not im
ply a constant division between wage and other income.
Finally, a restatement of the national wage-productivity,
or income-productivity, objective in terms of aggregates
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should facilitate coordination of guideline efforts with other
programs that are also intended to keep prices generally
stable. Specifically, the restatement below exposes a com
mon policy frontier along which the Council of Economic
Advisers, the other Executive agencies, and the Federal
Reserve need to cooperate continually. It points toward an
all-season, master criterion for countering both cost-push
and demand-pull inflationary pressures. Thus, avoidance of
cost-push inflation requires that payrolls or total factor costs
(preferably for the whole economy) rise no faster than the
real net output (of the economy or the greater part
thereof). 15 Meanwhile, the quantity theory of money, which
relates to the classical demand-pull situation, roughly
prescribes that the growth of the money supply and the ex
pected gain in real output should remain in balance. The
composite policy standard becomes this: To maintain
general price stability by keeping the annual percentage
growth in the money supply within the anticipated rate of ex
pansion for real output, which in turn should govern the rate
of increase for payrolls or total factor payments (expressed
in current dollars).
With the conclusion of this brief agenda for guideline
review, we also bring to a close our exercise in the formula
tion of a posture toward price-wage monitoring in general.
The above discussion has touched on both more formal and
less formal alternatives to, and variants of, a guideline pro
gram; on the need for government, as well as private,
"responsibility" in behavior; and on the key contributions
15. Control of cost-push pressures also requires that long-term supply bottlenecks be eased
while less fundamental inflation-suppressing remedies are applied. Persistent increases in
the cost of services that, year in and year out, figure significantly in the rise of the consumer
price index make it harder for workers to accept small pay adjustments in the "public in
terest."
For a brief recent discussion of the Council-Federal Reserve interface, see John Stark,
"Coordination of Monetary Policy: Unfinished Business," George Washington Law
Review (December 1966), pp. 318-328.
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that information and education could make to voluntarism
and diversity in private action and to flexibility in ad
ministration. Stress has been placed on macropreachment,
which ought to become a still more prominent feature of any
future continual stabilization effort. The founders of our
Republic did not believe in "systems so perfect," according
to T.S. Eliot's wonderful line, "that no one will need to be
good." It is to be hoped that the next guideline program or
any alternative monitoring system will also be conceived in
the same tradition of instrumental imperfection and of
dependence on the informed and voluntary cooperation of
the citizenry for achievement of the common good.

Postscript
The editors have kindly granted an opportunity to add a
brief comment acknowledging the latest Economic Report of
the President, published after this paper was submitted. The
1967 Report has some features that are obviously reassuring
to the viewpoint here expounded—that the trend toward a
monitored economy should be moderated and should also be
influenced in favor of the personalistic values still generally
prized. Sources of uneasiness, however, remain.
On the positive side, the guideline discussion of 1967 af
firms the 1962 objective of education, rather than prescrip
tion; reflects a sensitivity to charges, made especially in
business circles, of high-handedness and hubris; and avoids
setting out a new numerical productivity beacon to replace
the light that failed. The role of a Greek chorus, rather than
economic scenestealer, is reassumed, at least temporarily. A
tactic of didactic is adopted—with homely homily,
pedestrian pedantry, and even two quotations from the
Eisenhower Reports.
The major remaining sources of concern can always be
reduced to the single one of uncertainty as to which values
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will be subordinated, denigrated, or jeopardized when the
mandate of the Employment Act is vigorously interpreted.
The tortured sentence comprising Section 2 of the Act gives a
sufficient hint that national objectives may conflict and that
the assignment of priorities may properly differ or change.
The rules of the economic game no longer seem fixed to the
private players once the precedent of strong, but selective,
Executive intervention is established.
Equally or more pertinent are the ambiguity of the current
position of the professional adviser, the Delphic qualities of
the advice he can give in public to his principal, and the indefiniteness of his message to eager readers. The 1967
Report, like those for 1962-1966 and unlike those of the early
Truman and Eisenhower eras, separately identifies the con
tribution of the Council from the President's own statement
to the Congress. The guideline talk in the professional con
tribution is discursive, metes out praise and blame in a man
ner more appropriate to the President himself, is susceptible
of excerpting in defense of "irresponsible" behavior, and
courts charges of "political" involvement and disingenuousness. Prudence, after all, does temper an adviser's
choice of what to talk about in public, how to say it in the
presence of millions of listeners, and what to ignore. Could
not professional assistance on behalf of informal price-wage
stabilization be rendered best if the President's "consultative
and advisory body" 16 serves as his "spooksman" rather than
spokesman?
16. This term was used by the first triumvirate in describing itself in the First Annual
Report by the Council of Economic Advisers (not the first of the President's annual reports
to the Congress), December 1946, pp. 7-8.
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10
Productivity Measures
and Forecasts for Employment
and Stabilization Policy
The Story in Brief
This paper explores certain aspects of the meaning,
measurement, supply, quality, and use of productivity
statistics in the light of policy requirements concerning
employment and wage-price stabilization in our evolving
economy. It touches on some of the many conceptual,
technical, and practical problems that merit wider attention
in our changing environment. Such problems must be ap
preciated by public and private policymakers and by pro
gram administrators as well as by the constructors and
various users of productivity measures.
Two points should be made first about the economic con
text of this paper:
1. The strong interpretation of the Employment Act of
1946 in recent years has already conferred new
importance on labor-productivity time series,
including forecasts.
Reprinted from Sar A. Levitan and Irving H. Siegel, eds., Dimensions of Manpower
Policy: Programs and Research, Copyright © 1966, by The Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, MD.
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2. The recent trend toward strong interpretation is likely
to become confirmed as our "mixed" economy
continues to shade into a "monitored" one.
With respect to interpretation of the Employment Act, a
reminder is needed that the language is heavily qualified and
may therefore be read (as it has been by different Economic
Advisers to the President) with varying emphasis. The tor
tuous Teutonic sentence that comprises the Act's Declara
tion of Policy (Section 2) does provide a federal charter for
directing public and private policy toward fuller employment
with reasonably stable prices; but the law assumes no uncon
ditional obligation, sets no priorities, and gives no unhedged
pledge of jobs. Just before the familiar terminal words,
"maximum employment, production, and purchasing
power," we find the infinitive "to promote"—rather than,
say, "to guarantee." Furthermore, although the law is fre
quently miscalled the "Full Employment Act," the adjective
"full" is nowhere used, and no criterion for "maximum" is
offered.
The second of the two points refers to the emerging
economic order. In the future, we may expect federal
prestige, laws, regulations, and market power to be marshal
ed still more systematically for the exertion of "countervail
ing" force. More positive, though selective, use will be made
of governmental tools, with due but elastic regard for our
democratic traditions, to induce "responsible" private
behavior in a widening range of productive activities and
business situations.
The discussion that follows suggests several ways in which
the productivity information base might be strengthened to
assist the future formulation and execution of employment
and stabilization policy:
1. Improvement, as opportunities permit, in the scope and
quality of the corpus of productivity information for in-
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dividual industries, industry combinations, and larger
economic sectors.
2. Support of further research into stubborn problems of
concept and meaning—including test computations, where
feasible, to disclose the direction and magnitude of the dif
ference between (a) preferred measures and (b) the available
or derivable ones that have to be used as substitutes.
3. Promotion of the design, construction, and testing of
algebraically consistent index numbers that are especially
suitable for joint analysis of changes in productivity and
other economic variables, such as wages and prices.
4. Encouragement of: (a) experimentation with produc
tivity forecasting, since explicit outlook estimates are often
much more appropriate than routine extensions of past
trends; and (b) related research efforts to anticipate the
nature, extent, and implications of technological and other
important changes.
5. Maintenance, insofar as practicable, of "flexible"
governmental and public attitudes toward "official" pro
ductivity statistics and measurement techniques that cannot
qualify as definitive.
6. Stimulation of further company interest in the con
struction of measures, trends, and forecasts of productivity
as well as other variables relating to company operations.
7. Extension, at modest cost in comparison to obtainable
benefits, of the education of policymakers, administrators,
analysts, the press, and the general public with respect to the
character and limitations of available and normally derivable
productivity statistics.
This statement of needs neither overlooks nor is intended
to disparage past accomplishments in the labor-productivity
field; and it does not mean that data outside the immediate
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realm of productivity measurement are less deserving of con
tinual attention. The lifetime of the Employment Act has in
deed been a period of great progress in economic statistics;
but productivity work has not been especially favored and its
various prunings have hardly been intended to assure
robustness. The realm of productivity measurement is aided
in some degree, on the other hand, when improvements are
made in other statistics that are utilizable in pertinent in
direct methods of estimation (e.g., price deflation). But it
could be aided much more if significant improvements were
made along other lines, as indicated in the preceding seven
statements.

The Productivity Nexus
The developing need for more and better laborproductivity tools for policy is clearly reflected in the
Employment Act. Productivity, in the present context,
means the ratio of production to employment (man-hours or
persons, unweighted or weighted in some appropriate way);
and these are two of the three variables mentioned in the
concluding phrase of the Declaration of Policy, already
cited. Productivity also enters into the practical definition of
"purchasing power," as the promulgation of explicit "wageprice guideposts" in the 1962 Economic Report of the Presi
dent illustrates. Finally, productivity forecasts have a place
in the discharge of the presidential responsibility to report
annually the "current and foreseeable trends in the levels of
employment, production, and purchasing power" (Section
3).
At this point, a necessary distinction between "verbal"
and "literal" algebra should be noted. The mere cancellation
of words in such identities as " production =employment x
productivity" or "wages =unit labor cost x employment x
productivity" is not a sufficient criterion for the construe-
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tion of suitably matched index numbers. Ideally, com
patibility in a more "literal" sense—in the detailed data, for
mulas, and weights—is also required. Since these more ex
acting requirements can rarely be met, however, it is
desirable, at least, to appreciate their nature and the risks in
volved in substituting an available and seemingly equivalent
measure for a preferable but unavailable one.
Though commonly neglected, the distinction between
"verbal" and "literal" algebra in index-number measure
ment is not a technical trifle. Policymakers, administrators,
and specialists in nonproductivity fields, even those who
consider themselves "practical," ought to know or care that
algebraic operations help to determine the meaning and ap
propriateness of alternative productivity measures, that dif
ferent plausible sets of operations may lead to significantly
different productivity numbers, that different numbers may
counsel different decisions, that absence and ignorance of
the most suitable alternative productivity measure may
foreclose consideration and choice of the most warranted
course of action. "Practical" people cannot really afford to
rely on the mere names of series, on symbols, and on form,
and to show indifference to content. 1

Uneven Recognition of Needs; Uneven
Prospects of Remedy
As our mixed economy progressively becomes a monitored
one, in which the federal government exercises a more
positive and a wider coordinating role, the creation of more
1. For further discussion of "verbal" and "literal" algebra, see three items by I.H. Siegel:
Concepts and Measurement of Production and Productivity (Washington: U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1952); "On the Design of Consistent Output and Indexes for Productivity
Measurement," in Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961). pp. 23-41; and "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index
Numbers," 7965 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the
American Statistical Association, pp. 368-72.
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and better productivity statistics and outlook estimates will
very probably proceed at a rate that is far less than satisfac
tory. The expansion in supply and the advance of quality
may be much too limited for the demands placed on the na
tional data base. The popularity of macroeconomic serieswatching already tends to favor certain broad aggregates and
general economic indicators over detailed measures. Easy
reliance on these comprehensive measures leads to neglect of
their conceptual and technical flaws and their incomplete ap
propriateness to many of the uses to which they are put.
Their apparent adequacy diverts attention from re
quirements for other pertinent and detailed series, especially
building blocks. Indeed, a preoccupation with aggregates
and a complacent widespread acceptance of "verbal'*
algebra may make it appear that buildings no longer have to
be built by experts, or with bricks or similar elemental
materials, and that, therefore, little need exists for the cre
ation and improvement of such materials and for the careful
drafting of specifications and blueprints.
Inattention to the basic shortage of productivity building
blocks is easy to document (although some of the more ex
perienced students of economic affairs do occasionally file
pointed reminders). It is remarkable that only a few scattered
references were made to labor productivity by the in
dividuals, organizations, and users of statistics canvassed in
1965 by the Joint Economic Committee for views on im
provements required in the federal information base. 2 The
1967 Budget, furthermore, shows a trivial increase in expen
ditures for "salaries and expenses" of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for 1966 over 1965 and for 1967 over 1966 "for im
proved statistics and statistical research on employment and
unemployment, wages, prices, and productivity." 3 A related
2. U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Improved Statistics for Economic Growth,
July 1965.
3. The Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1967, p. 299.
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newspaper item reports a proposed "boost" from 30 to 35 or
37 in the number of industries covered by separate produc
tivity indexes of the Bureau. 4 Practically no reference was
made to statistical needs with respect to productivity in the
papers presented at the symposium celebrating the twentieth
aniversary of the Employment Act in February, 1966.
Whatever is added to the existing stock of productivity in
formation by federal agencies (including, incidentally, the
industry data of the Bureau of the Census) will be most
welcome, but the gains will very likely be much too small and
come much too late to satisfy any purist. The nature, scope,
and rate of progress affecting published industry and sector
statistics will doubtless be restricted, as in the past, by
technical difficulties of concept and measurement (as in the
service industries), by proper differences of opinion among
experts as to priorities, by the costs (in time, money, and
scarce statistical manpower) of data compilation for new
series (especially for making algebraically consistent
measures for particular analyses), and by the proliferation of
competing demands for available funds. Private organiza
tions, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research,
will presumably add to the supply of historical series, but
their contribution can hardly prove decisive in view of the
growth and diversity of foreseeable needs.
Plentiful opportunities for theoretical, analytical,
managerial, and educational advances will be afforded by
the challenges of policy to the confined data base. The con
struction of test measures and projections, the elaboration of
econometric models, and the empirical study of production
functions could yield some productivity-information
bonuses. Additional companies, furthermore, may find suf
ficient reason to prepare indexes of production, labor input,
productivity, and unit labor costs as guides for internal
4. Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1966.
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operations and planning, 5 but these indexes will most prob
ably not be published. Individual government agencies will
surely expand their measurement programs for managerial
purposes too. 6 The stage will be set for a continuing project
that merits governmental acceptance on cost-benefit
grounds—enhancement of the sophistication of the various
classes of users, the press, and the general public with regard
to the character, applicability, and pitfalls of available pro
ductivity statistics and with regard to the properties of more
suitable special-purpose measures (including forecasts).
The Employment Act has served as a focus for orderly ef
forts to improve the statistics needed for coordinating public
and private policy in the interest of economic expansion with
reasonable price stability. In the 1940s and 1950s, "gaps" in
productivity and other statistical areas were widely adver
tised—for example, by the Joint Economic Committee in
cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget. 7 In the 1958
Economic Report of the President, prepared when the
federal economic role was far less activist, a special appendix
dealt with problems of productivity measurement. In the
1962 Report, which promulgated the wage-price guideposts
as informational rather than directive, the limitations of pro
ductivity statistics again were frankly addressed. In subse
quent Reports, as the guideposts acquired doctrinal force,
the caveats became muted despite their continuing ap
plicability to available statistical gauges. A mellow
restrospective chapter in the 1966 Report, reviewing the first
two decades of the Act, points to notable improvements,
5. See, for example, J.W. Kendrick and Daniel Creamer, Measuring Company Productivi
ty ("Studies in Business Economics," No. 89; New York: National Industrial Conference
Board, 1965).
6. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Measuring Productivity of Federal Government Organiza
tions, 1964; and its War on Waste, December 31, 1964.
7. Statistical Gaps, a Committee Print, was issued in 1948. Also noteworthy are the Joint
Economic Committee's Hearings on Economic Statistics, 1954, and Hearings on Employ
ment and Unemployment Statistics, 1955.
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especially in the timely processing of an increasing number
of widely used "economic indicators"; but it also notes that
"our data are not completely satisfactory" and cites produc
tivity and fringe benefits among the areas "where there are
important gaps and weaknesses," remediable "only by ex
pansion of our statistical programs."
In 1962, a Presidential Commission reported on produc
tivity and other statistical needs expressed to it by the Coun
cil of Economic Advisers and other organizations and in
dividuals. An explicit interest in industry series was
registered by the Council: "its analyses of ... economic
developments would be greatly aided by better statistics on
employment and hours for major industrial sectors, which
could be used in conjunction with gross national product and
other output estimates to determine shifts in productivity."
The Council also "indicated that one of its most urgent
statistical needs is for better data on hours worked in all ma
jor sectors of the economy as a prerequisite for early and
reliable estimates of productivity changes." 8 In the long run,
it is to be hoped, even immediate statistical requirements of
the Council may be partially accommodated!
In 1965, while the Council still had its old needs for pro
ductivity information, it acquired an additional context in
which to restate them. A Council member, addressing the
Federal Statistics Users Conference at the end of October,
noted that "rough, global figures" had proved adequate for
public economic policy relating to reduction of the gap be
tween actual and potential employment. Successful reduc
tion, however, rationalized a shift of primary interest to
specific spheres in which "we need to strengthen our
knowledge substantially"—productivity, as well as prices
8. President's Committee to Appraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Measur
ing Employment and Unemployment, 1962, pp. 39 and 94.
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(domestic and export), capacity, job vacancies, and fringe
benefits. 9

The Growing Federal Role
What are the pertinent features of the evolving environ
ment in which productivity is assuming new significance,
regardless of the state and adequacy of the information at
hand? A trend toward a "monitored" economy, even in
"peacetime," is indicated by recent domestic events, and
also by earlier developments in Great Britain and Western
Continental Europe. 10 Emergence of a new pattern, a new
"style," is discernible—although detours, inconsistencies,
and reversals are also to be expected in the transition from a
"mixed" economy, as competitive forces and as the flux of
international affairs continue to register their effects.
Two characteristics may be said to differentiate the
monitored economy from the mixed economy. In the latter,
the central government already demands a sizable share of
the national product and already has a wide assortment of
powers relating to taxes, money and credit, resource
development, welfare, and markets. Thus, it already
possesses a capability of influencing private economic deci
sions significantly and selectively. More important, through
impact on both aggregate demand and the supply of critical
resources, it can also influence the general tempo of
economic activity and the total volume of employment. The
monitored economy is distinguished, first, by the use of
government prestige and power (in our case, through the
9. See reference to remarks of Otto Eckstein in The American Statistician, December 1965,
p. 2.
10. See the various essays in E.G. Hickman (ed.), Quantitative Planning of Economic
Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965); and J.M. Edelman and R.W. Fleming,
The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis (Urbana, University of Il
linois Press, 1965).

Productivity, Employment & Stabilization (1966)

209

presidential office) to define a comprehensive master objec
tive or small cluster of dominant "national goals," to set
"targets" relating thereto, and to pursue these aims
preferably by the manipulation of available "instrumental
variables" and by "exhortation" of the private sector. The
second distinguishing characteristic is the governmental
disposition to achieve the collaboration deemed essential to
the "national interest" or the "public interest" by going
beyond general exhortation to threats, sanctions, and the
mobilization of public sentiment against recalcitrant private
groups.
In the monitored economy, formal detailed "planning" is
not attempted for society, although quantitative and other
simplified forecasting "models" may be used as aids in
public and private policy design. Heavy stress continues to
be placed there on private initiative and money incentives,
and wide latitude remains for freedom of economic choice
and action. The national output retains its dominant con
sumer orientation, at least in "peacetime." Indeed, if the
monitored economy is successful in sustaining growth, an ex
tra welfare bonus becomes available to the population
through more complete and more continual access to goods
and services produced in greater abundance.
While traditional cultural values are strained in the
monitored economy, the spine of dominant ideology could
remain intact. The changes would tend to be regarded as ra
tional or necessary modifications in the rules of the game in
response to new challenges. On the whole, the people may
seem, like Macbeth following the dagger, to be marshaled
where they were already going. The targets indicate general
directions, rather than personal quotas, and gains in material
welfare could go far to compensate for any felt deprivation
in the realm of intangibles. Projections that are judged
desirable are expected to derive a self-fulfilling impetus from
the responses of the private sector, and corrective private
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responses are expected to be induced by the announcement
of national prospects regarded as objectionable. In addition,
government has to "plan" its own complements to such
private responses, which may not be deemed sufficient for
attainment of established national targets.
The roots of the emerging U.S. version of the monitored
economy are ramified and deep, traceable without exaggera
tion back to the Constitutional Convention—long before our
system even became recognized as "mixed." If specific
historical tributaries are to be singled out, first importance
must be assigned to the experience and to the threat of wars
and recessions—emergencies that fundamentally jeopardize
personal and national security, that accordingly provide oc
casion for the enactment and exercise of extraordinary
federal powers, and that also tend to focus and fix federal
leadership in the Presidency. 11
Employment Act as Integrating Framework
The Employment Act of 1946, passed in an atmosphere of
concern that the economic sluggishness of the 1930s might
return after World War II, provides a handy and "logical"
matrix for coordinating federal policies with each other and
with those of lower levels of government and the private sec
tor. The turgid single sentence that constitutes the Declara
tion of Policy is nowadays being interpreted, as already
noted, as a charter for strong federal monitorial action
11. In recent years, Congressional hearings and the reports of such groups as the
President's Commission on National Goals, the Committee for Economic Development's
Commission on Money and Credit, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the American
Assembly, and the National Planning Association have helped to modify professional,
business, and public attitudes concerning master objectives and the potentials for
government-private cooperation. Earlier contributions have been made, of course, by the
Economic Reports of the President—and also by the widely advertised concepts of "part
nership" and "shared responsibility" of the Eisenhower era, which are forerunners of the
current "creative federalism." Precedents were provided before World War II in the
reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee and of such New Deal agencies as
the National Resources Committee and the Works Progress Administration.
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rather than as a negotiated baseline of bipartisan unanimity.
A reconciliation of the Employment Act and the older
Federal Reserve Act, which provides another, but less com
prehensive, approach to the same sorts of national goals, re
mains to be effected in the future. A contribution to this rap
prochement is offered at the end of this paper.
One of the major recent strides toward a monitored
economy within the framework of the Employment Act in
volves the adoption and policing of guidelines for relating
wages to productivity and restraining prices. Introduced in
the 1962 Economic Report of the President, the
"guideposts" have since been energetically enforced to
frustrate industry intentions to raise steel, copper, and
aluminum prices. Government intervention has included
threats to use "monopsonistic" market power and to release
materials stockpiled for military emergency. Redistribution
or withholding of federal contracts has been threatened in
other instances—for example, in an effort to restrain con
struction wages—and federal intercession helped to undo
cigarette price increases in 1966.
In 1964, furthermore, fiscal policy was used boldly to ex
pand total economic demand and thereby reduce unemploy
ment. A drastic tax reduction that had been wistfully con
templated for many years was daringly executed at the Presi
dent's request by an agreeable Congress. Growth was spur
red as the potential economic energy previously wound into
the progressive rate structure became quickly converted into
the kinetic energy of private spending. The popularity of this
tax cut and the President's own prestige facilitated subor
dination of "market" decisions by industry leaders to the
Executive's interpretation of the national interest.
To add concreteness to our discussion, we refer to various
passages in the preface to the 1965 Economic Report of the
President. For our purpose, it does not matter that some of
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the assertions are, and must remain, arguable, despite the
wide advertisement of a "new economics." The Employ
ment Act is interpreted there as a "mandate" for pursuit of
"full employment" and certain other supporting objectives:
"rapid growth, price stability, and equilibrium in our
balance of payments." The consistency of these goals, even
of their "mutually reinforcing" character, given "proper
policies," is considered to have been proved by experience.
The President also stated that he regards "the goal of over
all price stability as fully implied in the language of the
Employment Act."
Lauding "the imagination, prudence, and skill of our
businessmen, workers, investors, farmers, and consumers"
for their fundamental contributions to "our basically private
economy," the President observed that an important ingre
dient had been added since 1960 "to invigorate private ef
forts." This ingredient is positive government policy, which
provides "the vital margin of difference" for "steady, but
noninflationary, growth." Indeed, 1964 marked "the first
time our Nation cut taxes for the declared purpose of
speeding the advance of the private economy toward 'max
imum employment, production, and purchasing power/ "
The President pledged new efforts to eradicate joblessness in
accord with his interpretation of the Act: "The promise in
the Employment Act of job opportunities for all those able
and wanting to work has not yet been fulfilled. We cannot
rest until it is."
With respect to wages and prices, the President appealed
to "the sense of public responsibility of our labor leaders
and our industrial leaders to do their full part." He com
mended the wage and price guideposts to these leaders and to
the public. He cautioned that he would "maintain a close
watch," would "draw public attention to private actions
which threaten the public interest," and would ask "for
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special, detailed analysis of price or wage increases in key
sectors of the economy."
With respect to job opportunities, the President placed
prime reliance on "fiscal and monetary measures," but he
also recognized certain structural problems that would have
to be met in other ways. In addition to referring to proposals
for manpower training and for strengthening the U.S.
Employment Service, he noted that an "active manpower
policy" is being developed "to reduce human costs, raise
productivity, and make possible full employment without in
flation."

Forecasting Productivity and Technology
The hazards of forecasting changes in productivity and
technology will add to the frustrations already encountered
in historical measurement as federal policy demands a wider
variety of explicit estimates of the future. The follies com
mitted in academic as well as journalistic discussions of the
prospective impacts of, say, research and development ac
tivity and of "automation" cannot modify the government's
increasing requirement for better appraisals, and they hardly
assure significant or rapid improvement in techniques or in
judgment. Earlier public and private efforts to forecast
technological change and its implications (e.g., by the Na
tional Resources Committee and the Twentieth Century
Fund) as well are more recent efforts (e.g., by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics) do suggest useful study approaches. Among
other things, they alert us to the importance of distinguishing
stages that have different economic significance: invention,
engineering development, innovation, and widespread ac
ceptance. Even within the last of these phases, which may
seem relatively well defined, a valuable lesson may be learn
ed through reflection on the persisting and extending
economic significance of an "old" invention such as the
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automobile in a period so rich in "new" inventions. Cliches
such as the "accelerating pace of technological advance*' ob
viously require fine-grain scrutiny in the interest of for
mulating relevant policy.
Since productivity outlook depends on technological and
other contingencies, it may always seem foolhardy to at
tempt more than a "conservative" extrapolation or minor
modification of past trends. Planning for action, public and
private, tends to discount talk about an "accelerating pace,"
especially if errors of overcommitment of resources are
penalized more heavily than errors of undercommitment.
But experimentation with explicit—detailed and timespecific—productivity forecasting is surely desirable. Fur
thermore, since implicit forecasts of productivity are being
generated whenever forecasts are made in studies that focus
specifically and explicitly on related variables, the produc
tivity implications should be recognized. Such implicit pro
ductivity forecasts merit explicit formulation for comparison
with, or for replacement of, figures derived in some other
manner.
Whatever the vocabulary one prefers, it is desirable to dif
ferentiate two kinds of forecasting and two subclasses within
each. 12 These distinctions acquire new importance with the
enlargement of governmental interest in employment levels
and price-wage relationships. One major forecast category
refers to outlook statements made by an objective or neutral
outsider—an observer who does not try to affect what he an
ticipates. The second category refers to outlook statements
that immediately involve the forecaster or his principal as an
actor—statements that are intended to be fulfilled through
the exertion of direct or indirect influence. Within the first
main class, two varieties should be differentiated: prediction
12. See I.H. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long-Run Forecasting," Journal of
Business, July 1953, pp. 141-56. This paper was prepared in the course of a study made
under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund.
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(or prophecy), which refers to unequivocal statements about
what mil happen; and projection, which refers to condi
tional (if-then) statements about the future, to the implica
tions of various assumptions that need not be (or may not
prove to be) correct. Within the second major category, we
distinguish two subdivisions: programming, relating to
statements that the forecaster or his principal attempts to
validate through manipulation of variables under direct con
trol, through use of resources and powers under command;
and propaganda, relating to statements to be fulfilled
through influence on other decisionmakers by communica
tion of information or opinion.
If a policymaker has complete control over relevant
variables and the environment, all varieties of forecast are
equivalent; and, if he can, therefore, make reliable predic
tions or prophecies, these cease to be of interest to him and
no longer need to be made. In the more usual case, projec
tions, preferably more than one alternative, are devised; and
the persons or organizations having an interest in applica
tions and outcomes pursue the one deemed "best" or most
likely of realization through programming and propaganda.
It is clear that, for the advancement of national goals, public
and private decisionmakers engage in projection, program
ming, and propaganda activities. The federal role of
"higher-system" monitor depends in some degree on the
prestige and credibility of official forecasts. Interactions and
dynamic effects that are induced by federal programming
and propaganda should ideally encourage fulfillment of
desirable forecasts (those in the "national interest") and in
hibit or counter forecasts of events deemed objectionable.
Interest in forecasting has increased greatly in recent
years, but it favors the broad economic indicators (e.g., na
tional price indexes) and such aggregates as the gross na
tional product and its major components. The shorter run
seems to attract special attention, and there is an unwar-
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ranted tendency to interpret past good estimates as evidence
of the improvement of forecasting art without reference to
the specific circumstances involved and to the many past
failures. The review of forecasting performance, however, is
a wholesome activity that is becoming more evident. On the
other hand, distinctions like those noted above among
varieties of forecasts are still far from fully appreciated. 13
Productivity forecasting in particular seems to be a weak
and neglected art—certainly in comparison to the art of
estimating the future population and labor force, which are
also important factors in the manpower-requirements
outlook. Perhaps, because the average annual increase in
output per man-hour computed for, say, the private sector is
numerically small, the task seems easy and the consequences
of error seem minor. 14
Let us look briefly at some approaches to productivity
forecasting. Econometric forecasts are hard to make because
productivity need not be significantly related in given periods
to, say, investment in plant and equipment, the growth or
supply of educated manpower, or expenditures for research
and development. Even production and employment do not
move together in the short run, and the long-run divergence
is not stable from industry to industry. 15 "Naive" forecasts,
13. On this paragraph, see, for example, Victor Zarnowitz, "How Accurate Are the
Forecasts?" Challenge, January-February 1966, pp. 20ff.; statement of G.H. Orcutt in Im
proved Statistics for Economic Growth, pp. 102-5; George Jaszi, Lawrence Grose, and
Maurice Liebenberg, Forecasting with Judgmental and Econometric Models: A Case Study
(Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1965); D.B. Suits, "An Econometric
Forecast of the Outlook for 1965," 1964 Proceedings of the Business and Economic
Statistics Section, American Statistical Association, pp. 18-21; A.M. Okun, "A Review of
Some Economic Forecasts for 1955-57," Journal of Business, July 1959, pp. 199-211; P.A.
Samuelson, "Economic Forecasting and National Policy," in The Employment Act: Past
and Future (Washington: National Planning Association, 1946), pp. 130-34; and Business
Week, January 15, 1966, pp. 19-20.
14. See remarks by Samuelson, "Economic Forecasting and National Policy," p. 133.
15. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long-Run Forecasting"; an unsigned article on
"Productivity: Key to Price Stability," Challenge, January-February 1966, pp. 24-25; and
various papers included in Manpower Implications of Automation (Washington: U.S.
Department of Labor, December 1964).
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which assume the persistence of an observed past rate of pro
ductivity increase, also lack realism. Judgmental forecasts
naturally differ according to the knowledge, intuition, com
petence, and temperament of the students making them. Re
cent experience with forecasts of the employment implica
tions of "automation," to which we have already referred,
should warn us how erratic judgment may be when not
tempered by an appreciation of history, an interest in
statistical and other evidence, a sensitivity to the difference
between technical feasibility and economic practicality, and
a concern for the eternal distinction between scholarship and
journalism.
Productivity Factor in Employment
and Production Outlook
The more deeply one is involved in forecasting manpower
and output prospects, the more troublesome becomes the
problem of choosing appropriate productivity factors. Naive
forecasts are often made; for example, the figure for the last
year or the average for a recent period is commonly ac
cepted. But a seemingly conservative approach need not lead
to realistic results, since annual productivity change is not
smooth, and an occasional decline may be experienced. Fur
thermore, even past multiyear averages vary according to the
length and the character of the period selected. Close
students of productivity are reluctant to forecast accelera
tions in the annual rate of increase16 or are content with only
16. In Measurement of Technological Change (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor,
July 1965), Solomon Fabricant, the leading student of U.S. productivity, stated that there
is no "good basis for supposing acceleration, in recent years, in the rate of technological
change" (p. 23). Fabricant prefers to estimate such change by means of a productivity in
dex for capital and labor combined, although he also cautions against belief that "there is
or ever will be a single simple measure." (Formulas for productivity referring to all
economic inputs combined were presented by Siegel in Concepts and Measurement of Pro
duction and Productivity.)
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small upward adjustments in the rate—despite strong con
trary propaganda aimed at influencing public policy.
This is an appropriate place at which to state that our
society courts needless dangers through (1) neglect of the
gaps and the more easily remediable defects in productivity
information, (2) only patchy support of nonjournalistic
research into the nature and implications of technological
currents and prospects, and (3) inadequate attention to
needs for general education on these matters for the respon
sible exercise of the functions of citizenship. Government
manpower policy could be forced massively in the wrong
direction in the absence of sufficient and more or less objec
tive information for distinguishing between a new era and a
new error. A worthy objective of public instruction is to en
dow "the people" (including bureaucrats) with enough
"sophistication" to detect the gist of a message embedded in
noise even before, say, a National Commission on
Technology, Automation, and Technological Progress
conies into being, deliberates, and prepares a report. The dif
ficulty of achievement does not diminish the importance of
dedication to such an objective, especially in a democracy.
Informed students and practitioners recognize and
acknowledge many limitations in techniques and data that
bedevil manpower forecasting. The 1965 Manpower Report
of the President, for example, observes (p. 52) that "projec
ting future manpower requirements is inherently a difficult
and hazardous undertaking, in view of the endless variety of
technological, economic, political, and other events which
may affect these requirements." An outstanding productivi
ty authority, having had occasion recently to note the ex
istence of aggregate productivity measures based on two sets
of labor-input data (i.e., "establishment" and "labor force"
figures) that do not always agree, further observed: "For
some purposes, . . . the difference is a bit of a nuisance, and
this is one of the sources of our problems, the fact that we

Productivity, Employment & Stabilization (1966)

219

don't have really very good basic statistics even on employ
ment and hours of work." 17
For at least three reasons, it would be desirable to project
manpower requirements industry by industry (ideally, within
an input-output framework) and then aggregate the results,
but this approach can be pursued only part of the way.
Detailed forecasting would permit averaging of the errors
that arise in component estimation; allow finer examination
of the prospects of particular categories of workers and of
specific occupations; and preclude intrusion of an algebraic
factor that occasionally distorts aggregate productivity
magnitudes when these are derived directly. The authority
cited above comments thus on the paucity of industry pro
ductivity series:
Nobody is preparing current statistics on produc
tivity by individual industries covering a substantial
number of industries. I do not know why there
should be such a lack of vital statistics. We need to
know more than just the average, or the figures for
just a few highly aggregated industrial groups. We
need to have some idea of the spread among dif
ferent industries. 18
Aggregate productivity estimates are frequently used in
forecasting "growth," which is commonly represented by
gross national product or private-sector output expressed in
supposedly "constant" prices. The productivity figures are
applied to labor projections in this case. In the 1965
Economic Report of the President, it is observed (p. 92) that
the rapid rise of productivity during the long expansion "is
typical of a period of improving utilization rates" and "does
not provide clear evidence that the long-term trend of pro
ductivity growth has changed." On the other hand, sustain17. Fabricant, Measurement of Technological Change, p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 21.
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ed expansion favors higher rates of investment and the in
troduction of advanced production processes, and these
changes, according to the Report, should contribute to a
"gradual" rise in the productivity trend although the net
quantitative impact "defies careful measurement."
The occasional anomalous divergence of an aggregate pro
ductivity measure from the figures for components is only
one of the many impediments to accurate forecasting. It is
also a source of confusion in the administration of wageprice policy, as will be noted again later. Thus, it is possible
for a measured rise (fall) of productivity in the private sector
as a whole to exceed (be less than) the indicated productivity
gains for the farm and nonfarm components of the sector.
Moreover, an observed anomaly of this sort may disappear
upon revision of the output statistics after it has been "ex
plained"! The "effect of intersector manpower shifts," as
this type of distortion19 is designated in the 1963 Manpower
Report of the President (p. 72), is normally positive and
hence welcomed as a source of national productivity gain.
But it can also be a source of puzzlement (and mischief),
especially if it is not shown as a separate "effect." Algebraic
bonuses, alas, cannot be distributed twice in the form of pay.

Productivity Factor in Wage-Price Policy
Government efforts to establish personal, puritanical "in
ner checks" on wages and prices once thought to be deter
mined by market forces add to the burden on existing pro
ductivity series and on forecasting techniques. The dif
ficulties surrounding establishment and administration of
guides for "responsible" wage and price decisions have fre19. The same kind of phenomenon can occur in the computation of single-industry produc
tivity measures from industry-wide output and labor series, the only data normally
available. Unfortunately, the absence of company or plant data precludes avoidance—or
analysis—of this possible distortion in productivity estimation for industries.
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quently been discussed by students fearing an evolution into
coercion of an initially voluntary system before its eventual
collapse. Some of the critics of "jawbone" controls have
become keenly aware of conundrums of productivity
measurement and interpretation that impede reasonable
determination and fair and sound application of guideposts.
As early as 1958, the President and the Council cautioned
in the Economic Report that "wage increases that go beyond
prospective productivity gains are inconsistent with a stable
price level." The word "prospective" indicated that outlook
is more relevant than trend; that any trend estimate
employed in price-wage deliberations is actually to be regard
ed as a "naive" forecast. The statement as a whole has a
more satisfactory tone, furthermore, than the guidepost ver
sion included in the 1965 Report, which seems to insist "that
the percentage increase in total employee compensation per
man-hour be equal to the national trend rate of increase in
output per man-hour." This kind of statement may
gratuitously encourage emergence of a new questionable
concept—a guaranteed annual wage increment equivalent to
the guidepost productivity percentage. Widespread expecta
tion of such an annual rise, reinforced by an annual increase
for federal workers in conformity with guideposts relating to
the private sector, 20 could easily undermine a national policy
of quasi-voluntary restraint. The language of the 1966
Report, comparable to that of the 1965 Report, also seems
less satisfactory than the wording of the 1958 statement cited
above.
Another feature of the 1958 Report is the general stress on
improvement of federal statistics, including productivity. In
20. A statement made in a National Planning Association publication, Looking Ahead,
February 1966, p. 7, ignores the inflationary potential (both direct and indirect) of annual
increases for federal workers in accordance with private-sector expectations: "The
guidelines gain in persuasiveness when the Federal government adheres to them with respect
to Federal workers."
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a special appendix on productivity, temporary and minor
discouragement was given to the emerging cause of guideline
specification—by the inclusion of (1) two sets of productivi
ty measures for the private economy and its two major com
ponents and (2) an extensive account of "problems of
measurement and meaning." Among the problems mention
ed were: the theoretical multiplicity of plausible productivity
measures, the dependence of meaning on the data and
methods actually used, the danger that an aggregate produc
tivity measure may lie outside the range of the measures for
components, the frequent need to substitute "gross" output
data for desired "net," the nebulosity of output indicators
that have to be derived by means of vaguely relevant
deflators (as in the case of the service industries and research
activity), the multiplicity of conceivable labor-input con
cepts, and the nonequivalence of labor series for hours
remunerated and hours worked.
The 1962 Economic Report of the President, which ex
plicitly advanced the guidepost concept "as a guide rather
than as a rule for appraising . . . behavior," acknowledged
existence of measurement problems and of difficulties of
choice among alternative indexes that may disagree. It noted
that year-to-year fluctuations in productivity change com
plicate the selection of a trend, and that the part of change
reflecting variation in capacity utilization should be isolated
from trend. It also made the important point that, when
comprehensive productivity measures are used as "bench
marks" for wage adjustment, allowance has to be made for
the changes they reflect in occupational composition and in
grades.
In 1965, a former chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers made reference to many inadequacies of the
statistics in his strongly critical commentary on the
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guideposts. 21 He felt that the price criterion would require
every company to know its own industry's productivity trend
in relation to aggregate experience. The present and prospec
tive condition of the public information base, however, rules
out such comparisons:
The productivity indexes now being published,
besides being often out of date, lump together a
great variety of products. In time, more detailed
and more current indexes of productivity will
doubtless be constructed, but there are limits to
what is statistically feasible. Even if measures of
this type become available for each of a thousand
or ten thousand industries, much confusion or
perplexity will still remain.
Among the additional "puzzles," he too refers to the danger
that the wage guidepost may suggest general entitlement to a
wage increase already "granted" in part through payments
reflecting an increase in average skill composition of the
work force.
Another informed student, answering an inquiry of the
Joint Economic Committee in 1965, pointed to a timeliness
gap in the reporting of data on fringe benefits, requested an
increase in the number of industries represented by in
dividual productivity indexes, and called for comparable
coverage of the hourly earnings and productivity measures.
"It would then be possible," he observed, "to estimate unit
labor costs for a larger number of industries and,
hence, ... to identify the extent to which cost pressures
develop because of higher labor costs and conversely." 22
21. A.F. Burns, "Wages and Prices by Formula?" Harvard Business Review, March-April
1965, pp. 55-64.
22. Jules Backman, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Improved Statistics for
Economic Growth, pp. 2-3.
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Suggestions on Guidelines

We conclude this essay with four suggestions, the first of
which is to consider afresh the theoretical and statistical re
quirements of an ideal guidelines system. An improved
system should be available for later "peacetime" periods in
which guidepost monitoring may seem appropriate and in
which "policy escalation" to formal wage and price control
is unwanted. Important insights for improvement would be
afforded by a patient test of the numerical differences be
tween (1) available pertinent indexes that merely satisfy the
verbal algebra and (2) ad hoc indicators for the same
variables constructed according to the principles of literal
algebraic consistency. A productivity measure derived from
aggregate information for an industry, a combination, or a
large sector need not be arithmetically equivalent to a pro
ductivity index designed for use in conjunction with others
for wages and prices. Comparisons should also be sought, of
course, for alternative wage and price measures.
The second suggestion is to consider the use of explicit
productivity forecasts (preferably "predictions") in wageprice guidelines when future quasi-voluntary efforts may
again seem warranted. Availability of both annual and
longer term forecasts would be desirable, with the more con
servative of the two figures serving as the preferred guide for
decisions in a particular year. These figures, however, should
be the same as, or compatible with, those used or implied in
estimation of the gross national product, its major com
ponents, and other key variables in the Economic Report of
the President.
Third, "real" wages deserve attention as well as
"nominal" wages in the definition of any future guidepost
policy. Unfortunately, wholesale prices seem to be of much
more interest than consumer prices in the discussion of infla-
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denary prospects. If consumer prices were introduced into
the stabilization criterion (for adjustment of the nonfringe
component of wages), greater official notice would have to
be given to, say, the type of long term inflation that has ac
tually been occurring in the services. Persistently rising prices
of services (which account nowadays for much of the
average employee's budget) stimulate new wage demands,
handicap cooperative union leaders, and typically lie beyond
the reach of federal monopsony power. Of course, cost-ofliving adjustments could not reasonably be superadded to
those based on productivity when consumer prices rise
significantly—if equity and inflation control are to be pur
sued jointly.
Finally, the wage guidepost should be restated in an
algebraically equivalent form that is simpler and has certain
clear analytical and administrative advantages. It does not
seem to be generally appreciated that the usual criterion for
assuring control of unit labor cost is the same as the follow
ing guide: that the percentage increase in payrolls should not
exceed the percentage increase in volume of output. (If the
second of the suggestions made in the preceding paragraphs
were adopted, the word "prospective" should be introduced
before "percentage increase in the volume of output.")
This restatement makes it easier to understand what to do
in the face of intersectoral shifts, changes in skill and oc
cupational mix of the work force, and the persistent in
creases in living costs. 23 Furthermore, it dramatizes the ad
jacency of the domains of the Federal Reserve Act and the
Employment Act of 1946, for monetary policy too em
phasizes the role of prospective increases in output. Accor
ding to the traditional formula for restraining inflation, "the
23. The criterion might also be adjusted to refer to "real" payrolls—to give another, more
explicit meaning to the concept of maximum "purchasing power" embodied in the
Employment Act.
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growth of the money supply must be held to a rate that ap
proximately corresponds to the expected rate of growth in
real output of goods and services." 24 A common border is
thus identified between the informal guidepost approach and
the conventional approach deemed more appropriate to con
tainment of diffused and increasing inflationary
pressures—the classic "demand-pull" situation.
24. "Guidelines Won't Do It Alone," Business Week, January 15, 1966, p. 148.

